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ABSTRACT
A Systems Perspective of the Processes and Management
of Change in Police Organisations
Neighbourhood Policing (N.P.) was first described and presented in
two undergraduate theses at the City University, London. An
experimental system was designed to test the N.P. propositions
and implementation of evaluated trials followed at selected London
and Surrey police divisions between 1982 and 1986. From this
origin, the Metropolitan and Surrey Police organisations developed
their present geographical policing systems.
The duration of the change process exceeded ten years from
specification to widespread and effective implementation of the N.P.
principles. The period of change is argued to be associated with the
process and management of change in police organisations, rather
than features of the N.P. project itself.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is argued that design of the
N.P. system was an appropriate and practical derivation of an
accurate systems analysis of the policing 'problem situation'.
Change in police organisations is the focus of this research, using
the N.P. project as an empirical study. A systems based, multi-
disciplinary approach is adopted to review the N.P. project and
evaluations, as well as to analyse the nature of organisational
change in the context of policing systems.
Chapter One introduces the subject and specifies the research
objectives. Chapters Two and Three describe details of the policing
environment, the N.P. concepts, the elements of the policing system
and the N.P. systems evaluation concept. Chapter Four reviews the
project evaluation material and advances a critical analysis of the
findings. Chapters Five, Six and Seven analyse the process of
change within policing systems, examining both organisational
issues and human characteristics. Heuristic models of the
processes, dynamics and complexity of change are proposed.
Chapter eight concludes that the systems approach, the systems
analysis and the systemic design of N.P. are all appropriate to
contemporary policing. The implementation processes and the
subsequent evaluations of N.P. are argued to have made less than
adequate contributions to the successful achievement of major
organisational change.
The research concludes by advancing a number of principles for
change management in police organisations.
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CHAPTER ONE
SummaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
This introductory chapter briefly describes the ongm and
development of the Neighbourhood PoliCing(N.P.) project within the
Surrey Police and the Metropolitan Police in London. The major
features of the policing methods are summarised and the objectives
of this research in relation to the management of change are stated.
A summary of the concluding findings is presented, together with the
resulting proposed principles of change management in police
organisations.
1.1 Introduction to the Research
1.1.1. Neighbourhood Policing (N.P.) was first described and
presented in two undergraduate theses at the City
University, London. (Hart 1981, Beckett 1981) From this
origin, the Metropolitan and Surrey Police organisations
have developed their present divisional policing systems that
now operate throughout both police areas.
1.1.2. N.P. was a 'designed system', (Checkland 1981) in that the
authors considered that the fundamental work of policing
took place from police divisions which were suggested to be
the basic organisational unit of policing. The police division
thus became the 'system of interest' (Flood and Carson
1993) and N.P. was created as a complete integrated
system, for delivering policing services from a police
division.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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1.1.3. N.P. possesses three distinct features that may be seen as
differentiating the scheme from other approaches to day to
day policing methods, although not being radical in nature in
comparison to conventional thinking on policing.
i. The police division was seen as constituting a
complete policing system. N.P. was designed to fully
integrate and harmonise all divisional policing
resources and functions into a holistic policing system.
Hitherto many such functions and processes operated
separately and independently from one another.
ii. The authors of N.P.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) suggested that existing
policing systems possessed a predominance of
'closed' organisational characteristics, whereas the
(N.P.) analysis of the police 'problem situation'
(Checkland 1972, Chapter Two) indicated they
needed to tend towards a more 'open' concept. (Katz
and Kahn 1978, Kast and Rosenzweig 1981)
iii. The response and patrol functions of police were
predominantly organised around rotating eight hour
tours of police duty. The N.P. analysis indicated that a
greater association with communities (Alderson 1979)
and improved productivity in the face of increasing
demands (Figure 2.1) might be achieved by
geographical assignments for officers, performing.
duty when demands were greatest
1.1.4.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAn experimental system was designed to test the N.P.
propositions and implementation followed at selected
London and Surrey police divisions. The trial was
evaluated by the Police Foundation (Irving et al 1989) as
the external and independent evaluators, and by an internal
police project team. (Turner 1987 [a-e]) The trials were
undertaken between 1982 and 1986 and the evaluation
reports published subsequently.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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1.1.5. Separately from the evaluation of N.P., the Metropolitan
Police Service (M.P.S.) implemented many separate
components of the N.P. system throughout London which
were established as organisational policies. (M.P.S. 1985 [a-
b], M.P.S. 1991) At the same time, individual divisional
commanders were permitted to implement local variants of
the N.P. system under the generic term 'geographic policing',
if they so wished. (M.P.S.1985[c])
1.1.6. During 1989, work commenced under the major M.P.S.
internal review process, known as the 'PLUS' programme,
(Olins 1988) to develop a further refined system of divisional
policing, based upon the N.P. principles. Force wide
implementation of what was to become known as 'sector
policing' followed during the early 1990's. (M.P.S. 1992,
M.P.S. 1994 [a])
1.1.7. Meanwhile, the Surrey Police were implementing their
version of the N.P. scheme that was known as 'Total
Geographic Policing'. (T.G.P.) This was developed and
refined to the present system that is known as 'Area' or
'Local' Policing. (Annual Reports of the Chief Constable of
Surrey 1985 - 1992)
1.1.8. This process took place over a period of approximately ten
years between the original specification of the N.P. policing
system and effective implementation of the principles. The
widespread implementation took place despite what will be
shown to be, substantially negative evaluations of both the
elements of the project and its systematic attributes.
1.1.9. It wi" be argued that design of the N.P. system was an
appropriate, and practical derivation from an accurate
systems analysis of the policing 'problem situation'.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.)
The subsequent experimentation and development process
leading to widespread implementation, may be considered
as lengthy in terms of organisational change programmes,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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even for large organisations such as the Metropolitan and
Surrey Police. So why, given the problems facing the police
during the early 1980s, (Chapter Two) did it take almost ten
years to implement the organisational changes?
1.1.10. The process of change in police organisations is thus the
focus of this research, using the N.P. project as the
practical case study. A multi-disciplinary, systems based
approach (Cummings 1980) is adopted to review the N.P.
project, the subsequent evaluations and to examine the
nature of organisational change in the context of policing
systems.
1.2 Objectivesof the Research
1.2.1. There are three principal objectives of this research that may
be considered as integrative of the subject matter and are
considered as major sections of the research. Six
supplementary objectives contribute to the principal
objectives and address specific aspects of the subject
matter.
1.2.2. The objectives and their relationships are specified below
and are summarised in the flow chart model at Figure 1.1.
i. to undertake a multi-disciplinary review of the
implementation and outcomes of the N.P. scheme,
ii. to undertake a multi-disciplinary review of the factors
and processes significant to the management of
change in organisations,
iii. to advance conclusions and to suggest models and/or
principles, if possible, for change management in
police organisations.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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1.2.3. The following supplementary objectives contribute to the
achievement of the above principal objectives in the
relationships shown at Figure 1.1: .
i. to specify the N.P. principles and design
ii. to consolidate and summarise the substantial volume
of evaluation material relating to N.P. experimentation
and to draw any general conclusions,
iii. to review and comment upon the evaluation methods
and processes and their appropriateness to both the
N.P. project and the subsequent organisational
development,
iv. to undertake a systems analysis of the processes of
organisational change,
v. to propose heuristic models of the major factors
involved in the change processes in police
organisations,
vi. to compare the outcomes from the N.P. experiment
with the results of the analysis of the organisational
change processes.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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To compare outputs from the
N.P.experiment to the
results of the systems
analysis of organisational change
26zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Figure 1.1 Flow Chart Model of Relationships between Principal
and Supplementary Objectives
To undertake a
multi-disciplinary
review of the implementation
and outcomes of N.P.
To undertake a
nulti-disciplinary review of the
factors and processes
significant to the
management of change in
organisations
To specify the N.P. principles
and design
To consolidate and summarise
r- the N.P. evaluations
Io review and comment upon the
'- N.P. evaluation processes
To undertake a systems analysis
of the processes of
organisational change
and to relate this analysis
police organisations
To propose heuristic models
of the major factors
involved in the change
process in police organisations
./
To advance conclusions
and suggest models and/or
principles for change in
police organisations
( s~~zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAJ ~~~ ~ .. _~_.;:_:_~__.
1.3 Sequenceof Presentation
1.3.1. Chapter Two describes the environment in which policing
was taking place during the 1970's and thus sets the
background against which 'Neighbourhood Policing' (N.P.)
was developed.
1.3.2. The characteristics of the elements and sub-systems of the
N.P. system are described, together with the systems
principles that underscored the overall project. The chapter
concludes at the point where decisions were made within
both the Surrey and Metropolitan Police to run a major,
evaluated trial of the new policing system.
1.3.3. Chapter Three expands upon the N.P. project
implementation principles and describes the original
experimental design that relied upon the existence of a
'control condition'. Following changes to the wider
organisation that precluded the retention of such a design,
the principles of the project are set in the context of a fresh
evaluation model.
1.3.4. The NP project approach considers a macro, or system level
of functioning and a micro or behavioural level of analysis to
be appropriate. This dualist approach to evaluation is
discussed in detail and argument is advanced as to why the
chosen approach was considered to be satisfactory in the
light of organisational development.
1.3.5. Chapter Four describes the systems approach to the
implementation of the N.P. treatments. The concept of
delivery systems for the implementation of change are
introduced and the relationship between the strategic aims
of N.P. and policing sub-systems are described.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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1.3.6. The evaluations of the trials of N.P. are reviewed within the
context and purpose of the delivery systems and judgements
and conclusions are made on the basis of the available
evidence as to the benefits of the outputs.
1.3.7. It is concluded that N.P. was not judged to be an overall
success. It is asserted that this outcome is equivocal and
more likely to have occurred as a result of the process of
change and implementation, rather than:
i. the systems approach adopted,
ii. the appropriateness of the N.P. strategy,
iii. the design of the individual elements.
1.3.8. Chapter 5 is the first stage in the development of the series
of models that build towards a system of change in police
organisations. The desirability of adopting the systems
approach is justified in the light of the contemporary schools
of management thinking and the absence of any unifying or
overarching theories of change.
1.3.9. A macro model of change is proposed that comprises three
major elements of the change process,
i. the stimuli for change,
ii. the target for change,
iii. the type of implementation.
1.3.10. Each element of the macro model is analysed in turn and the
attributes are examined in relation to other relevant
contemporary work. Models of three basis implementation
methods are discussed and variations are advanced.
Comparative advantages and disadvantages are examined
in the police system context.
28
1.3.11. Chapter Six considers the significance of the outputs from
an individuals' psycho social sub system to the process of
change. A manager's process model of change is derived
and the conflicts and contrasts present in the organisational
change process are examined from a managers'
perspective.
1.3.12. The issue of resistance to organisational change arising
from both organisational and human factors is discussed
and a model of an individual's dynamic response to the
process of change is advanced. The predominant skills and
needs of individuals are examined in relation to various
stages of change and these are related to the three change
targets suggested in Chapter Five.
1.3.13. The resulting complexity of the change process is noted and
described in the context of the 'change cube' model.
1.3.14. The elements of the suggested system of organisational
change are summarised and restated in Chapter Seven in
order to lead to models of the dynamics of change at the
overall police organisational level. The models are described
in the context of the implementation options advanced in
Chapter Five and developed in order to advance a model of
the N.P. implementation process.
1.3.15. From this position, a model of a system of change for police
organisations is advanced. It is argued that this system is
inherently complex, thus presenting considerable challenges
in order to bring about change.
1.3.16. Individuals' motivation to change is described in the context
of a system of motivation, which is developed into an
analysis of the options available to police managers for
implementing change.
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1.3.17. The concluding Chapter Eight of this research, suggests
there are five possible explanations for the apparent
divergence between the findings of the N.P. evaluators and
contemporary policing practice.
1.3.18. It is concluded that whilst the N.P. systems approach,
analysis and design were generally appropriate, the
implementation methods were not adequate in the face of
considerable individual and organisational resistance to the
changes.
1.3.18. It is further concluded that the N.P. evaluations were too
narrow in scope to be of value to the organisations
concerned, and thus implementation of the principles of
N.P. continued within both the Metropolitan and Surrey
Police.
1.3.19. The research concludes by deriving and proposing six
principles for the introduction and management of change in
police organisations.
1.3.20. It is noted that the principles and characteristics of N.P. are
now fully implemented throughout the Metropolitan and
Surrey Police areas.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1.4 Summaryof Findings
1.4.1. The five categories of suggested explanations of the
outcomes of the N.P. project may be summarised as follows:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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i. N.P. Systems Analysis - is argued as being an
accurate and appropriate representation of the problem
situation and the extemal change stimuli that N.P.
sought to address. (Chapters Two and Three)
ii. N.P. Systems Design - is argued to be appropriate as
a 'designed system' (Checkland 1981) and directed at
relevant change targets, having the potential for
improving the police problem situation.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.)
iii. N.P. Systems Implementation - is shown to be
inadequate in a number of significant respects in the
light of the knowledge of high levels of individual and
cultural resistance to change within police
organisations.
iv. N.P. Evaluations - are shown as not having addressed
the significant holistic and integrative features of N.P.,
or the change dynamics within police organisations.
Thus it is concluded that the evaluations have not fully
and reliably represented the outcomes of the N.P.
trials.
v. N.P. Systems Approach - there no evidence to
emerge from the N.P. project that weakens the original
assertions (Section 2.16) that systems thinking and
approaches offer the best opportunities for improving
the design and performance of policing organisations.
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1.4.2. This research proposes that a number of principles of
change management might be established that are
particularly significant to the implementation of change in
policing systems, as follows:
i. effective internal staff communications and effective
external public communications,
ii. active senior and intermediate management support for
the vision and changes proposed,
iii. effective change leadership at all levels,
iv. change implementation co-ordinated simultaneously
across all change targets; systems, structures and
culture.
v. the use of a combination of coercive and participative
approaches to change implementation.
vi. the creation andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAlor devel p ent of internal teams to
manage change,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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CHAPTER TWO
SummaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
This chapter describes the environment in which policing was taking
place during the 1970's and thus sets the background against which
'Neighbourhood Policing' (N.P.) was developed. The characteristics
of the elements and sub-systems of the N.P. system are described,
together with the systems principles that underscored the whole
project. The chapter concludes at the point where decisions were
made within both the Surrey and Metropolitan Police to runzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa major,
evaluated trial of the new policing system.
2.1 InTheBeginning
2.1.1. The origin of 'Neighbourhood Policing' was quite
unremarkable. It arose from the general dissatisfaction of
two young police inspectors with their respective
organisations. At the time, this dissatisfaction was probably
nothing more than the commonplace grumbling of most
working individuals. These grumblings gradually developed
into the more structured notion that some recognition should
be taken of the experience of policing schemes and
initiatives of the past in order to develop a fresh way forward
for contemporary policing. These thoughts coincided with the
opportunity for both officers to undertake three year
scholarships to The City University London. Inspector Ian
Beckett (now Assistant Chief Constable of the Surrey
Police) to read Psychology and the writer, Systems and
Management.
2.1.2. The opportunity was thus presented by way of
undergraduate dlssertanons to say something about the
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nature of policing and to propose a model of a policing
system that had at least the theoretical potential to correct
some of the problems as they ~re seen. ThezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtwo theses
that formed complementary halves of the project were
completed and submitted during March 1981 and were
subsequently entitled 'Neighbourhood Policing'.
2.1.3. During the Autumn of 1981 the Metropolitan Police and the
Surrey Constabulary agreed to collaborate with a view to
running an experimental scheme based upon the theses. A
police project team comprising the authors, police staff and
researchers was established and the Police Foundation
were invited to be the evaluators.
2.1.4. This was the beginning of a major effort by the two
organisations to endeavour to examine and change the
style of delivery of policing services. The experimental
process was to last until January 1986 with final conclusions
and recommendations being made in 1987.The outcome of
this extensive process is that today, both the Surrey
Constabulary and the Metropolitan Police operate a system
of 'geographic' or 'sector' policing based upon the original
Neighbourhood Policing Project.
2.2 The Policing Environment of the 19705
2.2.1. Policing during the 1960's and 1970's was characterised in
both rural and urban environments by major developments in
communications technology. Unit beat policing (U.P.B.), as it
was known, was introduced virtually nation-wide in order to
capitalise on the introduction of personal radios for patrolling
officers both on foot and in the ubiquitous panda cars. The
idea simply enough, was to free patrolling officers from the
repetitive burden of contacting their base station by public
telephones at pre-determined intervals, a practice
colloquially known as 'making points'. The personal radio
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allowed officers to be directed quickly to the scene of an
incident and provided a great deal of personal security for
officers when patrolling alone. This simple technological
development however, irreversibly changed the style and
nature of policing in the United Kingdom. On one hand the
public's expectation of a rapid response to their calls for
assistance increased markedly. The patrolling officers' job
became one of providing a more reactive service than
hitherto, and in so doing officers became more distant from
the communities they were policing. Thus the major
development of the mid sixties had turned into a major
problem by the late seventies.
2.2.2. The public, as well as a growing number of interested and
informed observers were beginning to scrutinise and
question police activity in a far more searching way than
hitherto, especially in urban conurbations. Police officers
were increasingly seen as becoming remote characters only
associated with law enforcement activities and bad news.
(Whitaker 1979) The demise of traditional policing was
blamed on the panda car which by the late seventies had
become an indispensable tool to meet the exponential
increase in public demands for police services. Despite this
major alteration in the way policing was being delivered, little
in the way of internal management changes were occurring
inside police organisations.
2.2.3. A number of regional amalgamations had occurred
throughout the nineteen seventies, largely to capitalise on
the economies of scale and to do away with some very
small, and cost inefficient police forces. However, nothing
had occurred in terms of structures or systems to re-shape
the operational aspects of police organisations for the future.
Police forces remained largely bureaucratic, hierarchically
managed autocracies, based loosely on a traditional military
model. Yet, by 1980 it was becoming increasingly clear not
only to the authors of N.P. , but also to a number ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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observers both inside and outside the police that dramatic
organisational changes were likely to become necessary.
2.2.4. Changes were especially necessary to increase the amount
of contact between police officers and the public they were
charged to serve. This problem of an widening 'distance'
between police and public was becoming increasingly
apparent in major conurbation's more so than in more rural
areas, although there is some evidence to suggest that
many rural communities who had been traditionally served
by their village constable were becoming increasingly
discontent with the U.B.P. system.
2.2.5. Essentially, U.B.P. amounted to a panda car arriving at
regular intervals, known in advance, and parking in a
prominent position in a village or small town where the
constable might be available to the public. Inevitably the
officers' visits became less frequent, less predictable and
generally more unreliable as the demands from the
personal radio sent him or her elsewhere to calls for
assistance.
2.2.6. It quickly became established in police culture that the
priority was to respond to the radio calls, rather than to
spend time involved in the daily problems of a community. In
the absence of any clear prioritisation from management
levels, the demand/react culture quickly took hold. This
approach offered a much more exciting prospect for officers.
It enabled them to absorb the variety and excitement brought
by mobility, rather than to spend often long, lonely hours
patrolling an area where seemingly nothing was happening
and nobody needed a police officer. (Keeton 1975)
2.2.7. Although U.B.P. was not adopted in london in precisely the
same ways as the provinces, the broad philosophy was
understood and this resulted in much of the patrol activity
taking place in the ubiquitous 'panda car'. (Critchley 1978)
This contributed to the london policing culture whereby thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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police increasingly saw themselves as the arbiters of good
and bad public behaviour. Policing focused on law
enforcement activities that wer~ reinforced by the law,
management systems and the hierarchy. Productivity meant
more arrests and summonses with an emphasis upon
dealing quickly with whatever demands the time of day
could produce. This style of policing not only isolated the
law abiding public from the police but had a much more
damaging effect on many minority groups who increasingly
felt marginalised by police. In many cases, ethnicity was
associated with criminality in a very negative way and used
as justification for police intervention. (Smith 1983 et al)
2.2.8. This situation, that was becoming increasingly acute by the
early 1980's, culminated with the riots in Brixton in April of
1981. (Scarman 1981)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2.3zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAn Emerging Philosophy
2.3.1. The events at Brixton had the effect of focusing much
attention on the environmental preconditions as well as the
policing methods that were to be subsequently criticised by
the enquiry. (Scarman 1981) However, Alderson (1979), as
the Chief Constable of the Devon and Cornwall Police had
recognised the potential problem situation and described in
considerable detail the issues as he saw them. He
concluded that there was a need for a radical reform of
policing in a modem, pluralist, democratic society. His
ideas of 'community policing' influenced a great deal of
thinking about pOlicingat the time (and indeed controversy).
Alderson's work amounted to a philosophy of policing but did
not go on to suggest any sort of system or organisational
model that made clear how his style of policing could be
delivered. He did however set out ten objectives for policing
that would steer a police organisation away from the
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conventional legalistic model of operation. He further
proposed a number of features of the new style of policing.
2.3.2. Alderson's (1979) ideas of 'community policing' suggested
there would be little prospect of containing criminality to
publicly acceptable levels unless the police worked jointly
with the public to tackle crime. He argued that unless the
trend of increasing police isolation was reversed and the
police stopped seeing themselves as the only significant
interveners in the law and order problem, then there would
be little hope of "....zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtransforming the seed-beds of criminal
behaviour .... ". His solution, whilst short of specifying a
system for delivery or intervention in the problem situation,
was to suggest that police must be proactive within
communities and be active in stimulating "....healthy and
constructive social endeavour ... ". This was the proposition
that gave rise to the much misused expression 'community
policing'. The expression is generally taken to mean
proactive police involvement in communities outside a
straightforward legalistic or reactive police role.
2.3.3. 'Policing Freedom' (Alderson 1979) was a milestone in
police thinking and indeed many of the changes that have
been brought about since that time can trace their
philosophical origin to this work. His views were derived
from concern about the nature of 'police accountability' - a
phrase that was to dominate debates on policing issues
throughout the nineteen eighties. (Jefferson and Grimshaw
1984, Stephens 1988, Feilding 1991)
2.3.4. Much of the research (Alderson 1979, Whitaker 1979,
Mawby 1979) that was undertaken in the preparatory stages
of N.P. indicated that police have a vital role to play in
assisting a community to deal with crime and social disorder
itself.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt ee ed th t the police should be acting as
motivators and facilitators, so providing skilled assistance to
communities in the areas of crime prevention and social
attempts to control crime.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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2.3.5. It therefore became a principle of the N.P. project, albeit not
original, that crime control was not exclusively a police
responsibility. Consideration of the resources available to
police suggested that the only viable remaining source that
was essentially untapped was the communities themselves.
This implied a return to the traditional concept of a contract
between the police and the public tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA\\'Ork together in the
maintenance of public order and the prevention of crime.
2.4 TheReactiveLoop
2.4.1. The authors of N.P. were aware of the analysis of Alderson
and others, as well as their conclusions, but it was apparent
that a similar conclusion could be reached by a quantitative
examination of the nature of demands on police.
2.4.2. It has already been noted that unit beat policing had
significantly altered the nature of police patrol activity,
(Critchley 1978) and it was evident that U.B.P. had also
contributed to increased public access to police services and
thus an increased level of public demands on police.
(Alderson 1979). It was equally evident that police
resources had not increased at a corresponding rate, or
were likely to in the future, given the rate of increase of
crime and demands on police. (Hart 1981). The result was
that police officers spent an increasingly large proportion of
time responding to calls at the cost of what might be
described as the preventive aspects of policing. (Critchley
1978)
2.4.3. This straightforward proposition was the starting point for
N.P. and was described as the 'reactive spiral' in the original
thesis, although the model is more akin to a loop. In
summary, this central tenet of the project asserted that when
apparently free police services are offered, the demands forzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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such services will invariably meet and exceed the
organisation's capacity to respond. Even when additional
resources are provided, the demand for services will again
outstrip resources, unless a significant proportion of these
new resources are directed towards preventing crime.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 2.1 The Reactive Loop
2.4.4. Figure 2.1 shows this process in the form of a signed di-
graph. The model illustrates that as the level of police
resources reacting to incoming demands from the public
increases, so the police capacity (or opportunity) to attend to
preventive measures decreases. Thus the link is a negative
or inhibiting relationship. As police attention to preventive
measures falls, so the rate of crime and the degree of public
disorderliness increases as a positive or augmenting
relationship. As the crime rate increases, so the positive link
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to demands on police is established and the level of
resources devoted to reacting to demands is augmented by
this effect.
2.4.5. This process described by the model thus established an
escalating system of demands on police that was suggested
to spiral higher on each iteration of the model through time.
Implicit in the model are time lags between the elements, the
duration of which would predominantly depend upon the
policing environment in which the system is operating. For
instance, in a supportive policing environment with
proportionally few active criminals, police preventive
measures are likely to be effective sooner than in a more
hostile environment where crime and criminals are more
prevalent. Similarly, levels of police resources reacting to
incoming demands are more likely to quickly reach maximum
capacity in a hostile environment, than those in a more
supportive area.
2.4.6. Although the process described by the model by no means
provides a complete explanation of the balance police must
achieve between prevention and reaction, it did provide a
sufficiently powerful focus for the subsequent direction of
N.P. project development.
2.4.7. If the police were to intervene in the 'reactive spiral' by
introducing an inhibiting effect on the system in order to
control the seemingly unending escalation, then it was
apparent that either:
i. substantial new resources would be required, or
ii. the police would have to find some way of both limiting
future demands and managing existing demands more
efficiently,
2.4.8. It was clear that additional resources on the scale that would
be necessary would be both politically and economicallyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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unacceptable, as well as being unlikely to provide a long
term solution. The model implied that public demand would
almost certainly increase to a point where the benefit of all
additional resources would be absorbed by the public's
insatiable consumption of 'apparently free' public services.
Therefore the N.P. project focused on ways in which the
second option (ii) might be realised.
2.5 Interveningin the Loop
2.5.1. The authors returned to Alderson's concept of community
policing as providing a possible solution. It was accepted by
Alderson (and has been subsequently validated, Scarman
1981, Smith 1983, Stephens 1988), that the police can only
operate effectively with the consent and support of the
majority of the public. He went on to suggest that the
traditional link of a contract between the professional police
and the general public provided the only realistic means of
limiting crime and anti-social behaviour in a democratic
society. Therefore the first proposition of N.P. was to re-
establish the publics' obligation to support and actively
assist their police. This proposition additionally served to
emphasise that police were not solely responsible for
combating increases in crime, but rather the responsibility
was shared. Additionally, the idea was introduced that there
was a realistic limit to police capability and that it was
necessary to prioritise police activity. • Although
straightforward, this amounted to a radical departure in
police thinking that had traditionally accepted that the
service would respond to whatever was demanded of it.
2.5.2. Acceptance of a limit upon police capability, together with
the publics' obligation to help, lead to the idea that the public
cannot continue to make unrestricted demands on the police.
This implied that the public should become actively involved
in the maintenance of public order and the prevention of
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crime, thus to some extent helping themselves, rather than
increasingly relying on the professional police.
2.5.3. Two difficulties were posed by this approach. Firstly, how far
can a community actually contribute to policing activities?
Secondly, how might a police organisation motivate and
control their assistance?
2.5.4. The suggestion that the general public or a concerned
community should, or even must, assist police in their work,
raises the question of what exactly is police work, what do
police officers actually do and how might the public assist?
2.5.5. The project's investigation into police work, especially at the
uniformed beat constable's level concluded that police
actions could be described as:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...behaviour that benefits other people by providing the
type of help or assistance tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa victim f crime or other
anti-social actions, that might reasonably be expected
from a concerned fellow citizen. II (Beckett 1981 pg. 151)
This description of the behaviour of uniformed beat patrol
officers led to the answer to the above question and the
second, but embarrassingly simple proposition, that
essentially police officers help people, especially the victims
of crime.
2.5.6. In effect this meant that preventive policing involved taking
steps to prevent people from becoming victims of crime or
other anti-social acts. The conclusion that police officers
help people thus began to suggest a direction for police
strategy and training. Also implied by this proposition was
that in order to assist the police, members of a community
should assist their neighbours if they were victims of crime
or were likely to become so.
2.5.7. Research carried out as a part of the N.P. project (Beckett
1981) indicated that where there is a viable community,
there seems to be a lower incidence of street crime.
Additionally, where police encourage the public to help each
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other and are responsive to reasonable community
demands, satisfaction with police is enhanced. This being
indicated by lower levels of complaints against police.
However, probably most importantly, where such
communities exist, there appears to be a lower level of
public demand for police response services.
2.6 ThePoliceProblemSituation
2.6.1. The project thus determined that the problem situation to be
tackled by the police would be to design a policing strategy
and system that balanced these positive attributes with the
need to maintain an adequate response to public demands.
In addition, it was suggested, police officers would need to
be motivated to work within the strategy and initially
stimulate a community to voluntarily play their part in
assisting police.
2.6.2. In other words, what was needed was a delivery system to
operationalise Alderson's (1979) community policing
philosophy. In turn, the delivery system' would require a
change in police officers behaviours and operational
practices to bring about and sustain the new approach.
2.6.3. It was suggested that in troublesome or difficult urban areas,
as well as less hostile environments, there would be little
need for radical change to existing policing melhods. Rather,
the approach should be to systematically plan the well
proven policing methods and incorporate them into a system
that was designed to place an emphasis on preventive
policing.
2.6.4. To this end, many past policing systems and experiments
were examined in an attempt to discover how they might
benefit modern strategies and which particular aspects of
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those systems were clearly not beneficial to more modern
approaches.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2.7 StrategicPrinciplesof NeighbourhoodPolicing
2.7.1. As a result of this work the N.P. project proposed a policing
strategy that broadly relied upon the following principles:-
i. Emphasis upon the use of proven and tested methods,
including the extensive use of uniform foot patrols, yet
still providing the publicly expected rapid response to
requests for assistance and the ability to maintain
public order.
ii. Flexibility within the strategy to allow local command to
reflect local needs, according to a broad policy
framework.
iii. The involvement of the maximum number of police
officers in everyday police work to enhance community
understanding and contact, also to reduce to a
minimum the worst organisational effects of over
specialisation
iv. The preservation of the service element of traditional
policingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
v. The efficient use of information fed back from the
community in everyday policing
vi. The development of existing training methods to
establish more positive police attitudes towards the
public, particularly in younger officers.
45
2.8 TheCharacteristics of the NPSystem
2.8.1. The characteristics of the NP system were as follows:
i. operational police officers should understand the
problems of their station area in a wider context than
previously,
ii. they should have the necessary flexibility and
motivation to respond to those problems and needs,
iii. they should have the ability to utilise all police
resources to that end,
iv. they should involve other service agencies and the
public themselves to tackle identified problems,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
v, they must be responsive to management controls.
2.9 The Neighbourhood Policing Sub-systems
2.9.1. In order to realise the design of a model characterised by the
foregoing principles, the following sub-systems were
suggested as necessary for the new policing system:
i. a source of data for the evaluation of dayzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAto day police
work and the problems against which it was directed,
(This being necessary in order to ascertain
requirements, assist decision making, aid planning
and measure effectiveness for feedback purposes.)
ii. an organisational structure to facilitate flexibility and
motivation at the lowest operational levels, yet still
responsive and accountable to local management,
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iii. a means of achieving an appropriate balance between
response and preventive policing,
iv. a network to gather information from the community,
v. a means of stimulating and controlling the community's
active participation.
2.9.2. In order to illustrate how the above elements might be
practically applied and co-ordinated, the project described
how the overall strategy could be implemented at a single
police station. Essentially, this was to be the 'Neighbourhood
Policing System' in its original form.
2.9.3. The strategy was described in four categories as follows:
i. Evaluation
ii. Management
iii. Training
iv. Operations
2.10 Evaluation
2.10.1. What was then described as a "low cost, desk-top" computer
would be installed at the selected police station. This was to
accumulate information from the incoming station demand
messages (message pad) and the daily duty state (record of
the duty and disposition of patrolling officers). The computer
system would provide the following outputs:
i. location and type of the heaviest workloads,
ii. summaries of the actual workloads at the station,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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iii. an analysis of the effective manpower and its capacity
to deal with this work,
iv. a duty state summary and overtime returns.
2.10.2. Additionally, it was suggested that surveys of the public
should be undertaken in order to identify existing or viable
communities and to assess the external effect of the policing
strategy.
2.10.3. Schematically, the inputs and outputs to the M.I.S. computer
system were described as follows:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
------_zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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'------- __ J
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Figure 2.2 Inputs to and Outputs from the
Management Information System
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2.11.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAManageme tzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2.11.1. Management information generated by the above system
was to be analysed at the police station by a unit set up for
the purpose to be known as the Divisional Information Unit
(D.I.U.) The aim was to determine the most effective
resource deployment patterns, having regard to existing
communities, or where communities needed to be
developed.
2.11.2. Using this analysis, the ground covered by the station would
be roughly divided into two parts, or sectors. The existing
four shifts ('reliefs') of police officers that provided the
current response to demands from the public would retain
their separate unit structure. But, two of the teams would
have special responsibility for one sector of the police
station area, whilst the other two would take responsibility
for the remaining portion of the area. This was shown
schematically as follows:
r-hhh--hh--{ OffIcerszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn Charge of Pollee Stilt/on Area }---h-------h--l
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
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: (re/iefs) (re/iefs):
: ;-- each under an ~ f each under an ~ :zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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!zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBASECTOR ~' SECTOR 'B' !
, ,
: I
: :
: :
: :
: :
, ,
, ,
:---------------- J
Figure 2.3 Geographic Responsibility for Teams
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2.11.3. The home beat officers (H.B.O.s) who traditionally had been
associated with small beat areas on police divisions were to
be attached to one or other of the appropriate reliefs and re-
titled permanent beat officers (P.B.O.s). They had hitherto
worked in a separate unit within a police division, not under
the direct command of the relief inspectors.
2.11.4. Each relief together with the P.B.O.s were to form a team
under their inspector and sergeants, who in turn were to be
allocated specific geographic responsibility within their
sector of the police station area. When each team of officers
worked their normal eight hour shift (tour of duty), the
constables apart from the P.B.O.s were to provide the
response policing for the whole station area, allocating any
remaining unassigned patrol capability to their own sector.
This was the most straightforward of the deployment options
and is shown diagramatically at Figure 2.4.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 2.4 Alternating Teams Provide Complete Policing
for the Whole Station Area.
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2.11.5. A number of systems were devised to ensure that each
sector received special patrol attention from a group of
officers working on alternating rei lefs, with a normal pattern
of rest days. They varied in complexity from the most
straightforward shown above to some enormously elaborate
variations.
2.11.6. However, in practical terms, all the variations were designed
to ensure that the whole area covered by the police station
would at all times receive the same, or even an improved
level of police service than conventionally provided at that
time. In addition there would be a daily, planned, co-
ordinated and concentrated application of available police
resources towards the more long term problems within each
sector of the station area.
2.11.7. Within the context of above model, the inspector, sergeants
and constables who have specific geographic responsibility
would be expected to initiate contact with members of their
local communities and be personally known to a large
number of residents. It was envisaged that during the early
stages of implementation, this aspect of the strategy would
rest mainly with the P.B.O.s, supported and directed by the
relief supervisors. (sergeants and inspectors)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2.11.B. The inspectors' role was considered to be vital. It was
emphasised that the major responsibilities for harmonising,
co-ordinating and controlling the sector teams would rest
with inspectors generally, although it was suggested that the
more senior of each pair of inspectors would be responsible
for the function of co-ordinating police initiatives in his or her
respective sector.
2.11.9. Although the project put forward this outline model for an
organisational structure to support the main objectives of the
project, it was emphasised throughout that a number of
options for management strategies existed. It was stated that
the model proposed was only a framework that might bezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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adapted to suit local needs. The important issue was that the
basic philosophy was to be adopted. It was seen as vital that
officers started to identify with an area of ground when they
were on duty, rather than merely the eight hour period of
duty as hitherto. The inevitability was recognised that
detailed adaptations would be necessary to suit local
conditions and manpower levels and it was suggested that
such decisions would best be made at the local (divisional)
level.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2.12 Training
2.12.1. Consideration of the scale and scope of the necessary
changes led to the view that an extensive training
programme would be necessary as a crucial factor in
introducing and maintaining the new system.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt was stated
that before the suggested (or similar) structures could be
implemented with the associated new responsibilities, it
would be essential for all officers to havezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAH... the right attitude
towards contact with the community. H Additionally, they
would also need to be competent in their behaviour, whilst
maintaining close contact with the public and dealing with
day to day policing problems.
2.12.2. These aims were to be achieved by specially designed
training which would have two main functions:-
i. to develop favourable police attitudes towards the
service tradition of policing and,
ii. to teach the skills required to obtain compliance of the
public without resort to force.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 2.5 Sequence of Training and Selection
2.12.3. As shown in Figure 2.5, all officers were to receive a
preparatory training course, but the selected permanent beat
officers would receive further training, as would those who
found some difficulty in displaying the skills required to deal
effectively with the public. Inspectors and sergeants were to
receive a management course in addition, that would
essentially address those new skills that would be required
for the neighbourhood policing system.
2.13. Operations
2.13.1. In order to produce an efficient and effective policing
service, the reactive loop model (Figure 2.1) suggests that it
will be necessary to establish a balance between the police
station manpower devoted to the community beats and that
applied to response policing. This means that the volume of
demands entering the police station would have to be dealt
with in a satisfactory manner. Satisfactory in this context
meaning that demands should not receive cursory or
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impersonal police attention as suggested to have been the
outcome of the U.B.P. system. (Critchley 1978)
2.13.2. The permanent beat officers, supervised by their respective
sector sergeants, would be allocated to specific community
beats in accordance with the information previously obtained
during the pre-implementation phase. They would then
prepare an in depth study of their own beat, gathering
information for this purpose from a wide variety of sources.
Using this study, the team inspector would make decisions
as to the specific policing tasks to be tackled and the tactics
to be applied to each beat. The duties of the P.B.O.s were to
be organised in conjunction with these tactics and also in
such a way that it was ensured that the P.B.O.s spent some
of their duty time working with their sector team.
2.13.3. The P.B.O.s were then to be directed to achieve close
contact with the community, especially the local youth in
their groups and gangs. Local residents were to be
encouraged to volunteer for such activities as victim support
schemes and to serve as special constables within their
community. The main thrust was to come from the P.B.O.s,
but with the encouragement and support of their supervisors
who were also to have particular responsibility for achieving
and supervising specific community tasks.
2.13.4. Contact should be established with existing residents'
associations or similar groups, and their formation shoutd be
encouraged. The inspectors working with the P.B.O.s would
then establish a formal information link between themselves
and the residents' associations or groups. The information
so obtained enabling the inspectors to make decisions and
where appropriate, recommendations concerning the
policing tactics in their particular community or sector.
2.13.5. During this period, the officer in charge of the police station
was to have developed the inspectors and other senior
officers into a management team. Through this team he or
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she would provide direction and advice as to the progress of
the overall strategy at the operational level. Thus it was
suggested, all activities would be co-ordinated,
2.13.6. It was noted that detective officers from the criminal
investigation department (C.I.D.) would also have to
participate in this planning in order to ensure that their
operations and day to day work were harmonised with the
new policing strategy.
2.13.7. Another important responsibility at the police station level
would be for the officer in charge to ensure that the day to
day activities of other relevant agencies were co-ordinated
with the police strategy at the operational level. For instance,
social services departments, probation and after eare etc.
2.13.8. It was recognised that above the operational level, a similar
team comprising the most senior officers of the police station
would need to ensure that all police activity was co-
ordinated and that the loeal strategy and policies were
based upon the information being provided by the policing
system.
2.13.9. The model shown at Figure 2.6 summarises this team
approach to police station managementthat links operational
issues to command strategies. The operations level is
commanded by inspectors who are members of the police
station (or divisional) management team that is commanded
by either a superintendent or chief superintendent. The
superintendent or chief superintendent is then in tum a
member of the higher level command team that sets
strategies for the whole police force or area.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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OPERATIONSzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
FigurezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2.6 The Team Appro ch to Police Station Management
2.13.10. This simply expressed notion of linking teams represented
a considerable departure from the more conventional,
hierarchical organisational chart traditionally associated
with the management structures and processes of police
forces.
2.13.11. Neighbourhood policing envisaged that the policy
formulated by this process should be expanded to influence
policy decisions made by all other agencies who provide
any kind of service to communities. It seemed that many of
the problems that police routinely tackled in urban
environments were only likely to be resolved by a joint
approach by statutory agencies. Alderson (1979) suggested
that although the police were the primary preventers of
crime, they also should have a vested interest in the work
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of other statutory agencies whose work touches upon crime
and associated matters.
2.13.12. The record of co-operation between various agencies had
not been reported as especially satisfactory beyond local
arrangements. Whitaker (1979) provides evidence of the
isolation of police from other agencies, and Alderson (1979)
made similar assertions citing the Maria Colwell Inquiry
(D.H.S.S. 1974) as an example of a lack of effective
communication·and liaison between agencies. Despite this
apparent parochialism of the statutory agencies it seemed
to the authors of N.P. that the police should take the lead in
stimulating effective joint problem solving, as only through
such an approach could problems be tacked in their
entirety, rather than from a solely law enforcement
perspective.
2.13.13. Where agency policies were incompatible, it was proposed
that the police should make attempts to convince the other
parties as to the value of a co-ordinated approach. It was
considered that liaison with local political figures would be
important in this regard. (Beckett and Hart 1981) The
political will to achieve a co-ordinated approach seemed
important. The reluctance of statutory agencies to become
involved in joint approaches to problems, albeit
understandable, was not producing sustainable solutions to
local problems that were seen by the N.P. authors and
others as necessary. (Alderson 1979,Whitacker 1979)
2.13.14.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt was not envisaged at the early stages of this policing
method that the present operational activities of specialist
departments (such as traffic patrol, specialist investigative
squads etc.) would be altered in any significant way.
Rather, neighbourhood policing would continue to require
their support in the same way as previously. However, it
was suggested that there would be an improved flow of
information from street level to specialist units that may
increase their effectiveness.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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2.14 Management EvaluationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2.14.1. Neighbourhood policing was a completely untried system of
providing policing services, although it was assembled from
well tried and tested policing tactics that had been used
successfully for many years in isolation. The concept of
bringing these apparently successful elements together in a
self supporting system was unique. Therefore it was
proposed that an evaluation should be conducted that would
seek to address whether or not the sought for objectives and
improvements had been achieved. It was suggested that the
broad criteria for evaluation should be:-
i. demands made by the public for police services
ii. satisfaction with police
iii. level of citizen involvement
iv. police attitudeszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
v. levels of complaints against police.
2.14.2. It was suggested (Beckett 1981) that the above factors may
eventually influence and lead to:-
i. a decrease in the levels of street crime, and
ii. a raising in the quality of life for local residents.
2.14.3. Where this evaluation showed that the strategy was not
effective, or the results did not justify the effort entailed, then
it was suggested that the particular part of the system should
be modified or discarded. Such decisions would have to be
made by the senior management teams of the police stations
or divisions concerned, who would have access to reliablezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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management information from operational levels to support
their decision making.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2.15 Implementationand EvaluationSummary
2.15.1. Figure 2.7 shows the major stages of the neighbourhood
policing system schematically.
2.15.2. The outline plan was to implement the local management
information system and gather pre change information from
the police station area. This information collection process
would continue throughout the life of the project, but would
initially be used to influence the training programme that
formed the basis of the selection process for the P.B.O.s and
the sector teams.
2.15.3. The teams would then set about implementing the new
policing style involving the public and other agencies with a
view to achieving local objectives.
2.15.4. Information concerning the success or otherwise of these
activities would then be available to compare with the earlier
problems and thus some judgements might be made as to
the benefits or otherwise of this approach. It was suggested
that the system might then be changed or aborted
dependant upon successes.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 2.7 Implementation and Evaluation Summary
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2.16 TheConceptual Differencesof the N.P. System
2.16.1. The neighbourhood policing systemwas not propounded as
an ideal system providing an ultimate answer to the
problems facing police, neither was it suggested that all the
propositions would prove to be correct or effective. However,
nothing in the new system was completely untested. Similar
components that had been incorporated into the overall
design of N.P. could be observed to be operating
successfully in other police forces, albeit in isolation and in a
different context.
2.16.2. As a plan for major change to police operations, N.P.
differed in that the project assembled successful elements of
existing policing practices into a unified system. Hitherto,
much police development had concentrated on
improvements to single functional aspects of police
operations, rather than to examine the whole task of day to
day policing from a strategic viewpoint and then to tackle the
design of a complete system. The approach of the N.P.
project drew from Checkland's (1972) concepts of systems
based problem solving in real world situations.
2.16.3. N.P. differed from previous schemes not only in terms of its
systems approach but also by identifying three key areas to
be tackled in order to bring about the necessary changes.
The detailed elements already identified were developed
and refined to three key strategic areas of concern that could
be approached and managed more effectively. It was
considered that change would not end with the
implementation of a fixed sequence of changes.
2.16.4. It was seen as necessary to create a system that was
'adaptive and which could take advantage of opportunities to
improve as it evolved. Conceptually, the aim was to design a
self-learning, self-adapting policing system. This was
thought to be necessary as the alternative would have been
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to implement a more traditional, rigid and tightly defined
change programme that would not be greatly dissimilar to
the previous attempts to improve policing.
2.16.5. If the preferred approach were followed, the overall policing
system could be dynamic and not become unsuited to
environmental conditions as had happened previously.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt
was proposed that the full benefits of the scheme would not
be realised unless the identified areas were tackled
simultaneously and allowed to develop under local
conditions. It was considered that the dysfunctional effects of
one isolated change on another would militate against the
positive benefits of the change if this strategy were not
followed.
2.16.6. The key strategic areas to be managedwere as follows:-
i. demand management - the adverse effects of the
reactive loop,
ii. police /public contract - active stimulation ot this
traditional concept,
iii. police organisation and efficiency
inappropriate structures and processes
tackling
2.16.7. Policing structures and organisations were for the most part
operating in the opposite way to that implied by Checkland's
(1972) concepts. They were largely functionalised and
compartmentalised in order to gain the benefits of
specialisation and the administrative convenience of routine
resource planning. A negative outcome of this structure
whereby one functional sub-system interacts with, and
influences others in a dysfunctional way was widespread
within police organisations, particularly in London, (Belson
1975, Christian 1983) The consequential effect of this
phenomena throughout the organisation was disruptive and
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led to inefficiencies. A major aspect of the police problem
situation was therefore the internal management of the
effects of these unplanned consequential effects between
internal work groups and functional specialisations.
2.16.8. The N.P. project recognised the inefficiencies caused by this
situation and proposed changes to the operational level by
focusing management attention on the policing environment
and on the actual service that was needed, rather than the
internal mechanisms by which the existing system
functioned.
2.16.9. This systems approach to the re-design of policing
operations was seen as a major departure from current
thinking and the potential benefits of the approach were
rapidly assimilated by senior police decision makers.
2.17 DemandManagement
2.17.1. As had already been noted, the resources available within
the police organisation to cope with rising demands were
clearly limited. Historically, new resources had been poured
into reactive or response policing and had been
conspicuously unsuccessful at limiting that demand.
2.17.2. In addition, the traditional assistance the police had received
from other statutory agencies had to be viewed against a
background of economic restriction. Since, in the main, they
too were reacting to problems after they occur and also
might expect to suffer from a similar effect to that suggested
by the reactive loop.
2.17.3. Despite the constraints, it was considered that demand for
police services should be managed and brought under a
measure of control before community oriented strategies
could be introduced. It was apparent that areas traditionally
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hostile to policing would have to be become priorities for
police attention and recidivist offenders brought to justice in
advance of the introduction of the.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBANP changes. It was likely
that a failure to do so, would harden resistance from the law
abiding sections of the community who would wish to see
existing criminality curbed.
2.18 Police/PublicContract
2.18.1. The notion of an informal contract between the police and
public to tackle crime together would clearly depend to a
large extent on the willingness of the public to co-operate.
Research had shown (Beckett 1981 et al) that where strong,
stable communities exist, the incidence of street crime is
lower and satisfaction with police is higher. However, of
more concern to police were the urban areas where
environmental conditions were poor, demands for police
services were high and there was little sense of community
identity.
2.18.2. In such areas there was seen to be little incentive for
individual members of the public to help each other or to co-
operate with the police (Mawby 1979). Since the police were
already struggling to cope with the high demands placed on
them, they were becoming progressively less effective and
resorting to more and more response type policing with the
consequent reduction in the general level of public
satisfaction.
2.18.3. The neighbourhood policing project was therefore an attempt
to systematically direct police effort towards securing this
contract. There was a marked emphasis within the project
towards preventive measures and the preservation of the
service element of traditional policing.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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2.18.4. The project also encouraged local officers to seize the
initiative; actively seeking out and strengthening viable
communities where they exist, or .fostering a new sense of
community identity where little or no such community identity
existed.
2.18.5. It was not however just a public relations exercise, designed
only to increase public satisfactionwith police (M.P.S. 1981).
Although there was definitely a need in the wake of the
Brixton disorder to improve the image of the Metropolitan
Police (Scarman 1981), the N.P. project was treated by the
organisation as a major initiative of the "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAhighes pri rity ... "
to tackle the wider problems of policing the Capital.
(Receiver of the Metropolitan Police, M.P.S. 1981)
2.18.6. One of the unintended consequences of a purely public
relations approach, would be likely to have been an increase
in public demand for police services, which was one of the
very problems that the scheme sought to tackle. Rather, the
thrust was to be towards getting the public actively involved
in crime prevention and providing support for their own
victims of crime.
2.18.7. The N.P. approach was to aim for the ideal system in which
professional police and a community establish a partnership
which results in a significant proportion of policing services
within that community being provided voluntarily by
communitymembers.
2.18.8. This may be seen to contrast starkly with other approaches
to policing both here and abroad, whereby law enforcement
is the total responsibility of the professional police.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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2.19 Police Organisation and Efficiency
2.19.1. There was no doubt that most police organisational
structures had evolved rather than been designed to meet a
defined purpose. It was clear that if police effort was to be
re-directed towards securing the contract by way of
increased community involvement, there was likely to be a
penalty in terms of the cost of police resources used.
However, as has already been discussed, police resources
were straining to meet the existing and rising demands
without the new burdenszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof increased community
involvement.
2.19.2. The N. P. project proposed that a possible means of creating
the necessary opportunities to tackle the suggested new
initiatives could be achieved by reducing the number of
inefficient and non productive processes and procedures
that were currently being undertaken. The opportunities thus
created could then be taken up with problem directed
preventive issues and not dissipated on administrative or
response type tasks. Therefore much of the organisational
aspects of the N.P. project were concerned with becoming
more efficient and dispensing with many non productive
tasks that would not contribute to the overall system aims.
2.19.3. Given that something could be done about resource
management, the project proposed a fundamental
reassessment of how resources were matched to incoming
demands. Local police station senior officers were to
examine ways of optimising the deployment of their scarce
resources. In simple terms , to have more officers on duty
when the level of demands were highest, and not to
dissipate manpower unnecessarily by allocating resources
equally throughout the day and night. This single proposition
was in direct conflict with much established organisation
practice and culture. Many established practices affecting
police officers' duty times and rest day rosters had been
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incorporated into Statutory Instruments and were for most
practical purposes not negotiable for change. (Police
Regulations 1969)
2.19.4. For it to be accepted therefore, the only way in which the
customs and cultures of generations could be altered and
the concept adopted, was slowly through a formal
communications system between the senior managers and
the officers actually performing operational policing.
2.19.5. The communications system devised was therefore based
upon the perceived need for a participative model of
management rather that the hierarchical or militaristic control
model that currently existed. This was seen as necessary
not only to ensure that operational officers were involved in
the challenging process of changing work practices, but also
to ensure that senior officers had an accurate view of the
problems confronted by front line officers on a daily basis.
This problem and the need for a more consultative style of
management within the Metropolitan Police was later to be
addressed in detail by Smith and Gray (1983) in their
extensive examination of 'The Police in Action' in London.
The emphasis within the established system was upon
issuing instructions and a reliance on procedures, rather
than upon achieving an end result or objectives.
2.19.6. The maintenance of the hierarchical system was dependant
largely upon ensuring compliance with rules and procedures
without question, whereas a process of participative
management would necessarily have to be we" informed
with access to relevant information regarding problems,
performance and achievements. Accurate data rather than
opinions based on experience and others' anecdotes was
obviously to be vital. The significance of the police station
management information system therefore became central to
the project.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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2.19.7. A number of further efficiency improving initiatives were to
be introduced as the project developed in order to facilitate
the new style of policing. All such changes were directed
towards creating the opportunity to free operational officers
to develop their communities in the manner described.
However, the most significant alterations were to be:
i. the change to local structures in order to facilitate the
'new' style of policing,
ii. the proposed changes of duty times to align with the
response demand profile,
iii. the moving of the emphasis away from autocratic
control towards participative management and,
iv. the greater management reliance on objective data.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2.20 Evolutionin Policing
2.20.1. To the police organisation and many influential police
decision makers, neighbourhood policing represented an
acceptable compromise between two policing philosophies.
At one extreme was 'hard policing' characterised by a'
strongly reactive style and typified by operation 'Swamp'
that preceded the disorders at Brixton in April 1981
(Scarman 1981). At the other extreme, were the radical
concepts of community policing as propounded by Alderson
(1979). This approach being characterised by a more
proactive style, fulfilling agreed community needs and
generally seen as a 'softer' style.
2.20.2. The public debate on policing methods that followed the
publication of Lord Scarman's report stimulated a
groundswell of opinion to adopt a more community
orientated style of policing. However, it was apparent thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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such moves were not universally popular within the
Metropolitan Police. (Smithet al 1983)
2.20.3. To the more progressive element within the Metropolitan
Police, N.P. represented an opportunity to implement a
more proactive policing style that was not seen as
impossible to achieve. To others, in particular the
traditionalists, the propositions were seen as unnecessary,
potentially damaging to the police and likely to be totally
ineffective. (Metropolitan Police 1981, Irving et al 1989)
2.20.4. Despite a considerable high level of internal unease that
would resist the prospect of such change (Smith 1983b),
the external climate had altered and was exerting
considerable influence on the style of policing that was being
delivered in London. There was no doubt that senior officers
within the Metropolitan Police saw the need to consider what
alternatives might exist to the policing methods that were
likely to be seen as a major contributory factor to the Brixton
disorders. (Scarman 1981)
2.20.5. When Lord Scarman's findings were made public in
November 1981 he had indeed concluded that:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"Chief officers of Police should re-examine their
methods of policing with particular reference to....the
pattern of patrolling the role of home beat officers and
their integration into mainstream policing....provision of
opportunities for officers to get to know their
communities.....and ways of ensuring greater
continuity..." (Scarman 1981 pg. 130)
2.20.6 Lord Scarman continued with recommendations that, inter
alia, were to alter and increase the nature of local police
consultation and accountability.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt was known that the
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police was under
considerable pressure to take up new initiatives in
accordance with Scarman's recommendations (Irving et al
1989) and indeed Lord Scarman noted that "...a newzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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approach is required....and that has already begun."zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
(Scarman 1981 pg. 135, Irving et al1989 pgs. 11-12)
2.20.7 Therefore, it was not a difficult decision for the most senior
officers of the Metropolitan Police to proceed with a trial of
N.P., albeit on the basis of the fairly limited research.
2.20.8 In November 1981 such a decision was made at New
Scotland Yard.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt as agreed on behalf of the Commissioner
that a major experiment would be conducted to assess the
potential benefits of N.P. in collaboration with the Surrey
Constabulary. Over a period of months, resources were
made available for the scheme, a project team was
established and a steering committee appointed to oversee
progress and monitor costs. The project was afforded
considerable importance.
2.20.9 The Commissioner and the Receiver of the Metropolitan
Police made it quite clear that "...this is an important project
of high priority for which the necessary resources of finance,
staff, equipment, etc., will need to be found." (M.P.S. 1981,
Irving 1989 pg.12)
2.21 The Needfor Evaluation
2.21.1. Resulting from the many frustrations experienced during the
research for the original thesis, the authors were convinced
that there was an urgent need for rigorous and objective
evaluation of policing operations. Traditionally, policing had
been managed by well intentioned, but never the less
relatively poorly informed decision makers who only had
their own experience and that of their advisors to inform
major decisions. This situation was apparent from the
relatively small amount of organisational, management,
social and psychological research material available on the
subject of U.K. policing prior to the late 1970's. (This
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situation was dissimilar to the U.S.A.where there was a well
established literature on many aspects of policing.)
2.21.2. The approach to decision making based almost solely upon
instinct, experience and opinion might have been previously
satisfactory , but in the politically critical climate of the late
seventies and early eighties it was becoming inappropriate.
(Critchley 1978) Circumstances were changing to a point
where critical police decisions concerning priorities, methods
and deployments were being openly questioned by
politicians, the media, opinion formers of disparate views
and others with interests in the criminal justice system.
(Scarman 1981, Smith et al1983, Jeffferson 1984)
2.21.3. It was apparent that many decisions regarding priorities and
deployments that had been conventionally made by police
alone in relative secrecy, were likely to be exposed to a
greater degree of external scrutiny in future. It was therefore
reasonable to conclude that in the future, it would be
necessary to be able to describe the approach to many such
decisions and the information on which they were based.
Observers of diverse characteristics and motivation would
need to be able to satisfy themselves that proper bases
existed to such decisions. (Stephens 1988) A need was thus
created for objective data which could more accurately
inform decision making, rather than convention, opinion or
the traditional belief that the 'police know best'.
2.21.4. Traditionally, policing had not been a highly controversial or
politicised activity. (Keeton 1975) However in the months
following the Brixton riots, policing in london at least had
become associated with many of the problems of inner city
life and thus the object of a great deal of scrutiny and
public debate. (Scarman 1981, Smith et al 1983). Therefore
it was considered vital that any major efforts to alter the
methods and style of policing should be accompanied by
some form of objective assessment.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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2.21.5. Consequently a great deal of attention was directed to how
the N.P. project might be evaluated to the longer term
benefit of the Service, whether or not the projects
propositions were successful. The N.P. project evaluation
proposals were originally scheduled to run for approximately
two years after initial implementation. The aim at the end of
that period was to provide an authoritative evaluation report
of both police and public contributions. The evaluation
function was to be divided into two parts:
i. the independent evaluation to be undertaken by The
Police Foundation and,
ii. the internal evaluation to be undertaken by the police
project team.
2.21.5. The separate evaluations were not seen as mutually
exclusive but rather addressing similar issues from
complimentary standpoints. It was envisaged that
operational managers and decision makers would have
feedback from the evaluation process as the project
developed, thus having the opportunity to make alterations
to systems and procedures to achieve the best effect.
2.21.6. By this means it was considered that for the first time in the:
evolution of policing, the Service would have a reliable
study addressing the effectiveness of a community based
style of policing applied to a major conurbation. This
apparently simple aim was derived from a memorable
remark made by Sir Peter Matthews, then Chief Constable of
Surrey who in conversation with the authors said "...wezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAneed
to findzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa way of policing the large towns and cities in the
same way as we police the villages ... "
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CHAPTER THREE
SummaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Chapter Three describes how the N.P. project was to be
implemented around an original experimental design that relied
upon the existence ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa 'control condition'. Following changes to the
wider organisation that precluded the retention of such a design, the
principles of the project are set in the context of a fresh evaluation
model.
The N.P. project approach considers a macro or system level of
functioning and a micro or behavioural level of analysis to be
appropriate. This duellist approach to evaluation is discussed in
detail and argument is advancedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAas to why the chosen approach
was considered to be satisfactory in the light of organisational
development. The references quoted in this chapter are those drawn
upon at the time of writing of the original work.
3.1 Implementation
3.1.1. A police project team was formed in January 1982 to
implement and evaluate an experiment based upon the major
principles of Neighbourhood Policing, namely;-
i. to increase public satisfaction with the police,
ii. to decrease the fear of street crime,
iii. to influence the street crime rate,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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iv. to influence the level of demands falling on police,
v. to bring about a change in public behaviour whereby
an active part is taken in the prevention of crime.
3.1.2. Additionally the newly formed independent research institute,
The Police Foundation adopted the project as their principal
research effort and were to expend considerable resources
on an independent evaluation. (Irving et a11989)
3.1.3. A range of organisational changes or treatments were
designed that it was suggested would provide the necessary
organisational systems to achieve the NP principles. A set of
behavioural hypotheses were proposed that defined specific
actions and activities the were suggested to be appropriate
towards achieving the required outputs. It was proposed that
the organisational changes in combination with the police
behavioural changes would bring about the NP system aims.
3.2 The Original Experimental Design
3.2.1. As the project was to be a collaborative undertaking between
the Surrey Constabulary and the Metropolitan Police, th~
experimental design required similar efforts in each police
area. Therefore the following (straightforward) model, Figure
3.1, was adopted that provided both test and control
conditions in both police areas, with the addition of a
separate site to monitor the effects of the computerised
management information system (M.I.S.). This feature was
considered necessary as the M.I.S. was an original
development and the benefits and/or costs were unknown.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Metropolitan Police
Area
Surrey Police
Area
Test Site:
To receive full project
treatments
Computer only
site:
To receive only the
computerised M.I.S.
Comparison
(control) site:
To remain effectively
unchanged and to be the
'control'
Notting Hill
Carter Street
Hackney
Camberley
Caterham
Walton on Thames
Figure 3.1 Matrix Model of Original N.P. Experimental Design
3.2.2. Project implementation commenced with pilot research at
Brixton in london and pilot implementation at Addlestone in
Surrey. Both these locations were outside the experimental
design, but were used in order to develop experience of both
evaluation and implementation techniques. Using the
experience of this pilot work, pre-testing commenced at
Notting Hill and Hackney in 1982 and at Caterham and
Camberley early in 1983.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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3.3zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe Difficulties with Pure ExperimentationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3.3.1. As the project developed, it was becoming apparent that the
approach of pure experimentation with social systems,
whereby unequivocal results are obtained would have to be
abandoned. This approach whereby causality could be
attributed to the treatments applied did not lend itself to the
evaluation of policing methods and operations due to the
turbulence of the policing environment and the need of the
police organisation to continually react to it.
3.3.2. The major difficulties of experimentation in a police setting
arise from ethical considerations; the need for ongOing
operational efficiency and the inability to control all the
variables. In a true experimental situation, a number of the
treatments tested would be designed to have no effect, or a
detrimental effect on the system's operation. This would result
in the public living in the experimental area receiving an
inferior level of service, which would be difficult to justify.
3.3.3. A further difficulty had also become apparent from the pilot
work arising from the impracticability of securing an equivalent
control group (Cook and Campbell 1979) who found that
equivalence in terms of the organisational environment was
a continual difficulty for field trials in social settings. Although
it initially seemed straightforward to match two or more police
divisions on the basis of environmental similarity, (population,
size, workload, urban deprivation etc.) it quickly became
apparent that normal organisational development involving
routine procedural changes, movement of staff etc. would
militate against the concept of equivalence being maintained
throughout a trial that was likely to extend to several years. It
was apparent that different divisions progressed in
organisation development terms at different rates and whilst a
commonalty of purpose existed, at any single point in time,
significant variations between divisions might exist.
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3.3.4. In January 1983 the decision to abandon the original
experimental model was finally made in the light of the above
as we" as a further and majororganisational development.
3.3.5. The newly appointed Commissioner of the Metropolitan
Police, Sir Kenneth Newman, was aware of the N.P. project
and was committed to a number of its proposals as well as to
a planning strategy derived from an American publication,
Policing by Objectives. (Lubans and Edgar 1979) This
approach to strategic planning was based on a large number
of 'action plans' that in themselves were very similar to a
number of the fundamental elementsof the N.P. project.
3.3.6. It was not possible therefore to retain the experimental
concept of a control site in London. The control would quickly
become confounded by the implementation of action plans
that wouldzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe so similar to N.P. treatments that it would not
be possible to observe a discernible difference in outcomes
between the experimental site and the control site.
3.4 The Fresh Approach to N.P. Evaluation
3.4.1. In order to overcome these difficulties and also achieve a
meaningful evaluation, albeit not totally based upon pure
experimentation, the multiple method approach (Saxe and
Fine 1979)was adapted to meet the needs of the project. This
approach suggests that the variety of methods available to
evaluation researchers, true experimentation, quasi-
experimental, systems analysis, operations research etc., are
fully compatible with one another.
3.4.2. The choice of methodology should depend upon the context of
the experimental programme and the evaluation
requirements. It is therefore possible to use methodologies
either singly, or together, as part of the overall evaluation of
the project. For some purposes one type of methodologymightzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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be employed and for other purposes another method might be
used. For multiple evaluation purposes, such as those
appropriate for policing schemes, multiple methods might be
used within the same evaluation programme under the
overall framework of the systems approach.
3.4.3.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt was considered for the most part that the N.P. project would
constitute a quasi-experimental design. (Campbell and
Stanley 1966). In quasi experiments, assignment of a
treatment to a condition occurs in some non random fashion,
unlike true experiments, where the experimental units are
randomly assigned to conditions. (Cook and Campbell 1976)
3.4.4. However, it may be possible to approach a true experimental
design by inclusion of more test localities within the
programme design and randomly assigning the various
treatments and control to each area. But clearly, this would
not have been a realistic proposition due to the number of
separate sites necessary for such an approach. At the basic
economic level the quasi-experimental design appeared to be
the only realistic choice.
3.4.5. Within the limitations of a quasi experimental design, Saxe
and Fine (1979) suggest that by use of a macro-micro
approach, it is possible to realise an evaluation which is close
to a true experimental design.
3.4.6. The term macro evaluation is used to refer to the use of non-
randomised control group techniques to assess the overall
efficiency of a scheme.
3.4.7. The term micro evaluation refers to the use of randomised
control group experiments developed to test hypotheses
about central components of the suggested design.
3.4.8. When applied in conjunction with one another, macro and
micro evaluation studies can provide a complete and
practical assessment of the suggested design and for
78
multiple evaluation purposes. This approach was developed
in the original N.P. project documentation (Beckett and Hart
1981) when the outline of the systems methodology for the
projectwas described.
3.4.9. It may be seen from this description how the two levels of
abstraction may be merged using the eclectic properties of
the systems approach and used as an overall evaluation
design. The macro evaluation being based upon the
systems approach and the micro evaluation on scientific
method which provides inputs to the macro study.
3.4.10. This approach to evaluation can be viewed as integrative. Its
object was to generate data, both concerning the viability of
the N.P. programme and its implementation as well as the
effectiveness of the operational features. The integration
would allow organisational decision makers to have
information concerning the operation of the system as a
whole, as well as more detailed information respecting the
components of the system. This could be achieved by
satisfying the scientific demands for data collections within
semi controlled micro studies, without forfeiting the
collection of non-experimental data about the system
through the macro studies.
3.4.11. In practice the macro study may assume the form of a
comparative time series design between experimental sites
which monitored the phased implementation of the scheme
from inception through to pre-tests, mid term tests and post
tests. The macro study could provide decision makers with
direct information about the operation of the experimental
system as well as providing data for routine operational
decisions.
3.4.12. The micro studies were to take the form of a series of semi
controlled experiments within each experimental condition,
whereby comparisons are achieved from the conditions
themselves. The efficacy of particular components of thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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programme, i.e. community and victim helping behaviour,
could thus be assessed in relation to their influence on
social modelling. These data could then be generally applied
both within and beyond the Confines of the actual
experimental scheme and help to establish its construct
validity.
3.4.13. One basic assumption was that the macro and micro level
assessments should be conducted in a fashion whereby
each level proceeds simultaneously and feed into each
other. The purposes of both types of studies is to understand
the processes underlying the degree of effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of the scheme. Problems identified by the
macro evaluation might be examined more rigorously in
micro studies.
3.4.14. Similarly, findings from the micro studies might reveal
possible problems, suggest the need for changes, or
highlight a shift in emphasis of the macro studies. Such an
approach may be seen as systemic and an appropriate
systems methodology for the project, representing a holistic
rather than piecemeal approach to evaluation. In this way, it
was seen as possible to gain sufficient knowledge about
the police systems' operation to enable objective decisions
to be made concerning replication or cessation.
3.4.15. This multi level approach was not new. Systems theory has
provided a powerful problem solving approach to many
complex problems (Warfield 1976, Weinburg 1975).
However, this approach could be criticised for lacking in
addressing detailed issues and it was considered that the
inclusion of a more conventional scientific approach through
the micro level evaluation would redress that potential
shortcoming. (Fairweather and Tomatzky 1977) In this way,
the body of existing scientific knowledge may be applied to
the policing system, the behaviour of which is comparatively
poorly understood.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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3.4.16. In the field of psychology, the, systems approach has
achieved an important position (Kast and Rosenzweig
1981) and therefore it is appropriate not only to adopt the
systems approach for the macro level evaluation but also to
use the same approach to harmonise the micro level into a
cohesive framework. The aim was to create an evaluation
that was a holistic assessment rather than a reductionist
approach that would fail to acknowledge the complexity of
modern urban policing.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3.SzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe Macro Evaluation
3.5.1. The term macro evaluation in the N.P. project was used to
refer to the evaluation of the total effect of a range of
treatments applied to non-equivaient test conditions in a
non-random fashion. The macro evaluation was based upon
a systems methodology (Checkland 1972) and utilises the
open systems theory of organisations (Katz and Kahn
1978).
3.5.2. The open systems approach with respect to the N.P. project
takes the police station as the system of interest and views
this system as exchanging information with and being inter-
related to its immediate human and physical environment.
3.5.3. The evaluation process began by identifying and modelling
repeated cycles of input to the police station, the
trensformatlon of the inputs by police and the subsequent
output. This in turn creates a renewed input to the station
which is processed by organisational procedures and output
to the environment. Thus a continuous cyclical effect is
maintained similar to processes observed in biological
sciences.
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3.5.4. It is the quantity and quality of information, appropriate
behaviour and the speed at which the cycle operates that
determines the degree of openness of the system. It is this
'degree of openness' that the N.P. project sought to increase
at the macro level through the application of selected
treatments.
3.5.5. Adoption of the concept of feedback is vital to the open
systems approach.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is clear from the foregoing that such a
process results in the police station system affecting the
environment and the environment affecting the system of
interest. It is information, behaviour and information implied
by behaviour that brings about this symbiosis - the
mechanism that creates the cyclical effect is feedback.
3.5.6. The corollary of the open system concept is the closed
system, whereby there is little or no feedback from the
systems' environment. Examples are typically found in purely
electrical and mechanical systems. In reality, closed systems
are seldom, if ever encountered in social systems. The
implication of this concept is that open systems exist in
varying degrees of openness, i.e. with varying degrees of
feedback.
3.5.7. Therefore, applying open systems theory to police
organisations, a proposition can be presented that police
systems (stations) exist in varying degrees of openness, i.e.
the quantity, quality and speed of feedback is a function of
the openness of the system with its environment. It was
further proposed that the series of treatments applicable to
a 'Neighbourhood Policing' station would increase the
degree of openness of the station system and that such an
increase was desirable.
3.5.8. The testing of this proposition was presented as being the
macro level evaluation objective. The proposition fell short
of amounting to a hypothesis or set of hypotheses, in that itzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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is not the convention to use classical hypothetical concepts
within the systems approach.
3.5.9. A definition was suggested for the ideal police station
system that brought together the aims of the project as
follows. "A police station system which seeks to optimise
available resources including all relevant agencies and the
community itself in order to prevent crime and offences
whilst an adequate patrol and investigative capability is
maintained in order to detect crime and offences and deal
with emergencies within given constraints." (Beckett and
Hart 1981)
3.5.10. In essence, this statement is defining a policing system that
is predominantly open in character and thus a systemwhich
did not share similar features to such a system, would be
closer to a closed system and not as effective in the N.P.
project's aim.
3.5.11. The treatments implemented through the project were all
designed to increase the openness of the policing system in
ascending degrees through time. But when and where a
final state of openness was reached was not specified, as
the limits of what might be achieved were largely
speculative. It was not therefore considered appropriate to
evaluate each individual treatment in isolation, but rather to
assess the combination effect insofar as it affected the
degree of openness of the police station as a whole.
3.5.12. This approach was a direct product of the systems thinking
that encouraged the tackling of organisational systems as a
whole.and not a set of discreet parts that could be changed
in sequence and then reassembled into a meaningfulwhole.
3.5.13. Many case studies indicate that where this incremental
approach is adopted, the benefits of a single change are not
felt because other key elements of the system are allowed
to remain unaltered and thus militate against the success ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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the new order. In other words the benefits are so slow
accrue that the dysfunctional effects of other features of the
system will overwhelm the mar~inal achievements. The
solution, according to Checkland (1972) was to tackle the
whole system.
3.5.14. The aim of the macro study therefore was not to ascribe
causality to individual treatments, but rather to assess the
impact of the station system as a whole through
identification of the significant associations from the
systems perspective described. Additionally, the macro
evaluation was to attempt to relate costs (in organisational
terms) to the quality, quantity and speed of information
feedback.
3.5.15. There are clearly limits to which it is appropriate to enhance
information flows as there is always likely to be a cost in
some form associated with the supply of information. It is
appropriate therefore to consider whether the benefit arising
from the supply of the information exceeds the cost of
obtaining it. A secondary aim of the macro evaluation was
therefore to try to determine the optimum quantity, quality
and speed of information feedback to satisfy the minimum
needs of successful operation.
3.5.16. For the purposes of the macro evaluation, the police station
system was seen as comprising three sub-systems, each of
which exchanges inputs and outputs by a feedback
process. The project applied the open systems concept to
the police station and its sub-systems as summarised in
Figure 3.2 below.
3.5.17. Here, the three police station sub-systems are shown in the
context of the police station's human and physical
environment which are discussed over leaf. Each sub-
system itself comprises a range of elements and
relationships which were to be the subject of data
collections.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 3.2 The Police Station Sub Systems
3.6 The Police Station Sub-5ystems
3.6.1. Po/ice Organisation and Methods. A distinction is made
between 'organisation' (Le. structure) and 'methods' (Le.
process). The elements within 'organisation' are relatively
static and include the component parts of the organisation and
the relationships between them whiCh form the established
organisational pattern. In contrast, 'methods' are dynamic
and include those additional elements which amount to
policies, procedures, controls and co-ordination that guide the
activities of people operating within the organisation.
Elements within this category necessarily include planned
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and formalised functions as well as those aspects of station
functioning which are unplanned and/or unwanted.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3.6.2. Individual Police Officers. This sub-system encompasses the
attitudes and behaviour of the human police resource, both
individually and collectively. Additionally, social psychological
phenomena and skills affecting the performance of police in
the light of organisational methods, resources and the
influence on individuals of the human and physical
environment are features of this sub-system.
3.6.3. Police Resources. The police resources sub-system is seen
as comprising physical resources, (as distinct from human
resources) but includes those of a less tangible nature such
as available timezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3.7 The Physical Environment
3.7.1. The physical environment contains elements relating to the'
size, degree of urbanisation, economic activity, physical
history, physical description and character of the test condition
environment.
3.7.2. The characteristics of the phisical environment may be
regarded as those features of any particular location that
differentiate it from any other, i.e. apperance, wealth, open
spaces, buildings, trees, commercial premises, places of
entertainment, residential accommodation type and style.
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3.8zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe Human EnvironmentzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3.B.1.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe huma environment comprises demographic, attitudinal,
behavioural and cultural phenomena at the individual and
group levels. The major factors at the group level being those
that impact directly on the immediatesystem environment and
which have a predominantly local membership and purpose.
The focus at the individual level is upon residents.
3.B.2. The three police sub-systems interact with one another and
form a multiple intersection which represents the aggregate of
the police station outputs to the environment. However, each
of the police sub-systems interact individually with the
environment and it is the significant individual interactions
which form the subject of the policing aspects of the micro
evaluation.
3.B.3. The macro evaluation is therefore concerned with the impact
of the intersection of the police sub-systems, i.e. the police
systems output, with the human and physical environment. A
complex situation thus exists whereby the three police station
sub-systems effect the features of the environment and vice
versa.
3.B.4. For macro evaluation purposes, the precise nature of
interaction between the police system and the environment
may be largely ignored and treated as a 'black box'. This is a
consequence of the very large and varied number of
interactions that occur and which are largely conditioned by
prevailing circumstances. Thus it is only realistic to consider
the aggregate effect, i.e. the overall system output.
87
3.B.S.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe evaluation plan suggested there would be a number of
actions and interactions occurring that amount largely to
police behaviours that convert inputs to the police system into
outputs. (DeGreene 1970). The overall effect of these
behaviours was to be assessed at an aggregate level rather
than at an individual level for the purposes of the macro study.
3.B.6. The concept here being that it was the combined behavioural
output of the police system that would bring about the N.P.
aims, rather than any single type of police behaviour.
However, the overall behavioural output comprised many
separate, individual behaviours, the detailed nature of which
would be subject of the micro level studies.
3.B.7. These concepts as applied to the police system constitute the
macro evaluation principles and are summarised in Figure 3.3
which shows the intersection of the three police sub-systems
(V, W, X,) providing information (I) and behaviours (B) to the
black box.
3.B.B. The black box also receives inputs from the intersection of
the environmental sub systems (Y, Z) in the form of public
information (El) and public behaviours (EB). The result is the
intersection of the five sub systems creating an output which
is fed back to each individual sub system in the form of
renewed information (RI[1]&RI[2]) and behaviour
(RB[1]&RB[2]). thus the cycle is established.
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Figure 3.3 The Macro Evaluation ConceptzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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3.8.8. There are six specific inputs and outputs that is addressed by
the macro level evaluation, each of which is determined by a
multiple measures.
i. Information (I) from the police system to the
environment - measured by police and public surveys
i.e. the police output from the police view, which
constitutes an input to the public and is in turn
assessed from the public's view.
ii. Police behaviour (B) - measured by surveys of police
attitudes toward defined behaviours and police
physical behaviour study. In addition a public attitude
survey assesses the public view of these behaviours.
iii. Information (El) from the environment to police-
measured by police questionnaire addressing police
knowledge of environmental information and a
demand study of the assessment made by police
officers of the quantity and quality of public demand on
police.
iv. Behaviour by police interacting with the public within
the human environment (EB) measured by individual
attitude questionnaire, police demand studies and
police behavioural studies.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
v. Renewed information (RI) as an output from the black
box measured by (i) and (ii) above. RI[1] in respect of
police feedback and RI[2] in respect of public
feedback.
vi. Renewed behaviours (RB) as an output from the
black box measured by (ii) and (iv) above. RB[1] in
respect of police behaviours and RB[2] in respect of
public behaviours.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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3.8.9. The above six indicators were to be considered by both
quantitative and qualitative methods. The combination of the
two assessment methods in relation to the evaluation would
enable two overall system assessments to be determined.
3.8.10. The speed of feedback of RI[1], RI[2], RB[1] and RB[2] will
provide a macro measure of system efficiency resulting in
change. A slow rate of feedback will indicate a low level of
efficiency at the station in achieving the stated aims of the
project, whereas a faster rate of feedback will indicate a
greater efficiency and responsiveness in achieving the
openness required. Efficiency in achieving the collective
project objectives may be assessed by this indicator on the
grounds that (I), (El), RI[1] and RI[2] are known at the pre
implementation stage and the same inputs and outputs will
be known at the post test stage. Therefore the effort
applied through project treatments in (I) and (El) will
produce an output in RI[1] and RI[2].
3.8.11. The quantity of information and to some extent the quality
and type of information being fed back (RI[1] & RI[2]) will
provide a measure of the degree of openness of the system.
The project required that a greater exchange is made
between police and public through a range of specified
treatments. The macro measure for this aspect is the degree
of openness determined by the quantity of information fed
back in relation to the initial situation. Here it will be possible
to determine how much output is obtained from the given
inputs established by the collective treatments. Qualitative
indicators will relate principally to factors affecting the
specific environmental condition and may not therefore be
of direct·significance to the comparative studies.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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3.9 Systems Efficiency and Systems Effectiveness
3.9.1. In the context of the preceding paragraph it becomes
important to define what is meant by efficiency and
effectiveness. Figure 3.4 shows the police station as a box
that receives inputs and transforms them into outputs. The
goals for the police station are shown as inputs and outputs.
Primary goals are set for a station by the wider organisation
but the station also has internal goals with discretion in terms
of which services it provides, to what extent and to which
specific area. The internally generated goals serve to direct
and focus the station's efforts and are fed back to the wider
organisation.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Outputs
Immediate Physical and Human Environment
Inputs
Effectiveness feedback
Efficiency Feedback
Police System Boundar)'
Figure 3.4 Model of Efficiency and Effectiveness FeedbackzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
(AdaptedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAfrom CLELAND and KING 1983)
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3.9.2. Figure 3.4 also shows two feedback loops. The lower labelled
'efficiency feedback' involves the comparison of outputs to
inputs. This is a measure of the abi.lity of the station to make
the transformation from inputs to outputs. This aspect is the
concem of the macro evaluation which proposes that the
system should be more open. The systems ability to
transform a greater and more varied level of inputs into
outputs is a measure of its efficiency (Cleland and King
1983) associated with a particular degree of openness.
3.9.3. The upper feedback loop, effectiveness feedback, relates
outputs to the goals of the police organisation. Thus, while
efficiency measures show how well the station is
transforming inputs into outputs, effectiveness measures show
how well the outputs correspond to desired achievements, i.e.
the intemal and organisational goals.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3.10 The Macro Evaluation - Experimental Design
3.10.1. To retum to the original proposition, it is an illusionary
concept that causality in policing systems research may be
ascribed with complete certainty outside pure
experimentation, or total elimination in order to arrive at a
singular explanation. This situation is not unique since
similar problems are posed in studies which concem for
instance, macro economic research.
3.10.2. The methodologies adopted therefore have to recognise and
cope with these difficulties. The situation is summarised in
Checkland's (1972) description of action research:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"The point is, being concerned with intervention in
purposeful systems, the action researcher , unlike the
researcher in experimental sciencezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAor techn logy can
express his research aims as hopes, but cannot with
certainty design them into his experiments. He is
prepared to react to whatever happens in the research
situation; he has to follow wherever the situation leads
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him, or stop the research."zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(in Beish and Peters 1976
pg. 57)
3.10.3. The aim should thereforezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe to ap roach th study with as
much rigour as resources allow and to fully exploit the
techniques and methodologies available. The altemative is
to ignore the complexity of the organisational/environmental
interactions and concentrate on limited, but necessarily
isolated evaluations, which due to their nature are generally
simpler and therefore more manageable.
3.10.4. The usual attempt in any experimental design is to match
conditions and subjects as closely as possible with only the
experimental treatment as a variable, i.e. treatment and
control. This proved to be impossible in the context of the
N.P. project and is now considered inappropriate in the
context of policing systems due primarily to the difficulty of
securing a truly equivalent control group that is subject to the
same environmental inputs.
3.10.5. The environments of each police station have their own
unique and distinct characteristics, making each markedly
different from each other, despite their many apparently
equivalent features. The police practices, methods and
individuals at the selected stations also differ, although the
police officers themselves displayed many similarities which
were to prove significant. Although the sites had a great
number of common factors they had significantly more
differences and it had to be accepted that the concept of a
control site was inappropriate. Additionally, the
implementation of very similar treatments on a force wide
basis through the action planning process removed any
possibility of an equivalent control group being maintained.
(Paragraph 3.3.3)
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3.10.6. Therefore, a change to the macro evaluation project design
was made. The new macro evaluation was to comprise three
features as follows:
i. repeated treatments,
ii. interrupted time series,
iii. case studies.
3.11 RepeatedTreatments
3.11.1. It was considered that the difficulty of securing an equivalent
control group could be overcome to some extent by using
the four police station sites to control against each other.
Cook and Campbell (1979) specified a model for a
repeated treatment experimental design whereby at a
single condition, treatments are phased in and out and a
judgement is made as to attribution on the basis of the
resulting time series.
3.11.2. This would seem not to be a totally practical solution for a
complete policing system although the approach did seem to
have possibilities at the micro level. However it was thought
possible to repeat the implementation of a similar range of
treatments at each of the four sites in sequence. Should
similar outputs be observed at all four sites then some
certainty might be ascribed to the association between
output and treatment. If each site displayed a similar trend
across a range of similar indicators then overall attribution
might be ascribed to the project treatments.
3.11.3. Say the probability of any given system output occurring by
chance, or some wider organisational design is P[0.51 for
each of the four test conditions. Assuming that the
probability of the system outputs occurring by design of the
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project is higher, say P[0.75], then the probability of the
specified outputs occurring by chance at all four conditions
would be P[O.06] (i.e. P[0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5]) but the
probability of all occurring by design would be much higher,
P[0.32]. Therefore, should the four test conditions show
substantial similarity in findings then it would be probable
that there was a non-random effect occurring and some
judgements may be made as to attribution.
3.12 Interrupted Time Series
3.12.1. Secondly, implementation of treatments was to be phased
between the four test conditions which thus established
four separate sequences of implementations which are
considered as four simple interrupted time series. At its most
basic, a simple interrupted time series requires one test
condition and multiple observations before and after a
treatment. However, in the case of the N.P. project, it would·
be known with some precision when the various treatments
were applied to the four test conditions. It would therefore be
possible to observe when and whether the expected
changes had occurred after implementation. Le. there
would be some interruption to the established output which
would be repeated at the four test conditions in sequence.
3.12.2. It would not be known until after the treatments have been
applied to the first condition the extentzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof the time lag before
an interruption occurs. However, once this has been
established at the first condition, a similar finding after a
similar lag at the second and subsequent site would provide
some re-enforcement to judgements as to attribution. This
method is somewhat more problematic than the earlier
design in that the speed of the effect of the treatments
would depend largely on the organisations receptiveness to
change at the test conditions, which is largely outside the
control of the proiect,
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3.12.3. Much of the data required to create the time series models
would already exist in police archives. The duration of the
project would almost certainly be too short to establish
reliable time series of data specifically collected for the
evaluation. By utilising data collected for other purposes as
a part of the routine organisation functioning it would be
possible to establish the necessary time series.
3.12.4. However, such an exercise would not be without difficulties.
Seasonality, other exogenous cyclical variations, variations
in recording practices, inappropriate data groupings (weekly,
monthly, annual etc.) and the very limited availability of
behavioural data would all complicate and thus reduce the
rigour of this approach. Despite these difficulties, the use
of archive material was considered appropriate as the
sources were readily available and thus cost effective.
Amongst those suggested sources were:-
i. reported crimes, including arrests and clear-ups,
ii. reported traffic accidents,
iii. police response data,
iv. staffing levels,
v. demographic data, (Le. local age profile)
vi. racial attack and other minority group incident
data,
vii. juvenile crime statistics,
viii. public order tension indicators,
ix. police sickness,
x. complaints against police,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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3.13 CaseStudies
3.13.1. Thirdly, the N.P. project by its very nature, might be
assessed by four separate case studies whereby the
progress of the project is objectively observed at each test
site. Without the benefit of any comparative assessments,
case studies in isolation are still able to provide a useful
assessment of change.
3.13.2. The principal benefit arises from the un-confounded pre-test
information that was taken at the beginning of the project
before the structure and output of the project were widely
known at station level. Additionally the pre-test data taken
form the other stations involved form a reliable base line
from which individual station case studies might be
commenced.
3.14 The Modified Experimental Design
3.14.1. The three foregoing features that comprise the multiple
method approach for the N.P. project were to be applied to
four separate sites, or test conditions. The results from each
site would combine to form a potentially reliable basis from
which a systems level assessment might be made of the
N.P. project.
3.14.2. In London, the original site selection decisions were
reviewed and four divisions were selected to form the new
experimental model. These were to be Notting Hill, Hackney,
Brixton and Kilburn divisions. In the Surrey Constabulary
area the original site selection decisions were not altered
although the concept of a control site was dropped on the
basis of the difficulties described. This left Camberley to be
considered only as a case study.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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3.14.3. The original decision to integrate the management
information system (M.I.S.) into the experimental design
was also dropped and the M.I.S. was considered as a case
study only at one site in London and one in Surrey. The
reasons for this alteration were more practical than
theoretical. Considerable difficulties were experienced with
development of the system which made co-ordinating
implementation with other aspects of the project virtually
impossible. This issue is later discussed in more detail.
(Section 4.3)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3.15 The Micro evaluation - Police Methods and Concepts.
3.15.1. The proposition thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAI••• the prevention of crime as well as the
detection of offenders... IzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1 is an important theoretical goal
and is as appropriate now as when professional police
forces were formed in 1829. However research, (Punch
1979 and Jones 1980) has indicated that the practical reality
of present day policing reflects a bias towards a legally
oriented police organisation where professional police
norms very much favour offender detection as the behaviour
of an 'ideal' police officer and thus constitutes 'real' police
work (Beckett 1981).
3.15.2. The evidence indicated that whilst police have demonstrated
considerable success in some areas, they are gradually
failing in their statutory and publicly expected duties of
crime control (Gurr 1978). It has been argued (Shaffer 1980
and Hart 1981) that the observed offender detection bias
constitutes an ineffective police strategy and that more
prevention oriented policies must be implemented by police.
The N.P. project attempted to .add evidence to this
proposition through the micro evaluation studies.
1This quotation is attributed to Char1es Rowan and Richard Mayne, the first joint
Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. (Critchley 1978 pg.52)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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3.15.3. Although the detailed range of micro evaluation studies fall
outside the scope of this present research it is appropriate to
describe the underlying principles and theories in order to
set the N.P. project in context.
3.16 Police Behaviour
3.16.1. Initial research into modem urban policing, (Mawby 1979
and Punch 1979) concluded that contrary to police
preferences, police spend too little time in offender detection
and mainly provide assistance to various members of the
public who are, or consider themselves to be, victims
requiring help.
3.16.2. The type of help demanded and usually provided is the type
of help or assistance one might reasonably expect from a
concerned fellow citizen. (Manning 1977). The evidence
would therefore indicate that professional police behaviour
is made up of large amounts of helping or prosocial
behaviour responses directed at victimised members of the
public.
3.16.3. The N.P. project suggested that it may be possible to
influence and increase the development of prosocial
behaviour in both police and public. The model developed
by the project was based on theories by Staub (1978) and
provides a testable framework within which it is possible to
influence the behaviour of individuals.
3.16.4. The most direct methods of influence are either by providing
experience and improving competence, or by providing
rewards and enhancing self esteem when prosocial
behaviour is exhibited. Environmental influences are also
considered important in creating the 'ideal' conditions for
prosocial behaviour to be the accepted norm. It is in this
context that the adoption of personal modelling within azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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social learning paradigm (Bandura 1971) is suggested tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe
a powerful aid to developing norms of prosocial behaviour
in individuals.
3.16.5. The primary response that the N.P. project suggested to be
important to policing behaviour was 'victim' helping, that
could be exhibited either by a police officer or a private
citizen. The N.P. project defined victim h'elpingbehaviour as:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
HBehaviourthat benefits other people by providing the
type of help or assistance to a victim of crime, or other
circumstance, which one might reasonably expect from
a concerned fellow dtizen". (Beckett 1981)
3.16.6. The N.P. project proposed three hypotheses on the basis of
this assertion (Beckett 1981) which are stated informally as:
i. an increase in victim helping behaviour will
increase public satisfaction with police,
ii. an increase in victim helping behaviour by police
will predict an increase in such helping behaviour
by members of the public, (on the basis of social
learning)
iii. an increase in victim helping by community
members will predict a reduction in street crime.
3.16.7. It was recognised that it would be extremely difficult to
introduce a practical police strategy in an urban
environment that would stimulate individual members of
the public to be influenced in such a way, simply due to the
"numbers of individuals concerned. It was suggested that a
possible means of influencing the desired behaviours and
reducing the challenge to rnanaqeable proportions was to
use group learning techniques through established
community groups. (Beckett 1981)
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3.16.8. The community group appeared to be the most appropriate
vehicle for influencing deviant behaviour towards beneficial
group norms. In the police context, deviant behaviour is
taken to encompass outside, or street crime.
3.16.9. The urban environment appeared to militate against the
successful maintenance of such community groups, the
bias being towards smaller and smaller units of people and
many isolated individuals.
3.16.10. Additionally, the range and diversity of such groups tends
to suggest that consensus about norms of behaviour may
only be achieved in respect of the most extreme forms of
deviance. Although some groups such as deviant criminal
gangs find the urban environment more conducive to
formation and maintenance, finding as they do, sufficient
individuals with like deviant norms to form a group and an
environment in which their type of behaviour is successful.
3.16.11. It was suggested (Beckett 1981) that the most important
requirement is a behaviour which can be measured at both
the individual and community (group) level. He concluded
that such behaviour could be called 'community helping
behaviour' and was defined aszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAHBehaviour that benefits the
creation, development or stability of a community group the
function of which is to increase services to the communny"
3.16.12. The significant difference between community helping and
victim helping behaviours is that community helping is
aimed at groups of people rather than the individually
oriented victim helping behaviour.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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3.16.13. The N.P. project suggested that by using the influence of
modelling on behaviour. communities might be created and
maintained in an urban environment. The agents in such a
process would be professional police officers and public
volunteers. The project thus proposed five further
hypotheses which are informally stated as:
i. an increasing community helping behaviour by police
will increase public satisfaction with police.
ii. an increase in community helping behaviour by police
and a significant number of directly influenced
community volunteers will increase the overall level of
positive community oriented activities and will predict
an increase in the level of community helping
responses by indirectly influenced community
members. (through social learning)
iii. an increase in community helping behaviour by
community members will predict an increase in victim
helping behaviour by community members.
iv. an increase in community helping behaviour and victim
helping behaviour by community memberswill predict a
decrease in the actual level of street crime in the
geographical boundaries of that community.
v. an increase in community helping behaviour and victim
helping behaviour by members of the community will
predict a decrease in community demands for
immediate police response services.
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3.16.14. It will be noted that increases in both victim and community
helping behaviour by police are suggested to have little
effect other than initially increasing public satisfaction. This
is because it was thought that such behaviour in isolation
by the police without full public participation would only
serve to further fuel the police response loop previously
described. (Figure 2.1)
3.16.15. In order to stabilise the loop or even reduce it, input is
required from the public, thus emphasising that services are
not free in that they entail a social cost to the users. In this
way it was suggested that a reduction in the demand for
police services might be brought about. (Beckett and Hart
1981)
3.16.16. The vital element in this policing strategy was the front line,
foot patrol officer who interacted with the public on a day to
day basis. However, as indicated previously it was thought
that the existing police organisational system was not
conducive to such a complex tactic to support the required
police behaviours.
3.16.17. Therefore the N.P. project suggested a number of
organisational, structural and process changes in order to
more appropriately support a policing system that
reinforced such behaviours rather than constraining them.
3.16.18. The dependant nature of front line policing on its
environment indicates that considerable attention should be
given to developing a more open system at lower levels in
order that police officers mayzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe more responsive to their
environment. Additionally, the complex nature of such work
with little discernible end product and the difficulties of
effective supervision suggest that 'small work groups may
provide the most appropriate front line structure.
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3.16.19. The training of front line officers for the N.P. project thus
had two aims. Firstly to enable individuals to internalise and
understand the organisational. goals and secondly to
enhance competence in the various types of behaviour
within geographically assigned work teams. Two further
hypotheses were thus proposed which are simply stated
as:
i. a change in police training and organisational
rewards/reinforcement will change police
attitudes,
ii. a change in police training, organisational
rewards/reinforcement and police attitudes will
predict a change in police behaviour.
3.17 The Micro Evaluation Model
3.17.1. The N.P. micro evaluation contained fifteen separate
variables arising from the ten hypotheses. These are
summarised in the signed di-graph at Figure 3.5. This
systematic representation shows how the various elements
of the micro behavioural aspect of the project relate
together.
3.17.2. In Figure 3.5, the circles represent the various
hypothesised behaviours described in Section 3.16. The
connecting lines and arrows indicate the directionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof ei her
an augmenting effect, indicated by a [+] sign, or an
inhibiting effect indicated by a [-) sign.
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[0)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA= Hyp thesis d Behaviour, V.H.B. = VI tim Helping ~r, C.H.B. = Community Helping
Behaviour, [ot -) = Direction of inhibiting effect, [ot +) = Direction of augmenting effect.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Figure 3.5 Signed Di-graph of Micro Evaluation
Aggregate Variables
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CHAPTER FOURzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
SummaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Chapter Four describes the systems approach to the implementation
of the Neighbourhood Policing (N.P.) treatments. The concept of
delivery systems for the implementation of change are introduced
and the relationship between the strategic aims of N.P. and policing
sub-systems are described. The evaluations of the trials of N.P. are
reviewed within the context and purpose of the delivery systems and
judgements are made on the basis of the available evidence as to
the benefits of the outputs. It is concluded that N.P. was not judged
to be an overall success. It is asserted that this outcome is equivocal
and more likely to have occurred as a result of the process of
change and implementation, rather than the systems approach used,
the appropriateness of the N.P. strategy,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAor the design of the
individual elements.
4.1 The Approach to Implementation
4.1.1. Throughout the planning of N.P., a systems approach
advanced by Jenkins (1976) was adopted and advocated.
Jenkins suggested that successful change to organisational
systems had to be achieved by an overall and holistic
approach. He rejected a reductionist approach on the
grounds of the rapidly increasing complexity of modem
organisations. He argued that organisations would come to
depend on overall and co-ordinated system functioning for
success and competitiveness.
4.1.2. The implications of Jenkins (1976) approach for policing
organisations were that plans would be necessary for
changes to the entire policing system at a police station,
rather than to progress with a more conventional,
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incremental and piecemeal approach. The desirability and
potential benefits of adopting such an approach was
reinforced by a number of prominent writers on systems
approaches to organisational change. (Beer 1980,
Checkland 1972, Cleland and King 1983, Koontz and
O'Donnell 1976, Kast and Rosenzweig 1981 et al)
4.1.3. It was repeatedly asserted by the authorszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof N.P. (Beckett
and Hart 1981) that introducing change to a single feature
of the police system in isolation should be avoided. Arguing
that it was considered probable that little benefit from the
change would be realised. It was suggested that
dysfunctional influences of existing components of the
pOlicing system, that were not designed to co-ordinate with
new elements, would negate the benefits of change.
(Cleland and King 1972)
4.1.4. N.P. was designed as a synergistic system whereby each
element of N.P. system relied upon other elements
operating efficiently in order that potential effectiveness
could be realised. Therefore it was argued to be
conceptually inappropriate to implement each element in a
sequence, whereby each succeeding element would only be
introduced as the preceding change was seen to be
effective.
4.1.5. In order to overcome this problem, whilst avoiding further
difficulties associated with implementing each treatment
simultaneously, N.P. was designed so as to facilitate
sequential implementation of groups of elements. (Chapter
5) A detailed implementation plan was prepared and
presented in the form of a P.E.R.T. chart from which a series
of more detailed of flow charts were developed. The charts
showed the sequence of changes that were designed to
provide a logical and timed progression from one change
event to the next. (The P.E.R.T. chart and samples of
detailed flow charts are reproduced in a reduced format at
Appendix A.)
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4.1.6. The proposed advantage of this approach was seen to be a
compromise between a sudden, total system change, that
could be argued to be unethical, (Beckett 1981) and a more
protracted approach. On the basis of the evidence relating to
systems approacheszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) it was considered by the authors
that if each element of N.P. were introduced separately and
sequentially, then evaluated and assessed, the overall
implementation time would be unacceptably extended and
the potential advantages of the systems approach could be
lost. (The relative advantages and disadvantages of differing
approaches and timings of implementations are discussed in
detail at Chapter Five.)
4.1.7. Whilst there is a logical sequence to the programme of N.P.
changes, it was apparent that the sequence would need to
be varied to suit local circumstances. Factors such as the
motivation of local management, equipment availability,
training capacity and variations in the speed of
dissemination of information about the changes would all
influence both the pace and sequence of the changes.
4.1.8. In order to manage the resulting complexity, the N.P.
elements are organised into groups according to their
strategic aim as described in the original proposals. (Section
2.16.) The elements grouped in this way provide a
manageable sequence for the implementation of changes
and may be considered as change delivery systems. The
principal feature of a change delivery system being that it
combines elements of the policing sub-systems into a unified
change initiative, i.e. outputs (I & B) and (RI & RB) shown in
Figure 3.3. Here, individual police officers and their
resources work in a new structure, with new procedures, to
bring about the actual alterations in routine police work that
win achieve the strategic aims viz.:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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i. demand management,
ii. police organisation and efficiency,
iii. the police/public contract.
4.1.9. Demand management elements were to be introduced first,
in order to stabilise the existing policing system. It was
considered in Section 2.4, that some control should be
gained over the demand led nature of policing before new
internal systems to improve organisational efficiency could
succeed.
4.1.10. Such an approach was to be closely linked to the provision
of management information concerning the demands on
police and the associated management systems and
procedures, in order to promote the necessary action and
change. Finally, with demand, management and
organisational systems introduced, it would be possible to
implement the policing behavioural changes that would
address the police public contract and thus the preventive
aims of N.P.
4.1.11. Conceptually the implementation sequence for N.P. is as
described at Section 2.15. and in Figure 2.7. Below, the
stages of the implementation sequence are summarised
with a feedback loop and comparison to the original
situation. The design of N.P. envisaged a continuous
process of feedback from each of the groups of treatments
as they were implemented. In this way it was envisaged that
the system wouldzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe adaptive to local onditions.
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4.1.12. The comparisons of outputs with the original situation wouldzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
be made on the basis of monitoring. measuring and
evaluation at the macro level as set out in outline at Figure
2.7 and in more detail in Chapter Three. Data for monitoring
purposes would be available form the M.I.S. and D.I.I.U. and
feedback from management and staff would provide the
qualitative comparison.
Police System Inputs I
Infonnation
~
Management f---
Systems Systems
Structures I Police S
and r-.. PoliceI Behaviour
I Procedures
I
I
I
ystern OUtputs IzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
I \
I \
: Compare II
: to original :
I situation :
I I
I I
I I I I
I J e.g. ~ J
: evaluations, :
I monitoring, :
I measurement, :
I II management and:
\ staff feedback. !
\ IzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
'--------------_./
Implemen1ation of B follows A
Feedback & ComparitDr Loop
- ~
Figure 4.1 N.P. Learning Related Implementation Sequence
111
4.2 SystemEvaluation
4.2.1. The approach to evaluation set out in Chapter Three
describes how an assessment of the overall system
functioning might be achieved without necessarily
understanding in detail, the nature of the interactions in the
'black box'. (Paragraph 3.8.4.) It was not therefore proposed
as necessary to understand precisely how each of the
elements of the system interacted with each other. Rather, it
would be necessary to know whether each element was
producing the desired output in order to complement and co-
ordinate with other elements of the system. The outputs of
the N.P. system, whether beneficial or otherwise, would be
considered at the macro or system level, rather than by
conSideringeach element in isolation.
4.2.2. For this purpose, the elements of the N.P. system may be
most conveniently analysed within the three strategic areas
associated with their respective delivery systems 'as
described before. (Paragraph 4.1.8) The association
between police sub-systems and the delivery systems are
shown in the diagram at Figure 4.2.
4.2.3. Here, the police sub-systems (Section 3.6) are shown
interacting together to produce a collective output. This
amounts to the total police system output to the environment.
The total output is then shown as divided into three delivery
systems which operationalise the specified changes. The
changes produced then affect the human and physical
policing environment, as well as feeding back to the police
sub-systems. The feedback therefore bringing about
changes to the overall policing system.
4.2.4. Each of the police delivery systems contain a group of the
N.P. treatments or elements that either associate together
by virtue of their strategic aim, or which are mutually
supporting by virtue of their synergistic relationship. (4.1.4)
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Figure 4.2 Police Operations Delivery Systems
4.2.5. Pragmatically, it will be apparent in that each N.P. element is
not mutually exclusive, or solely confined in its operation to a
single strategic purpose or delivery system. Each element
whilst operating within its own sub-system, will have an
influence on a range of other elements, thus influencing their
operation and other strategic aims. This is the practical
realisation of systems concepts applied to a real world
organisational systems and illustrative of the complexity
involved in the process of change.
4.2.6. The N.P. elements grouped according to their delivery
systems are shown at Figure 4.3.
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DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Demand Police Organisation Police Public
Management and Efficiency Contract
Management Geographic Information
information system responsibility exchange
and divisional
information and Directed patrolling Community crime
intelligence unit prevention
Targeting and
Aligning duties to surveillance Community and
demands victim helping
Participative
Crime management management Community
and case screening development
Sector and divisional
Graded response to planning
demands
Dedicated
communications
officers
Initial and follow on training for N.P.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
(These elements are associated with each delivery system)
Figure 4.3 N.P. Elements in Delivery System Groups
4.2.7. A review of the elements of the N.P. system follows, where
each element is evaluated in the sequence shown in Figure
4.3 within delivery system groups. Each element iszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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assessed in the context of associated objectives including
training, together with how each operates within its own
particular policing sub-system. ·Also considered is the
interaction and co-ordination with other elements and sub-
systems in accordance with the evaluation concept
described in Chapter Three. Training .as a separate subject
is considered within the police organisation and efficiency
section.
4.3zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBADemand Management - he M.I.S. and D.I.I.U.
4.3.1. The original problem situation summarised by the self
reinforcing, 'reactive loop' of demands shown at Figure 2.1
represented the first strategic area to be tackled. Central to
achieving success in this regard, was to be quantitative
monitoring of incoming demands on police by the station
based management information system (M.I.S.).
4.3.2. Over a period of two years commencing in August 1981
with the assistance of the Management Services Department
and the Department of Computing Services of the
MetropOlitan Police, the N.P. project team designed and
installed a working M.I.S. at three of the test stations. (Figure
2.2)
4.3.3. The M.I.S. was designed to process data inputs captured
from incoming demands (incident information) to the station
which incorporated location, day, time, type and result
·information. Resource availability data was also to be a
feature of the design, enabling managers to assess how staff
availability corresponded to the station demand profile
throughout each twenty-four hour period. This information
was essential for adjustments to be made to officers' shift
and deployment pattems. Outputs were provided in the form
of daily, weekly and four weekly charts which displayed
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summary information in the fromzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof bar charts an pie charts.
(Hall and Hart 1983)
4.3.4. The M.I.S. was installed in conjunction with the creation of
the N.P. element known as the 'Divisional Information and
Intelligence Unit' (D.I.I.U.). This small unit was staffed by
two or three police officers and civilian staff who were
responsible for operating the M.I.S., collecting and collating
other relevant information and preparing it for dissemination
to appropriate managers and staff.
4.3.5. This section will demonstrate that the concept of the D.I.I.U.
may be claimed to be one of the major successes of the
N.P. project, although at the experimental stage a number of
major difficulties limited the potential effectiveness of the
units.
4.3.6. Despite the early setbacks, by the mid 1980's every division
in London was operating such a D.I.I.U. and the Metropolitan
Police had published an internal booklet setting out
guidelines and best practice for establishing and running
such units. (M.P.S. 1991). The progress and development of
the experimental M.I.S. to this point was not straightforward
however, nor originally successful in relation to the
realisation of the design expectations. (Atkinson and
Wilmore 1984)
4.3.7. The M.I.S suffered from a sequence of major setbacks and
delays, anyone of which having the potential to terminate
the M.I.S. project. (Atkinson and Wilmore 1984; Irving et al
1989) These may be summarised as follows:
i. the bespoke software was very unreliable in an
operational setting, despite having passed acceptance
testing,
ii. the software did not conform to the user requirement
(Hall and Hart 1983) in several significant respects
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which reduced functionality, e.g. the M.I.S. could not
show the numbers of incoming demands to the police
station by timezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof day or beat, a mapping feature was
not provided, duty state information (staff availability
data) was not provided and the software suite was so
highly structured that enhancements and changes
could not easily be realised,
iii. the choice of hardware proved to be inappropriate
both in terms of reliability and suitability for the
software suit,
iv. the M.I.S. system design was not generally seen by
the end users as wholly appropriate to their needs,
v. the implementation process suffered from a series of
delays and system failures, although the training given
to operators and the appreciation presentations for
supervisors and managers were generally successful
and appreciated.
4.3.8. The external evaluators, (The Police Foundation) were
convinced of the worth of the concept of the M.I.S.
describing it aszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAH... the logical hub of the N.P. whee!..."
(Irving et al 1989 pg. 69). This confidence was seen to have
been well placed, as by 1987 the Metropolitan Police had
fully adopted the concept of the M.I.S. and adapted the
functions into a station based microcomputer system called
T.O.P.S.Y. (Territorial OPerations SYstem). The essential
difference between the original M.I.S. and T.O.P.S.Y. was a
greater degree of user flexibility built into the latter. This
was almost certainly achieved by result of packaged
software developments, as opposed to the bespoke software
approach used for the experimental M.I.S.
4.3.9. Despite the longer term success of the station based M.I.S.
concept, the evaluators were critical of both the N.P. project
team and operational officers involved in trying to establish
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the M.I.S. (Irving et al 1989). Criticism at the station level
centred upon the reluctance of most local officers to
appreciate or foresee how such a.system could be of value
to their work. Operational officers could see value in a
system that collated criminal intelligence information, but not
one that collated and presented only statistical data
concerning incoming demands. A number of presentations
on the subject of the M.I.S. were made by project team
officers, but these only served to raise the expectations of
local officers which were subsequently to be unrealised by
the actual performance of the computer system (Irving et al
1989)
4.3.10. The project team was widely criticised by the evaluators in
respect of the M.I.S. design, the realisation and the
implementation of the computer system and the 0.1.1. U.
concept. It is difficult to find any positive assessments of the
M.I.S. or O.l.I.U. in any of the evaluation material. Turner
(1987[a]) goes even further than Irving (1989) in his
condemnation and stateszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAH••• the cost effectiv ness of thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
0././. U. was rated as zero or margina/ ... H (pg. 26)
4.3.11. It would be misleading to attempt to speculate as to which
single factor was the major cause of the early rejection and
failure of the M.I.S. There is little doubt that any of the above
factors could have the potential to produce a situation that
would result in a failure. It seems more likely however, that .
the initial M.I.S. suffered from the combined effect of a
number of faults and shortcomings, which resulted in both a
failure of the computer system itself, and the associated
temporary rejection of it by police station users. The issue of
the human reaction to change and cultural resistance to it, is
discussed in more detail in Chapters Five and Six. But it is
worthy of note at this stage, that a possible reason for the
failure of the M.I.S. concerns the issue that the M.I.S. had
the potential to alter the style of policing undertaken by local
officers. The M.I.S. output if acted upon, would have focused
management attention on the nature and extent of incoming
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demands and the police response to them, rather than the
arrest and charge rate that had been the traditional implied
measure of performance. (Smith et al 1983) Such an
emphasis would alter the style of local policingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAaway from a
law enforcement orientation towards a more service
directed approach which was one of the strategic aims of
N.P. (Paragraph 2.7.1.)
4.3.12. Such a possibility was not addressed by the evaluators;
neither was the desirability of linking the provision of
management information to the strategic needs of the whole
organisation. AtkinsonzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& Wilmore (1984) advanced the view
that the operational officers' role should be linked to the
provision of appropriate information. They comment, "The
primary problem appears to be the lack of (a force wide)
planning strategy for information." (pg. 105) Despite the
views of the objective evaluators the concept of station
based computerised information systems has grown in
popularity and by the 1990s considerable emphasis was to
be placed upon quantitative analysis of demands,
resources and performance at every Metropolitan police
station. (M.P.S. 1991) So desirable is this now seen by both
police for operational purposes and public and govemment
for accountability purposes, the regular reporting of police
performance information has become a statutory
requirement. (Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994
Section 4. Ch. 29)
4.3.13. One common finding that emerges from each of the three
separate evaluations of the M.I.S. and D.I.I.U. (Atkinson and
Wilmore 1984; Tumer 1987; Irving et al 1989) is the failure
'of the Metropolitan Police as it was then organised, to
adequately develop and co-ordinate the actual operational
data needs of practising officers with potential technological
solutions. Possible reasons for this in the context of the
dynamics of change processes in both organisations and
humans are examined in more detail in Chapters Five and
Six. The specific findings from the reports of the above N.P.
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evaluators regarding the likely organisational reasons for
poor technological support, may be summarised as follows:
i. a lack of clarity as to the organisations' priorities,
ii. the absence of a corresponding information strategy,
iii. a computing department largely familiar with only
bespoke software and large centralised mainframe
applications,
iv. little organisational experience of representing
operational users' priorities in the design of flexible
computer solutions,
v. organisational size, structure and culture unsuited to
quickly developing small computer applications,
vi. an unfamiliarity at operational levels of the potential of
'micro' (personal) computers,
vii. an unfamiliarity at operational management levels in
both specifying and using information to improve
performance.
viii. a traditional reliance on reported crime statistics as
the principal barometer of the police environment.
4.4 Demand Management- Aligning Dutieswith Demands
4.4.1. The proposal to align police officers duty times to
correspond to the hourly time profile of incoming demands is
essentially straightforward in concept. Practically, it is
dependant upon the ability of a police station to accurately
measure the incoming rate of demands from the public
across a 24 hour period for each day of the week.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Operational officers are then assigned to duty times that
correspond to need, i.e. larger numbers on duty at times of
predictable peak demand, reducing to minimum numbers at
times of forecast zero, or minimal demand.
4.4.2. It is an essential feature of police operations that sufficient
staff are available at all times to react satisfactorily to
emergencies. But the tradition and practice in London as
well as in many forces elsewhere, had been to divide the
operational officers at any particular division into four
separate work groups of approximately equal numbers. The
work groups, known in London as 'reliefs' and typically
identified as A, B, C, or 0, were then assigned to an 8 hour
tour of duty, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. (early), 2 p.m. to 10 p.m.
(late), or 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. (night) with the fourth relief having
a rest day. A roster was applied that covered a twenty-eight
day period and ensured that each relief worked for 7 days
each of early shift I late shift and night duties with 8 rest
days in any twenty-eight day period. (The eighth rest day
being taken on a rotational basis, usually when a 6 am to 2
p.m. shift was rostered)
4.4.3. A predictable and administratively convenient system thus
ensured that an equal number of officers were on duty
throughout any 24 hour period.
4.4.4. The advantages of this methodwere:
i. simple and straightforward to manage and administer,
ii. routine and easily predictable staffing levels,
iii. supply of officers invariably exceeded demands at
slack times and thus a contingent staffing level was
available for sudden emergencies,
iv. duties and leisure activities were straightforward for
individuals to plan well into the future,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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v. officers always worked with the same colleagues and
supervisors, thus strong team identity was established
for each relief.
4.4.5. The rules and regulations that controlled these conditions of
employment were incorporated into legislation through
statutory instruments and the Police Regulations enacted
under primary legislation of the Police Act in 1964.
Therefore there was little local managers could alter in
respect of basic working practices without the active co-
operation of the work force and staff associations.
4.4.6. It was considered by the N.P. project team that the variability
of incoming demands to a police station fluctuated
sufficiently throughout the day so as to make alterations to
the existing system worthwhile. A sample frame was
developed that randomised internal and external variables to
produce a mean daily rate of incoming demands that
required a response from police. The example shown below
is in respect of Notting Hill police station, but similar tables
were produced for all other experimental sites, all of which'
showed broadly similar profiles.
Mon Tues Wed Thur Frid Sat Sun Total
Early 10 15 16 14 17 12 9 93
Late 31 25 33 26 19 22 18 174
Night 12zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA7 10 14 14 17 11 85
Total 25 15 15 27 26 30 15 153
Figure 4.4 Notting Hill Division - Mean Daily Response Messages
4.4.7. It will be seen at Figure 4.4. that the late shift is considerably
busier than the other two shifts, although less significantly so
at weekends. Furffier data collections established a reliablezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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pattern on an hourly as opposed to shift basis. This more
detailed analysis illustrated how the majority of demands
arose before 2.00 am on night duty and after 8.00 am on
early shift. This pattern was similarly repeated across each
division tested by the N.P. project team, although some
significant variations arose at weekends at different
locations. There was no evidence of seasonality where the
data collections were repeated at intervals of several
months, or any evidence to suggest that there was any
pattern to the severity or difficulty of the demands.
4.4.8. This in itself was an important finding in that the amount of
police time consumed by any single demand is not only a
function of its severity, but also its difficulty in terms of
complexity or uniqueness. For instance, a domestic murder
although severe in nature, is a potentially straightforward
matter for the responding officers, especially if the suspect
has remained at the scene. After the initial response, the
investigation would be entirely handed over to senior
detective officers. A domestic dispute that has not resulted in
a death however, may be much less severe in character, but
in terms of difficulty, may occupy the responding officers for
many hours.
4.4.9. It was ascertained that severity and difficulty of incoming
demands on the police were randomised across times of the
day and days of the week. Therefore, the basic demand
frequency data shows there is a persuasive argument to
justify altering duty times in order to more closely align
officer availability, with the periods of highest numbers of
incoming demands.
4.4.10. Turner (1987) in his evaluation of N.P. found that the
alteration of officers duties to correspond with incoming
demands was not found to be general practice within the
trial. He suggests that experience at Hackney division was
typical in that the senior officers thought the initiative to be
worthwhile, but not considered to be practical by lower
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ranking officers. This contrasts with the evaluation of the
divisional commander who asserted that:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"From an operational point of view, this was very
successful in combating the (demand) problems
affecting the division. It particularly meant that there
waszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa greater awaren ss of problems and of the varied
responses available to them" (Stapley, 1986 pg. 15)
4.4.11. The Police Foundation evaluation of the Notting Hill trial did
not directly address the issue of duty alterations either in
concept or practice. (Irving et al 1989) Within their report of
observations and discussions with officers at Notting Hill
however, it is clear that there was a strong feeling that the
relief team should remain established in the existing duty
roster pattern. More significantly however, Irving found that
patrolling officers apparently had sufficient time to engage in
more community contact within the existing duty roster
system.
4.4.12. This contrasts sharply with the reports of officers interviewed
within the overall N.P. research. These officers generally'
asserted that they were usually too busy dealing with
incidents that required a response, which prevented them
from engaging in other more proactive functions. Irving's
finding is summarised as follows:
"There is no evidence that the level of incidents which
patrol officers had to deal with precluded engaging in
more community encounters, or further extending the
range and scope of helping and other non-crime
encounters. The message from this analysis is that
patrolling officers appeared to have adequate time to
engage in other activities if they had a mind to.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAn (Irving
1989 pg. 143)
4.4.13. This finding at Notting Hill appears to have been reinforced
to some extent at Brixton where small teams of operational
officers who were allocated to especially busy and sensitive
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areas, adjusted their timeszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof work to match peak demand
times and were reported as being "....zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthe most productiv
work units with a range of multiple objectives being
achieved."(Beckett, 1989 pg. 295)
4.4.14. Although widespread implementation of this initiative did
not occur during the field trial of N.P., there did appear to be
sufficient evidence to emerge from the project to warrant
further exploration of the concept. The major advantages
appearing as:
i. economic, in that a greater proportion of officer time
may be demonstrated as being used productively,
leaving less unaccountable time to be used at the
officers' discretion,
ii. greater visibility of officers to the public during peak
times,
iii. improved efficiency in that more officers are available
to deal with demands at peak times,
iv. the duty roster ean be designed to correspond to loeal
community needs as opposed to administrative
convenience.
4.4.15. The concept of aligning duties to demands was
subsequently implemented throughout the Metropolitan
Police from 1991 onwards (M.P.S. 1992) on the basis of the
foregoing advantages.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4.5 Demand Management - Case Screening and the
Crime Desk
4.5.1. The recording and investigation of allegations of crime
reported to the Metropolitan Police had traditionally been
125
the major functionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof the Criminal Investigation Department
(CID). Minor crimes were generally allocated to more junior
officers and the more serious allegations to progressively
more experienced and senior officers. Functional variations
in the form of specialist squads were frequently established
at divisional level to deal with specific types of crime, Le.
very minor or 'beat crime', robberies, drug dealing, murder
etc. The principal determining factors as to whether to form a
squad, being the seriousness of the problem and/or the
amount of police time allocated to the investigation(s), or
specialist/specific knowledge involved. However the majority
of crime reported to a police station was customarily
allocated by CID supervisors to CID officers to investigate.
4.5.2. It had been illustrated by Hart (1981) and has been
subsequently reinforced in the O.P.R. (1990) that crime
reporting rates, as well as other demands on police have
been steadily increasing, at least over the preceding ten
years. This overall, steady increase of between 7% and 15%
per annum had not been matched by corresponding
increases in police numbers, or in Government or local
authority spending on the police. The result was.
significantly less police time being expended on the
investigation of minor crimes and those crimes where it was
quickly apparent that a successful outcome was unlikely.
CID supervisors were thus in the position of having to make
informal judgements as to which crime would attract more
investigative effort than others. The rationale for this
approach was simply that there was insufficient time to
tackle every crime that was reported with the same rigor as
hitherto.
4.5.3. This was not a unique situation. An almost identical
problem had previously existed in many regions of the USA.
As a result, The Stanford Research Institute (P.E.R.F. 1979)
had conducted a study amongst twenty-six separate police
departments and produced a model for selecting which
cases should be subject of further investigation and which
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should not. Essentially, the model drew from contemporary
research into crime report characteristics and correlated a
range of factors relating to the circumstances of a burglary
and the subsequent reporting to police, with the final
outcome of the investigation. Thus, the greater the incidence
of a particular feature when correlated with successful
outcomes, the greater the value of the feature to an
investigation. Weights in the form of numerical points were
assigned to the features of a crime that were found to be the
most reliable predictors of success in the subsequent
investigation. The weights were allocated according to a
ratio scale, in that a score of 7 represented that the value
of the presence of the particular feature was seven times
more valuable to the investigation, than a feature weighted
at 1. The Stanford model assigned weights as follows:
Estimated range of time of occurrence
(1 to 24 hours since occurrence)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
o to 5
ii Witness report of offence 7
iii 'On view' report of offence 1
iv Usable fingerprints 7
v Suspect information
(Description or name)
9
vi Vehicle description 0.1
vii Any other factors o
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4.5.4. The resulting arithmetic total indicated whether or not the
crime should be 'screened out' and not investigated further
unless additional information came to light. (e.g. in the
Minnesota police agency the score for any single crime had
to exceed 10 for an investigation to proceed)
4.5.5. Essentially the crime screening system was explored as a
means of providing a more methodical and rigorous means
of making management decisions regarding the allocation of
resources to crime investigations, which hitherto had been
made on the basis of an individual's experience and local
circumstances.
4.5.6. The N.P. problem situation (Section 2.6) had clearly
identified the desirability of regulating and managing
incoming crime demands. The Stanford model offered such
an opportunity by incorporating a systematic process into
the overall N.P. model.
4.5.7. In order to administer a similar system, the N.P. project
team suggested it would be necessary to introduce a single
point at which the case screening decision might be made, in
order to ensure consistency. This gave rise to the concept
of the 'crime desk'.
4.5.8. The paper report of each crime made out by a police officer
wouldzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe studied by the crime desk staff who would make
the screening decision in the light of the likelihood of a
successful outcome. The crime desk was to be staffed by
experienced officers who would be available to both police
and public on a 24 hour basis and who would provide a
focus for crime report administration at a police station. The
generalised sequence of the crime report process and the
N.P. case screening system are shown in the diagram at
Figure 4.5.
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AllegationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 4.5 The N.P. Crime Screening System
-
4.5.9. The potential advantages of the case screening and crime
desk systemwere seen as:
i. improved use of C.I.D. officer time,
ii. improved detection rates,
iii. a singe point at which the public could seek information
regarding the progress of an investigation,
iv. a greater opportunity to recognise, co-ordinate and
utilise crime intelligence arising from crime reports,
v. a greater opportunity to recognise crimes following a
pattern or trend.
4.5.10. Turner (1987) produced data from which the following table
is drawn that illustrates the mean proportional rate at which
crimes were screened out at N.P. stations.
Notting Hill Hackney Brixton Kilburn
Beat and
Motor Vehicle 59% 78% 59% 68%
Crimes
Major Crimes
18% 2% 18% 18%and Robberies
Burglaries 26% 78% 74% 52%zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
All 40% 68% 52% 55%
Figure 4.6 Proportion of Reported Crimes 'Screened Out'zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(198617)
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4.5.11. Figure 4.6. shows considerable variation between screening
rates at different locations. These variations tended to
depend on workload and the existence or not of specialist
squads to deal with particular types of crime, e.g. robbery,
burglary etc. (Turner 1987) As might have been expected
however, the screening out rates for the generally less
serious beat and motor vehicle offences are substantially
higher than for the more serious types of crime. In practice
this represented release of a large proportion of C.I.D. officer
time. This time having been previously expended in
investigating predominantly minor crime, or crime that could
have been initially predicted as being realistically unlikely to
successfully conclude.
4.5.12. If the substantial amount of time thus saved had then been
allocated to those cases that showed a higher probability of
successful investigation, then it would be reasonable to
predict that a corresponding increase would be observed in
both arrest and conviction rates for the more serious crimes.
4.5.13. Turner's (1987) analysis of the N.P. stations made
comparisons with the crime report, arrest and conviction
rates for the remainder of the Metropolitan Police and the
1987 British Crime Survey. He concluded that his figureszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...gave no support to the case that case screening has
made any material difference to the allocation of resources
or chance of detections." (Turner 1987 [a] pg. 25)
4.5.14. There could be a number of explanations for this outcome:
i. the actual time saved was not 'new' time, as it is likely
that in practice every crime was not fully investigated
prior to the introduction of case screening - case
screening merely formalised existing practice,
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ii. the time saved was expended on other, non crime
investigation activities,
iii. there exists a natural limit to the number of cases that
have the potential for successful investigation that is
considerably below the report rate - so screening out a
proportion of 'low potential' cases will not influence the
number of 'high potential' cases.
iv. arrest and conviction rates are more sensitive to
factors other than investigative time, e.g. the skill of the
individual officer, information available from informants,
quality of witness accounts etc.
4.5.15. The operation of the crime desk received a similarly
negative evaluation from Tumer (1987). He concluded that
the wider aspects of crime management including dealing
with extemal enquiries were all handled by the crime desk
staff, but there was little evidence that the methods adopted
were any "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAdifferent fro normal practice". (pg. 25)
4.5.16. This is an incomplete finding in that a purpose of the crime
desk was to centralise normal practice at a single physical
location and in this regard it appears to have been
successful. Stapley (1986) in his evaluation is more
positive as to the benefits of the crime desk, especially
insofar that operational officers were released from
administrative functions. He also recognises the benefits of
standardisation in crime management procedures, including"
screening decisions. Beckett (1989), in his assessment of
N.P. at Brixton division, also reports favourable features of
the operation of the crime desk, especially in respect of the
transfer of crime intelligence information to the D.I.I.U.
4.5.17. The findings from the N.P. experiment evaluators are
equivocal in relation to case screening in particular and the
operation of the crime desk concept in general. Despite
some fundamental uncertainties regarding case screening in
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1988, the Metropolitan Police implemented a
comprehensive system of case screening throughout London
which was associated with the implementation of the crime
desk system. The basis of this implementation was a
consensus view from operational detectives that the crime
desk system was the most efficient and effective way to
allocate crimes to investigators, to deal with victim follow up
procedures and to generally manage and account for action
in respect of a" incoming reports of crimes. (M.P.S. Crime
Investigation Priority Project [C.I.P.P.] 1988)
4.5.18. The case screening model that was implemented throughout
the M.P.S. was similar in a" fundamental respects to the
N.P. system. Initia"y, the system was applied to offences of
burglary using those known features of a report of such a
crime that were thought to be reasonable predictors of a
successful outcome. (Paragraph 4.5.3) Case screening was
later extended to other types of theft, dishonesty, damage
and a range of less serious crimes. The rationale for the
implementation was that the growth in the rate of reported
crimes was such that the police were unable to deal with
every crime report as hitherto, and a scheme to prioritise
police effort was therefore essential. (M.P.S. 'C.I.P.P.' 1988,
O.P.R. 1990)
4.5.19. Both case screening and crime desk systems have
subsequently been fully incorporated into police station
crime procedures and become an established feature of
divisional crime management. The operation of both have
been fully justified by extensive intemal research that
examined the complete range of administrative and
management procedures in relation to crime. (M.P.S.
'C.I.P.P.' - Final Confidential Report, 1991)
4.5.20. The questions that remain which will be addressed in
Chapters 5 and 6 concem how and why such initiatives
apparently fail in the short term. Is it the way they arezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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implemented, a staff resistance to change, or that the ideas
themselves are underdeveloped at the outset?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4.6 Demand Management - Targeting and Surveillance
Teams
4.6.1. The N.P. strategy had assumed that the C.I.D. time liberated
by the application of the case screening model and the
operation of the crime desk would be productively applied to
activities of targeting and surveillance. By directing the
energies of experienced detective officers to those known
criminals who persistently commit crime (targeting) and
watching their movements and activities until such time as
they offended, or revealed evidence of offences,
(surveillance) it was suggested that arrest and clear up
levels would increase. Such techniques were not uncommon
hitherto but had largely only been applied to specific types
of crime, usually serious in nature and not to the day to day
investigations at local police stations.
4.6.2. A number of variations were possible for organising officers
to function in this specialised way and the N.P. project
settled on the following three alternative approaches:
i. in the Metropolitan Police, locally based crime squads
to have their establishment supplemented by additional
detective officers (released from more mundane duties'
by case screening) who would identify targets and co-
ordinate the new work with the activities of the crime
squad,
ii. dedicated targeting and surveillance teams might be
created under the overall direction of C.I.D. managers,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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iii. individual C.I.D. officers might be tasked on a rotational
basis to undertake such duties alongside their other
responsibilities.
(This approach was generally less favoured, in that the
benefits of specialisation would be lost in routine day to
day duties.)
4.6.3. Despite the logic of this initiative, the comparative ease of
implementation and the attractiveness of such techniques to
operational police Officers, Turner (1987) could find little
evidence of success in london. He does note that at the
Surrey Police sites some successes were reported and
these were attributable to N.P. He speculates that a
probable cause was that the initiative was largely new to
Surrey and they adopted a dedicated team approach as
outlined above. In london however, the role description of
divisional crime squads in theory at least, already included
this approach to crime detection.
4.6.4. Given the concern of officers respecting criminality and their
reported concern to deal with offenders (Irving et al 1989) it
is surprising to find that they did not take full advantage of
the opportunities presented by this particular aspect of N.P.
It is possible therefore that the explanation concerns issues
not connected with the actual tasks of targeting and
surveillance as criminal investigation techniques, but rather
organisational and/or motivation factors. These and
associated matters are discussed further in Chapters Five
and Six.
4.6.5. It is significant to note at this stage that surveillance and
targeting techniques are now firmly established as major
features of criminal investigation in london. The value of
these approaches is illustrated their use and success as a
part of the recent major anti burglary campaign known as
'Operation Bumblebee' which has been widely publicised
and advertised in the public media during 1993/4. ThiszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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initiative and others utilising a similar approach depend
upon:
i. dedicated officers allocated to deal with all incoming
reports of burglary,
ii. the screening - in of all reports of burglary,
iii. the collation of all potentially useful information from
the scene of each reported burglary,
iv. the collation of intelligence concerning known active
burglars,
v. active follow up of the source of all recovered stolen
property, i.e. markets, car boot sales, dealers etc.
4.6.6. It is not known whether the success of such initiatives is
simply due to the additional resources concentrated on a
particular type of crime, (at cost to some other police
activity), or whether higher levels of resources provide the
opportunity to apply the above combination of techniques. It
seems plausible that where sufficient resources are' not
applied to a specific problem, then diminishing returns in
the form of clear-ups will set in earlier than where a
combined approach is sustained. The decision as to the
extent of resources to apply to the investigation of a
particular crime or category of crimes is often finely
balanced. Under resourcing, even by a marginal level,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmay
result in the total failure of an investigation, whereas a
marginal increase in resources may produce a complete
success. The N.P. trial did not produce any reliable data
to aid such decisions, although such targeting and
combination techniques continue to be regarded with
favour by operational officers.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
136
4.6.7. Again, the question that remains is why, given a negative
evaluation in the N.P. project, targeting and surveillance
techniques have proved to be successful in other settings?
4.7 DemandManagement- Graded Response.
4.7.1. The reactive/demand loop model (Figure 2.1) at the basis of
the N.P. project, shows how police resources are primarily
demand led by external environmental factors. The major
source of such demands arise from members of the public
making a call for a police response, although a minority arise
from administrative sources. Demands occur when an
individual, or an organisation, experiences a difficulty,
problem, or need which might broadly fa" into one or more of
the following categories:
i. a problem to which it is perceived the police might
have, or ought to have a solution, i.e. crimes, traffic
accidents/incidents, law enforcement etc.,
ii. a problem the police are able to completely solve, but
an assumption is made that the police wi" help and/or
may know of an appropriate agency or individual who
will, i.e. lost property, neighbour/domestic disputes,
missing persons etc.,
iii. through desperation in not knowing where else to go to
alleviate a personal or social problem and being
unable to cope with a situation - using the police as the
most easily accessible 24 hour social service, i.e.
homelessness, injury/death, mental illness, fear etc.,
iv. public access to the statutory police roles in respect
of licensing matters, i.e. liquor, firearms, taxis (in
london), aliens registration etc.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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v. internal demands arising from the courts, Crown
Prosecution Service, internal procedures, local and
national government and other administrative sources;
such demands principally concern statutory
responsibilities falling on police support services but
may constitute a demand on operational officers.
4.7.2. Calls for police services may occur at the time of the
incident, at a time when the individual concerned has given
the matter some thought, at a convenient moment, or even
days later when say, in the case of a crime, insurers insist
that a report is made to the police. Thus the nature and
frequency of incoming calls for police
determined by:
attention is
i. the type of incident,
ii. the perceived level of seriousness,
iii. the perception of success of police involvement,
iv. accessibility to a means of contact,
v. convenience to the individual making the report,
vi. statutory or mandatory requirement to report.
4.7.3. It may be appreciated from the foregoing list, (which is not.
exhaustive) that many factors which drive police resource
allocation are not under the immediate control of police.
Additionally, many police organisational surveys have
established that demands on the police arising externally
were increasing substantially against a static resource
profile. (Oxford 1983, O.P.R. 1990)
4.7.4. Therefore as already described, a major feature of the
policing problem situation was the established need tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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provide a fast and immediate response to all incoming
demands for police attention. By providing such a service, it
seemed the police had little opportunity to engage in
proactive work originated by themselves.
4.7.5. The police role had gradually but steadily become
predominantly one of reaction to the public's problems and
this in turn had moved the culture of the police officers
towards a more reactive orientation. This was apparent from
the common habit of officers regu.arly using uncommitted
time waiting for an incoming demand to which they could
react, rather than utilising the time pro actively. (Irving et al
1989, Smith 1983)
4.7.6. The aims of a satisfactory solution to this problem would
thus contribute to moving the goal of policing away from a
predominantly reactive paradigm towards one of a more
preventive orientation. It was apparent that two principle
interventions would be necessary:
i. a mechanistic system for managing demand,
ii. a means of influencing the 'reactive culture'.
4.7.7. The N.P. project proposed that it should be possible to
manage incoming demand in a way that was acceptable
both to the public and the police. This was considered
feasible as it seemed that the public motivation to make a
eall to the police at a particular time was not solely a
determinant of the incident itself.
4.7.8. If incoming demands could be managed to achieve a
smoother demand profile, then an improved utilisation of
resources could be achieved through more rigorous staff
duties planning. Officers would therefore be able to engage
in more preventive activities and work they originated
themselves. Benefits would thus accrue towards influencingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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the demand/reaction loop model and also the cultural bias
that favoured reaction to prevention.
4.7.9. The system that was introduced by N.P. to address this
problem became known as 'graded response'. A number of
other experimental systems were examined, principally from
American police departments that were variously known as
'differential response', 'planned response', etc., but all
essentially sought to manage the police response to
incoming demands, rather than for police to be
predominantly demand led.
4.7.10. The system involved grading incoming calls to a police
station at the time of the report and advising the caller as to
when a police response might be expected. It was found to
be the case and has subsequently been validated by
research (O.P.R. 1991) that the public would generally be
satisfied with a non immediate response to a non urgent
problem, provided they were advised at the time of report. In
other words there is a public expectation that the police will
respond immediately to everything, but there is also a
realisation that it is not practicable, necessary, nor even
desirable to always do so.
4.7.11. The N.P. graded response system that is shown
schematically at Figure 4.7 assigns incoming demands to
four categories as follows:
i.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAImmediate Response - To take precedence overzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAall'
other grading and to result in an immediate
deployment of a police officer, mobile, foot, uniform, or
any other unit, who will arrive at the scene in the
shortest possible time. This category would be an
appropriate response to emergency incidents and
crimes actually in progress.
ii. Delayed Response - To a reasonably urgent, but not
necessarily immediate time scale. A incident where a
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police deployment need not be made straight away and
where if a less pressing response is made, such a
response would not materially effect the outcome. This
category would be appropriate for incidents where a
significant delay had occurred between the time of the
incident and the time of the report to the police.
Additionally the matter wouldzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe non-urgent, either in
respect of the nature of the incident itself, or in relation
to the preservation of evidence, availability of
witnesses etc. This category would require the
agreement and consent of the caller for the police
response to be delayed.
iii. Extended Response - An appointment at a mutually
convenient time to be dealt with by a particular officer
who has the specific skills, or particular knowledge of
the subject matter.
iv. Referred Response - Those calls that essentially seek
advice and which do not require a physical police
response. Customarily such demands are referred to
a department within the police station for the caller to
be given appropriate information or advice.
4.7.12. Detailed criteria and examples of the above were provided at
the experimental sites in order that officers could quickly
appreciate which category applied to any particular incident.
This was important as hitherto the police culture had
strongly reinforced the necessity for an immediate response
to demands from the public and indeed officers were
customarily criticised and in some cases sanctioned for not
dealing with matters with due haste.
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Figure 4.7 The N.P. Graded Response System
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4.7.13. From informal observations after the implementation of this
process, it was seen that officers were uncomfortable with
the concept of introducing a delay into the system which
had previously required immediate attention. The detailed
grading criteria were therefore seen as an important
statement of commitment from senior officers. A major
concern in this respect was the need for an assurance that
sanctions would not be exercised against officers, where
delays they had introduced in good faith, were
subsequently found to have exacerbated or worsened a
situation.
4.7.14. The evaluation of the graded response system may be
seen to be very closely linked with the individual officers
who operated the system. This evaluation is therefore
addressed in the following section. (Section 4.8)
4.8 Demand Management - Dedicated Communications
Officers
4.8.1. In order to properly implement the graded response system it
was necessary to provide adequately trained and
experienced officers to deal with the incoming calls from the
public. Officers working in the divisional control rooms had
been assigned to those posts on a random, daily basis.
Customarily, young or inexperienced officers, officers
recovering from sickness or injury and even those who had
demonstrated unreliability in an operational context, found
themselves posted as control room operators. The task was
not generally popular, largely due to the negative
connotations attached to post holders. (Stapley 1986)
4.8.2. The N.P. project recognised that if graded response was to
succeed, it would be necessary to have officers dedicated to
the posts of control room operators. Appropriate advice was
published on the criteria and selection of suitable staff and
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training was given in both telephone answering techniques
and the mechanics of the graded response system.
4.8.3. It was recognised in the evaluation of N.P. that dedicated
communications staff were "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthe single most valuable
deployer of resources in the station..." (Stapley 1986 pg.
19). However, despite this recognition little effort was
reported from the experimental sites to fully exploit the
benefits of dedicated staff or the associated graded
response system. Tumer (1987) in his reports of Brixton and
Hackney divisions found that neither initiative operated
satisfactorily. He found that once trained, the dedicated
communications staff were not exclusively used as control
room operators and that their training was incomplete,
(although he neglects to specify in which aspect).
4.8.4. The major projected benefit of graded response was not
realised according to Tumer in that the system did not
release any additional officers or officer time into non
responding activities. Neither was there any perceived effect
on public satisfaction, either positively or negatively. Tumer
suggests that if there was any effect then it was too small to
be detected by public survey.
4.8.5. In all the evaluation material associated with the N.P. project
there is little of a positive nature that can be found
respecting the graded response system, or dedicated
communications officers. This is surprising, in that there can
be little doubt that graded response as a procedure'
operated by dedicated communications officers is the gate
keeping sub-system into the larger police organisation. As
noted by Stapley (1986), the effective allocation of police
resources is under their direct control and they" ... markedly
affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the station."(pg. 19)
4.8.6. It was noted earlier that the police culture at a station level
had a strong bias towards reaction as a style of policing.
This officer preference has been noted in a number ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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extensive studies of officer behaviour (Smith 1983, Irving et
al 1989) and probably accounts for the apparent failure of
this aspect of the N.P. system. What is also of significance,
is that given the acknowledgement of senior divisional
officers that such procedures are vital for effective
management, it is surprising to find that the procedures were
not satisfactorily implemented, or implemented incompletely.
4.8.7. On the basis of this analysis, it is reasonable to suggest that
something that might be termed a 'response culture' existed
at police stations. The response culture seems to have
developed as a strong influence on officer behaviour to the
point where officers would rather meet public needs than the
expectations of their senior officers. Irving et al (1989)
reinforced this finding with the observation that whilst
patrolling officers apparently had sufficient time to engage in
proactive work, they generally preferred to wait for a call to
which they would then respond. (Section 4.10.1-2)
4.8.8. Despite the experiences with graded response and
dedicated communications officers associated with the N.P.
project, the M.P.S. took the opportunity to re-introduce the
initiatives at the same time as the introduction of the force
wide computer aided dispatch system (C.A.D.). This London
wide networked system necessitated extensive officer
training to operate the sophisticated computerised message
switching procedures that are associated with the recording
of all incoming calls to the police. Thus operators had to be
dedicated to the control room posts in order to be sufficiently
knowledgeable to efficiently operate the equipment.
4.8.9 Graded response as a procedure was perceived as a
feature of the new technology and today operates as
originally designed. However, despite the acceptance of the
mechanistic procedures of graded response, there has not
been a noticeable alteration in the response culture, or the
preference and perceived significance that officers assign to
being demand led. (O.P.R. 1991)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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4.9 Police Organisation and Efficiency - Geographic
Responsibility
4.9.1. The original N.P. thesis established the proposition that the
association of a police officer with a specific geographic
area or community was preferable to the established model
of time based, or 'relief policing (Beckett and Hart 1981)
The postulation was that officers were more likely to engage
the strategic aims of N.P. (Section 2.8) and thus the day to
day problems of a particular community, if they routinely
worked in the same area. Rather than relying on irregular,
ad hoc visits and patrols for local knowledge that are
associated with time based, response policing. (Sections 2.2
and 2.3)
4.9.2. The basic model that was proposed for geographically
structuring local police service delivery is described in
outline in Section 2.11. This basic model was the simplest
structure that could be derived from the major design
principles of N.P., listed below. The variety of differing
existing police organisation structures militated against
proposing anything other than the most general structure in
the original work to illustrate the principles. It was
acknowledged that local adaptations would be necessary to
the basic structure to suit local conditions and establishment
levels. (Hart 1981)
4.9.3. The desirability of incorporating local flexibility to'
adaptations of the basic model quickly became apparent at
the experimental sites, where each division evolved a
different structure, although each essentially conformed to
the basic design principles (Sections 2.7 and 2.8) as follows:
i. a police system must possess sufficient flexibility and
adaptability to respond quickly to changing inputs from
the environment and from variable elements within the
system,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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ii. police officers should operate within a system that
allows them opportunity to expand their role and
increase their job satisfaction,
iii. team approaches to both reactive and preventive
roles should be adopted and team objectives should
closely coincide with those of the organisation,
iv. the changing environment in which police systems
operate best suit an organic police structure,
v. there is benefit to be achieved from well defined roles
and functions, but flexibility is also significant and a
balance needs to be achieved,
vi. the opportunity for police officers to influence their
career direction is important, but not at cost to the
overall system,
vii. the benefits of functional divisions and specialisation
are limited at divisional level and care should be
exercised over the number of separate functions
created and the corresponding difficulty of co-
ordination and aggregation,
viii. formal and informal information systems are necessary,
ix. the effects of staff establishmentfluctuationsshould
not result in a permanent change to the character of
the system,
x. task allocation should be supervised and non-urgent
tasks used as an opportunity to develop public contact,
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xi. contact should be developed on an interactive basis
with the public,
xii. individual constables should be responsible for
specific, designated geographic areas,
xiii. response policing must be efficient and available on a
regular basis,
xiv. supervisors should have clear roles and
responsibilities,
xv. supervisors must be familiar with the problems and
needs of specific, designated geographic areas,
xvi. supervisors should be responsive to information
systems and be able to co-ordinate the full range of
police resources including functional specialists,
xvii. specialist officers should be associated as closely as
possible with day to day policing.
4.9.4. Many of the above principles are aspirational in character
and therefore may not be totally realised from a structural
design alone. The underlying hypothesis however, was that
the structure of local policing would, to some extent,
determine the character or style of service that was
delivered. Thus, if the organisational structure was.
designed, or had evolved to deliver an efficient response
service, then it was likely that the same structure and
officers operating within it would not be most appropriately
organised for a more proactive, or problem solving approach
to police work. Geographic responsibility was seen by the
authors as the fundamental feature of the N.P. system that
would help to shape and maintain appropriate behaviour of
officers working within it. (Beckett 1981)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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4.9.5. In order to cater for local variations to the organisational
structure, the N.P. project team relied upon the deliberations
of the participative management process and in particular
the divisional working party. (Section 4.9). This resulted in
some extreme variations in structure. Notably at Camberley
in Surrey, the concept of reliefs (time based policing) was
completely abandoned in favour of a structure that gave
geographic assignments to all uniform officers. At Notting
Hill, the relief method was retained for an especially
sensitive portion of the division. (This was thought
appropriate to cater for the unique and symbolic
significance of the All Saints Road areazyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1.) The remainder of
the division was policed by officers who were allocated
specific geographic responsibility but who still retained
membership of the rotating relief work groups. Further
variations and detail adaptations were conceived by the
working parties at Brixton, Kilbum and Hackney which they
considered appropriate for their particular local needs.
4.9.6. Despite the local variations in structure, Tumer (1987) could
not find any visible benefits from geographical responsibility
in crime or clear up rates at any of the sites. It is reasonable
and intuitively sensible to conclude from this finding that
structures in themselves do not materially effect police
performance against crime. Tumer did however suggest
that it was likely that geographic responsibility improved
police contact with community groups, although not with
individuals, so far as he could determine.
4.9.7. Irving et al (1989) concentrated his analysis on the
developmental process of designing a system of geographic
responsibility at Notting Hill. The account describes in
considerable detail, the tortuous group processes of local
management and the project team trying to involve local
1AII Saints Road had been a focal point for drug dealing for a number of years and
had a reputation within the M.P.S. for being a difficult and hostile area to police
effectively and to prevent from becoming a police 'no-go' area.
149
officers through a working party in the design of an
appropriate model. There was much resistance from
operational uniform officers to changes to the existing 'relief
system. The main objections concerned:
i. the alteration of duty times, (described at Section 4.4)
that were closely associated with implementing
geographic responsibility,
ii. difficulties of communication between officers
commencing duty at different times,
iii. maintaining minimum staffing levels in what was seen
as a hostile policing environment.
4.9.8. Perhaps more significantly than the specific objections of
officers to the new system, whether justified or not, Irving's
account describes a process of stalled negotiations and
prevarication by all concerned, covering a period of over 18
months. It is clear form his account, although not specifically
analysed by Irving, that the root of the problem was a deep
underlying resistance to change of any sort that effected the
established relief teams and the very strong culture
associated with those work groups.
4.9.9. Other observers of the N.P. experimental process support
this interpretation. In particular, Stapley (1986) asserts that
geographic responsibility was the most fundamental of all
the changes and was central to allowing the principles of.
good job design to be applied to operational policing. It is so
fundamental that "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmanagers should not look for quick
results.....and results may go down initially." (pg. 28) He
continues by suggesting the police attitude to such change is
"...particularly harsh..." and that "Culture can be a brake on
change..." (pg. 28)
4.9.10. It seems that whilst most objective observers agree that
geographic responsibility is the central and thus the most
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vital element of the N.P. system, it is the change that
attracted the most resistance from operational officers. As
the officer deployment system for N.P. and being closely
linked with staff duty rosters, it is the subject that
substantially affects more officers than any other in the N.P.
change programme. Officers attitudes to working within such
a system free of the encumbrance of the prospect of
change from the known model are therefore highly relevant.
4.9.11. At Brixton, Goddard (1984) and Beckett (1989) report
favourable changes in officer attitudes to a system of
geographic responsibility:
% officers preferring geographic to
time based responsibility
1983 10
1986 70
4.9.12. The same questionnaire survey in 1986 showed that 58% of
officers who had regular experience of geographic
assignments at Brixtonhad agreed that the system had led
to improvements to policing in the area. Few officers (10%)
wanted the system abolished and approximately 1 in 2 felt
they spent more time working on their sectors in:
i. getting to know people,
ii. patrolling on foot,
iii. receiving information from the public,
iv. identifying crime spots and trends,
v. working as part of a team,
vi. looking at long term problems.
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4.9.13. This finding contrasts fairly sharply with the qualitative and
more subjective analysis of observers provided by Irving
(1989) on the Notting Hill experience. Turner (1987)
reinforces Irving's findings so far as Notting Hill senior
officers (Inspectors and above) are concerned, finding that a
reduced proportion thought that geographic responsibility
offered some improvement over a two year period. (83%
reduced to 61%). This finding was broadly repeated at
Hackney, although 75% of inspectors as a group preferred
managing officers with geographic responsibility. It seems
that at least in the case of Hackney, the problem for senior
officers was a frequently reported shortage of officers that
accounted for expressed preference to see changes. (58%)
4.9.14. Turner's work at Brixton (1987b) generally supports
Beckett's positive findings at that division, but both senior
and junior officers wanted to make some detail changes to
the system but did not want to return to the previous
methods of working. Turner found a similar situation at
Kilburn (1987c) where generally attitudes of both senior and
junior officers were positive towards geographic
responsibility, although detail changes were thought
necessary and shortage of staff was seen as the major
cause of problems. 87% of all those surveyed preferring to
continue with geographic responsibility, rather than return to
the former methods.
4.9.15. The frequently expressed concern of both junior and senior .
officers that systems of geographical responsibility require
either more staff, or greater availability of existing staff is not
born out by Turner's analyses. He found no evidence to
support the notion that geographical responsibility,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...consumes more manpower..." than other arrangements.
(Turner 1987c)
4.9.16. The findings from all sources in relation to geographical
responsibility are thus equivocal as might have been
expected given tne variation in models. However, some
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findings, as follows, are consistent across policing
environments and are therefore likely to be repeated
wherever geographic responsibility is implemented:
i. The view of police officers at all levels is generally
supportive of the concept, but officers at operational
level are reluctant to see the demise of the relief
system in favour of geographic responsibility. (Irving et
a11989)
ii. The public have consistently expressed support for any
system that brings uniformed police patrols to their
neighbourhood more frequently in the form of officers
who are known to them. (deKerdrel1983, Wood 1985,
O.P.R. 1990)
iii. The system does not produce a consistent,
measurable improvement in police performance
against crime, or a measurable alteration in number of
crime reports from the public. (Turner 1987)
4.9.17. These findings were generally unsurprising, although it was
to be hoped that police performance against crime in terms
of clear-ups would improve. However, the measurement of
police performance by recourse to reported crime statistics
is an imprecise study due to the variability in the publics'
propensity and motivation to report crimes as demonstrated
by the British Crime Surveys. (Home Office - H.M.S.O.) In
the light of Beckett's (1989) findings in relation to a small
area of Brixton Division, where police crime performance
and reporting rates did show improvements, it is possible
that the measurement methods used by Turner (1987) were
too insensitive to record any crime trends in the time
available.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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4.10 Police Organisation and Efficiency - Directed PatrollingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4.10.1. The elements of the N.P. system not only addressed
structures and procedures, but also police officer behaviours
and activities. Directed patrolling moves police patrol
activity away from random, unplanned patrols towards more
precise tasking and purpose. Customarily, much police
patrol activity is completely discretionary for the most part.
One of the consequences of the introduction of personal
radios from 1966 onwards, was the releasing of officers from
fixed beats or patrols to a far wider area of movement,
whether on foot or mobile. Amongst the effects of this
change has been that officers customarily fill the periods of
time in between responding to calls and other reactive type
duties, with random patrol activity. They generally move
around the area to which they have been assigned as their
initiative takes them.
4.10.2. According to Irving et al (1989), these uncommitted periods
account for well in excess of a quarter of an officers' time,
whether engaged on foot, or on a mobile patrol. In terms of
patrol productivity, this type of random activity does not
maximise the potential benefits of the opportunities
available. Therefore the N.P. project defined a process of
directed patrolling.
4.10.3. At its most basic, directed patrolling is simply extending
conventional officer briefings at the commencement of a shift
to incorporate specific patrol objectives. Such objectives
might concern concentrating patrol activity on a particular
street or area at a particular time with a view to preventing a
repetitious crime, or other incidents of which complaint has
been made. This type of direction is frequently given to
patrOlling officers working in conventional policing systems.
Although the benefits of such direction are far from clear inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
154
termszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof numbers of crimes thus prevented, it will be
apparent to members of the public who notify police of some
regular occurrence, that something has happened in
response to their complaint.
4.10.4. However directed patrolling at its most ambitious is
described in detail by Beckett (1989). The process concerns
a sophisticated grasp of a specific environments' potential
for crime and disorder derived from a divisional D.I.I.U.
(Section 4.3) and then carefully selecting the appropriate
police strategy for officer intervention. The police
intervention is designed to suit the environment and to
secure a solution through public co-operation with
community and victim helping tactics. (Section 3.16) Such
interventions are planned to start with establishing police
public contact, then moving to providing help to both the
community and victims and finally reducing crime and
conflict in a partnership with residents.
4.10.5. At one extreme, N.P. saw directed patrolling as the means
by which areas of acute social instability that were hostile to
police could be managed by officers at both strategic and
practical day to day levels. At the other extreme, directed
patrolling could be used as the means by which high quality
policing services could be efficiently delivered to less
volatile and supportive communities.
4.10.6. The key feature of the initiative was that officers patrol
activities were directed according to a plan that had been
developed by officers with their supervisors. In effect this
meant that the uncommitted random patrol time could be
directed to specific tasks or areas and thus achieving greater
productivity towards identified local problems
4.10.7. The results from the N.P. experiment do not however follow
what might be suggested as the line of least resistance for
the officers involved. It would be reasonable to expect that
the effect of such a treatment might have been more
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successful in a supportive policing environment. However,
neither Turner (1987) or Irving et al (1989) could find any
effects of directed patrolling at any of the N.P. sites in
Surrey or london except Brixton. Here, in arguably one of
the most hostile policing environments, a reduction in
reported crime levels was achieved by directed patrolling
over an extended period.
4.10.8. Turner did not find it possible to attribute crimes prevented
to individual events or occasions of directed patrol (D.P.),
due to the long term nature of the N.P. tactics. The intended
output of directed patrolling was not necessarily seen by the
authors as measured by arrests or crime detections. Rather
as a means of achieving comparative tranquillity in an area,
represented by a decrease in street incidents, an
improvement in safety as a result of police presence and
thus an improvement in the quality of life for people using
the streets.
4.10.9. Over a period of nine months crime steadily reduced in a
section of Brixton division and Turner notes that "zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBADP must
be a candidate for the continuing crime reductions II (Turner
1987[d] pg. 43) This reduction is illustrated by the fall in
residential burglaries across Brixton division during 1985
(Figure 4.8.) when the directed patrolling tactics were
introduced.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1983 1984 1985 1986
3353 4209 3274 3622
2% 25% 22% 11%
Increase Increase Reduction Increase
Figure 4.8 Residential Burglaries - Brixton DivisionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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4.10.10. At minimum, directed patrolling clearly provides at least a
theoretical means of fully utilising officer patrol time.
Where it has been fully implemented and officers directed
towards the resolution of specific, long term problems, the
scheme appears to have met its design objectives, and as
Turner suggests, has shown the potential to achieve
further crime reductions.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) H wever, as with many
organisational changes, the design of a system to ensure
that officers are appropriately directed with patrol
objectives seems to be at the basis of the potential success
of this element of the N.P. system.
4.11 Police Organisation and Efficiency - Participative
Management
4.11.1. Traditional police management processes had tended
towards a quasi militaristic model, the predominant feature
of which was a vertical hierarchy based on rank. Decisions
were taken according to a set of authority levels for
particular subjects or issues and procedures to be followed
were specified in some detail, typically in the now
abolished Metropolitan Police General Orders. (A common
and popular remark in police circles which epitomised the
spirit of General Orders was that they amounted to a
catalogue of the organisation's reaction to every mistake
that had ever been made!)
4.11.2. It was clear to the authors of N.P. that if policing was to
become more responsive to community needs, then
management systems would need to reflect this change by
becoming more flexible. The existing closed system of
decision making would need to be replaced with a
management system that was able to quickly respond to
environmental changes.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
157
4.11.3. As the knowledgezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof community needs generally rested
with the operational levels of police officers, it was
appropriate to design a system of participative
management that allowed the senior officers at a station to
be familiar with the issues confronting their more junior
staff. This seemed little more than common sense for any
organisation. However, due the existence of a highly
prescriptive system of standard operating procedures, the
management task had tended to concentrate on ensuring
conformity with procedures, rather than to allocating
resources to problems and priorities.
4.11.4. The diagram at Figure 2.6 shows the basic N.P. approach
to team management that was quickly to be replaced at
each of the experimental sites with the model shown at
Figure 4.9.
4.11.5. Here, a similar approach is shown to the basic model, but
with the addition of a working party that had been
established at each division to progress implementation of
N.P. and to adapt the basic principles of the project to suit
local conditions. It was appropriate that the working party
was an integral part of the management system and not an
adjunct to it. Therefore the structure shown at Figure 4.9.
became the standard model.
(In Figure 4.9 over leaf, the circles represent the boundary of
meetings whose membership in terms of ranks Is shown in the
intersections, the senior rank being the chair.
No contact occurs at the central intersection of three circles which
has no significance to the model)
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WorkingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Party
Meetings
Relief
Meetings
Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit
- _,_, __ . __ ._._._._._._._ --- _._._._._._._._._._._._._-_._._._._._._.- _._._,_._._,_,_,---,_
Feedback
Information
Figure 4.9 The N.P. Divisional Management Team Model
4.11.6. The management system was designed to operate in such
a way that the leader of each team, described by a circle in
the model, was represented on at least one other level of
the structure in addition to his or her own. It was considered
that the system would improve information flows and
feedback whilst keeping the management chain as short as
possible. The district management comprised the most
senior officers from a group of divisions who would hold
regular structured meetings to co-ordinate a unified
approach to policy and planning, as well as the more usual
assessment of day to day operational problems. It was
hoped that chief superintendents would bring with them to
those meetings, timely and apposite information gained
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from their D.I.I.U. and the process of local planning by
their divisional management teams.
4.11.7. The divisional management team (D.M.T.) comprises the
local divisional senior officers under the command of the
chief superintendent. This group was responsible for co-
ordinating the medium and long term planning of the
division through the participative management system.
They were charged to jointly formulate the actions
necessary for the implementation of N.P., as well as
realistic and challenging objectives in respect of operational
policing for the division. These D.M.T. meeting were to be
formal, structured by agenda and minutes taken that were
to be made available to all divisional personnel, as well as
to the more senior level.
4.11.8. The working party was the central unit responsible for
early identification of problems posed by data provided by
the D.1.1.U. It was to be composed of both selected and
elected representatives of all ranks functions at the division.
The primary purpose of the working party was to agree
options for tackling operational problems that could be put
forward to the D.M.T. for decision and action.
4.11.9. Additionally the working party were to have a key role in the
implementation of N.P. in addressing those features of the
project that required local design or adjustment to suit the
local policing need. They were to consider the feasibility of .
variations of N.P. elements for their particular division and
then to put forward options and recommendations to the
D.M.T.
4.11.10. The remaining element in the participative management
structure was the relief meeting. Here the aim was that
each relief representative on the working party under the
chairmanship of the relief inspector would keep his team up
to date on the changes that were being considered. The
forum would also provide the opportunity for relief officerszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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to express their views on forthcoming changes and thus
have their suggestions considered. Relief meetings were
also to be the means by which the inspector could
promulgate instructions from the D.M.T. on plans and
strategies that had been agreed for the division as a whole
and develop the directed patrolling priorities. It was
considered that effectively conducted relief meetings would
become increasingly important to the efficient operation of
the station as directed patrolling and the setting of personal
objectives became more common.
4.11.11. The implementation of the participative management
system at the first experimental site at Notting Hill was not
achieved without difficulty. Irving (et al 1989) reports upon
this process largely from the perspective of the working
party and the internal process of that group. The outcome
of this study is generally vague and shrouded in much
verbatim reporting of officers comments that were
interpreted by the observers as significant. However one
conclusion that does emerge is that the whole process was
very unfamiliar to the participants and the status or
influence of the various groups was far from clear to the
members.
4.11.12. This uncertainty, combined with the unfamiliarity with the
N.P. strategy and aims presented the working party, in
particular, with a daunting prospect. It is not surprising
therefore that the working party did not enjoy rapid success.
Rather over a period of two
process developed and
years, the management
matured, gradually and
progressively functioning more effectively.
4.11.~3. Turner (1987) takes a far more positive and much wider
view than Irving of the participative management model
and process at each of the experimental sites. He
concludes that the process was cost effective despite the
cost of time spent on meetings and seminars and generally
the system was seen to meet its objectives. Officers viewszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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were generally favourable towards the system whether at
senior or junior level, although the working party was the
subjectzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof more unfavour ble comment than other features
of the system. Stapley (1986) in his observations of the
process, reports an interesting variation that is not
mentioned elsewhere. He observed that some officers had
a strong view that participation was valuable and should
always be a feature of management processes, whereas
others strongly felt it was a mistake to do so, preferring to
be told what to do and when. He concludes that this arose
in part because individuals simply did not know what was
expected of them in such an unfamiliar system.
4.11.14. The outcome of the introduction of participative systems of
management within the Metropolitan Police Service
(M.P.S.) has been significant. Within three years of the
introduction of N.P., the M.P.S. had produced and
distributed a booklet to every manager setting out
'Divisional Guidelines for Participative Management'
(1985). Shortly after, the major re-structuring of the M.P.S.
known as the Force Organisation and Management
Review (F.O.M.R.) incorporated the principles of
participative management into job titles and job
descriptions. The principle example of which being that of
the post of divisional chief superintendent whose primary
role became that of 'team leader' for the divisional
management team (D.M.T.)
4.11.15. It is not possible to claim that the major cultural change in
the M.P.S. from a quasi militaristic model of management to
a more shared, participative style was entirely attributable
to N.P. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the
necessity for such changes were widely recognised prior to
N.P. Indeed the action planning process introduced into the
M.P.S. duringzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1982/3 (Paragraph 3.3.5) did not include a
specification for participative management associated with
the process of objective setting. The assumption being that
divisional senior officers would set objectives within their
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spans of command and then rely upon directives to
subordinates to achieve results. without any attempt at
participation to foster 'ownership':
4.11.16. This situation was corrected by the subsequent force wide
adoption of the N.P. management model by the process
referred to at 4.11.14 and Section 4.12 following. The N.P.
management model was initially specified outside the
project environment in an internal publication entitled
'Planning for a Police Station' (M.P.S. N.P. Project Team -
Jan. 1984) and there does not seem to have been any
specification prior to N.P., of structures to operationalise
the participative management concept as normal police
organisational practice.
4.11.17. Therefore it is legitimate to record that N.P. achieved a
lasting success by altering the M.P.S. management style
and culture through force wide implementation of the
participative management initiative.
4.11.18. It is also the case however. that the principles and practice
of participative management at divisional level were very
slow to be internalised by operational managers. Possible
reasons for this are examined in Chapters Five and Six.
but. it is appropriate to note at this point. that had the
changes towards a more participative style been achieved
faster at the N.P. sites. it is likely that implementation of the
more challenging features of the project would have been
less problematic.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4.12 Police Organisation and Efficiency - Sector and
Divisional Planning
4.12.1. The productionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof detailed written plans for a geographic
sector that aggregate into an overall divisional plan were
incorporated into N.P. as a result of inspiration from the
work of Lubans and Edgar. (1979) Their description of
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'Policing by Objectives' provided a means of bringing the
well established principles of management by objectives
(Drucker 1954, Koontz and O'Donnell 1976, et al) into the
police service. The approach enabled officers to think
carefully about precisely what they wanted to achieve in
pro-active terms and to plan a strategy for achieving it. The
plans were to include precise verifiable objectives, as well
as data sources for measurement, time scales and criteria
for success.
4.12.2. The approach seemed particularly appropriate for officers
who had a well defined span of responsibility, such as
geographic (sector) inspectors and those officers
undertaking directed patrols, (Section 4.10) or engaged in
targeting and surveillance operations. (Section 4.6)
4.12.3. According to Turner (1987) the N.P. planning system was
more or less fully implemented at each of the test sites. As
noted previously however, (Section 3.3) the introduction of
the N.P. planning system preceded the more widespread
planning system for the M.P.S as a whole by only one year.
Therefore it became difficult to distinguish between the
effects of N.P. and those brought about by the newly
introduced central planning system. Turner does not make
this distinction and accordingly notes that with the exception
of Brixton, it was not possible tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAH... disti guish any results
that could be ascribed or enhanced by these plans. H (Turner
1987[a] pg. 22) Rather he speculates that where
improvements were found, they were attributable to the
operational treatments, Le. directed patrollinq, geographic
responsibility etc., rather than the planning system itself.
4.12.4. Turner's view of the planning system as a whole was that
apart from small areas of special policing significance, such
as Railton Road in Brixton and All Saints Road in Notting
Hill, plans were produced and then largely ignored.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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4.12.5. From informal observations at the four experimental sites it
became quickly apparent that the classic critique of
management by objectives, equaHyapplied to the planning
aspect of N.P. (Koontz and O'Donnell 1976)
4.12.6. These shortcomings combined with the additional
difficulties created by the juxtaposition of the new force wide
planning system, (Section 3.3.5) with the original N.P.
planning system were to prove troublesome for both the N.P.
project team and the trial site management teams. The force
wide system was centrally administered from New Scotland
Yard and the original N.P. system was administered by local
managers. Difficulties were created for local managers in
that both planning systems had to be satisfied and this led to
a degree of genuine confusion for both the project team and
officers at the trial sites. In order to overcome this and other
difficulties associated with the administration and mechanics
of the two planning systems, the N.P. project team were
tasked by the planning unit at New Scotland Yard to
produce:
i. the planning guidelines for the M.P.S. as a whole,
ii. a training programme for officers who were directly
involved in the administrative and co-ordinating
aspects of planning.
4.12.7. The planning process was detailed by the N.P. project team
in a large document, the first edition of which was entitled
'Planning for a Police Station' (A2[3) Branch Jan. 1984).
Subsequent versions drew from this initial specification of
the planning process and effectively sustained this approach
to planning within the M.P.S. for the next decade.
4.12.8. A training programme was similarly designed and provided
by the N.P. project team which essentially equipped officers
who were tasked with implementing the planning system
across the whole of the M.P.S., with similar techniques thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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had been utilised during the design of the N.P. project.
These included project planning, the use of descriptive
statistics, questionnaire design and presentational skills.
4.12.9. Again, it is noted that despite an apparently adverse
evaluation, albeit incomplete, the M.P.S. substantially
adopted the N.P. planning initiative despite the emerging
findings. It is notable that prior to N.P. however, there was
little formal planning at divisional level in any rigorous and
observable way. This being the case, the organisational
bias towards a reactive mode of operations becomes more
understandable.
4.13 Police Organisation and Efficiency - The N.P. Training
4.13.1. It is convenient to review and evaluate the N.P. training in
the context of the police organisation and efficiency delivery
system, although in practice the N.P. training started at the
outset of the project and continued at each site throughout
the implementation phase. The training specification in the
original N.P. documentation did not develop the detail
necessary for the design and implementation of an
appropriate programme. The diagram at Figure 2.5 provides
an outline of the training concepts that were subsequently
developed by Joss et al (1982). At the most basic, the
training was to address two issues:
i. familiarisation with the N.P. project and its multiple
components for both operational officers, supervisors
and managers,
ii. training for operational officers to provide the
knowledge and skills necessary to realise the
behaviours hypothesised as appropriate for the
specified outcomes. (Section 3.16)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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4.13.2. The N.P. project at each site commenced with a three day
seminar for divisional managers. The objective was to
achieve (i) above and to establish commitment to adopting
the principles of N.P. After a difficult start with the Notting
Hill managers, the process refined and subsequent seminars
became more productive in terms of achieving the above
aims. Stapley (1986 pg. 8) records that the event was "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof
considerable value ... "
4.13.3. After the divisional managers' seminar, classroom training
commenced for all officers at that division. Classroom
training of one week's duration was directed towards the
foregoing objectives that were refined to detailed lesson
objectives by the officers delivering the training. (Joss 1982)
This exercise at each test division proved to be a major
logistical and operational undertaking, but over a period of
approximately three months the majority of officers from any
one division could attend. The major difficulties arose from
abstracting officers from operational work and the
consequential demands on the remaining staff.
4.13.4. The classroom sessions were evaluated by the training staff
and although the results have never been written up in a
formal sense, there remains little doubt that the training was
effective having regard to the objectives and most officers
thought it worthwhile. Turner (1987) identifies the difficulty
of establishing the quality of the training due to the lack of
data, but does report that the majority of all officer sat the
test sites did receive the initial training input.
4.13.5.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOf far greater significance however, is to what extent the
skills and knowledge imparted in the classroom were carried
over to operational duties? In this regard, the training
programme must be seen as a failure, with the possible
exception of the specialist skills training that was given to
small groups of officers undertaking specific roles. (e.g.
dedicated communications, D.I.I.U., crime desk) In summary,
both Irving (1989) and Turner (1987) are clear that N.P.
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could not be successfully implemented by training
procedures of the type and style adopted. Irving notes that
the N.P. philosophy has the ability to generate enthusiasm
and dedicated adherents. Translating the philosophy into
organisational reality by the chosen means cannot be
considered to have been successful. Irving considers that
the training stopped short of creating a "hard core" of
enthusiasts for N.P. at Notting Hill.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is likely that this was
also the case elsewhere, as the basic training programme
did not alter substantially between sites which were
essentially similar in policing character.
4.13.6. This observation does have to be set against the practical
difficulties of expending extended periods on officer training
to the detriment of the operational service levels. It must be
acknowledged however, for whatever reason, that the initial
N.P. training did not deliver the expected outcomes either in
terms of operationalising the N.P. aims, or in terms of
officer behaviour change.
4.13.7. It is not clear from any of the evaluation material whether
this was due to poor quality training, or whether the gene~al
training aims were too ambitious and thus unrealisable
within organisational constraints. Some explanations are
offered in Chapters Five and Six of possible limitations on
the effectiveness of training as a part of a change process.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4.14 Police - Public Contract
4.14.1. The notion of a contract between police and public is
described at Section 2.18. It originates from the traditional
concept of British policing that the majority of policing
activities are essentially matters for the public themselves.
4.14.2. From the earliest era of the parish constable (900 - 1750)
policing functions have been undertaken by individuals from
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within local communities . The title of constable originated
from Norman times and was used in Britain through to the
advent of the justice of the peace, when the office took on
responsibilities on behalf of the court , which was in itself
constituted around representatives of communities. The title
continued and was adopted as a rank upon creation of
professional police officers in London in 1829. (Critchley
1979)
4.14.3. In law, all police officers hold the office of constable,
regardless of their rank, and are charged by the Monarch to
exercise original authority and not a delegated authority.
Thus, police officers are individually accountable through the
courts for their actions. (Critchley 1979)
4.14.4. The premise that communities are responsible for their own
policing is thus firmly established in British history, where
imposed policing has rarely featured as an approach to
community regulation and control. Rather policing traditions
in Britain have grown up around the notion of 'policing by
consent' which is the idea that communities collectively and
willingly submit themselves to regulation by largely unarmed
constables. (Alderson 1979 et al)
4.14.5. Thus the notion emerges of a contract between the police
and public where obligations exist on either side. (The name
is slightly misleading in that a contract implies an
enforceable agreement, whereas only the law enforcement
aspects of the police/public contract are enforceable at law.)
4.14.6. The N.P. project envisaged a number of constituent
elements to the police - public contract as shown at Figure
4.10. The delivery system for realising the police side of the
contract being made up of the interaction of the four
elements that might be described separately, but which in
practice are interdependent and inextricably linked, as
follows:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
169
Human and Physical EnvironmentzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 4.10 The N.P. Elements of the Police/Public Contract
4.14.7. Turner in his 1987 analysis of N.P. concluded that it was
not possible to distinguish between the cause and effect of
the community involvement treatments at station level, or
to differentiate between their outputs as they merged
together. It is therefore entirely consistent with the
evaluation concept (Sections 3.5 to 3.8) to consider the
collective output of the community involvement features of
N.P. without attempting to separate the contribution of
each element in isolation.
4.14.8. The exchange of information between the police and other
statutory organisations with a responsibility for improving
170
the quality of life was a fundamental feature of N.P. If
policing is a shared responsibility between police and
public, then implicit in that relationship is a need to share
information concerning common problems.
4.14.9. N.P. specified a range of treatments to improve the flow
of information to external bodies with a view to stimulating
a multi agency response to policing problems. These
treatments included already well established and accepted
practices such as schools involvement, through to
initiatives that were seen as more radical, such as the
creation of sector working parties that brought together
police and residents to tackle local issues.
4.14.10. Irving et al (1989) undertook a detailed study of the
community and agency influence of N.P. Over 40 differing
groups were interviewed and reported variously on their
experience of co-operation with police. As might be
expected, the results are equivocal. Some agencies
reporting favourable contacts and exchanges of views and
information with police, whilst others saw that much more
might be achieved.
4.14.11. Generally, contact at more senior levels was successful
with other statutory agencies such as the local authorities,
with whom it was suggested, police felt more comfortable.
With the less hierarchically structured groups, such as
community associations, residents groups, the local law
centre and to some extent the Social Services Department,
Irving found that liaison was less effective. It was reported
that in general, officers involved did not appear to be
interested in understanding genuine community problems
and tackling them.
4.14.12. From a police perspective, officers found it difficult to
distinguish who constituted the law abiding community
with whom they might establish the necessary partnership,
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especially in the more sensitive and hostile areas. (Irving
et a11989)
4.14.13. At Brixton, the only site to establish sector working parties
with members of local communities, a more favourable
outcome was reported. Beckett (1989) considers that
significant success was achieved with the involvement of
the public in the joint planning of police activities directed
towards issues that residents of the respective sectors saw
as problems. He also comments that at Brixton, the senior
officers of the division were highly committed to achieving
results through community partnership.
4.14.14. This contrasts sharply with Irving's (1989) account of
senior officer attitudes at Notting Hill that suggests that
senior officers were less than fully committed to the
approach.
4.14.15. At Hackney, Stapley (1986) found that whilst an inter
agency approach to shared problems was desirable, this
was largely unachievable due to an official Council policy
at that time that prevented officials collaborating or co-
operating with police.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is interesting to note however, that
despite this official policy, a great deal of co-operation did
exist between police officers and officials at an operational
level, which Stapley felt could be enhanced by joint
training to foster a reciprocal appreciation of needs,
abilities and problems.
4.14.16. The N.P. community based crime prevention concept
advocated two approaches:
i. treatments directed towards involving residents to
contribute to crime prevention such as neighbourhood
watch, sector working parties, crime prevention panels,
residents associations and many other group initiatives
designed to heighten awareness of crime and the
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actions that the public might take to prevent becoming
a victim,
ii. treatments directed towards making the physical
environment safer such as improving the design
characteristics of public places and buildings so as to
reduce the opportunity for crime, street lighting
programmes, opening of sight lines in public places to
reduce criminal opportunity, in fact any environmental
improvement that might reduce the potential for
victimisation.
4.14.17.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt was envisaged that when the preceding N.P. treatments
had been implemented, local officers would be better able
to co-operate with local residents, groups and agencies to
help bring about such initiatives that by definition would be
unique to the location, but generally in accordance with
the above approaches.
4.14.18. Both Irving (1989) and Turner (1987) found improvements
arising from such local initiatives but stopped short of
attributing the benefits to N.P. The suggestion being that
such improvements, schemes or desirable outcomes could
have taken place independently of N.P. The effects of the
schemes were not assessable in terms of crimes prevented
or offenders caught. Two thirds of the Neighbourhood
Watch scheme co-ordinators who were questioned
however, thought they were effective in improving the
information flow between police and public, bringing
neighbours closer together and improving police/public
relations.
4.14.19. A major feature of the N.P. community intervention
programme was the hypothesised police behaviours,
(Sections 3.16 and 3.17) that were suggested to be able
to influence crime and disorder through community
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development and through victim and community helping by
police and public. Both Irving (1989) and Turner (1987) are
condemnatory of this approach. In summary, Irving et al
(1989 pg. 210) recommends thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"All notions of pro-social
education of the public by role modelling and social
engineering should be abandoned" Additionally, their
evaluations do not put forward any evidence that could be
construed as supporting any of the hypothesised micro
evaluation behaviours or effects. (Section 3.17 and Figure
3.4)
4.14.20. Beckett in his (1989) assessment of N.P. at Brixton ignored
the concepts of pro social or helping behaviour by police
as a role model for community members. Officers at Brixton
when surveyed at the conclusion of N.P. however, agreed
that there was a greater propensity for members of the
public to involve themselves at the scene of a problem,
telephone the police or be a witness at court than hitherto.
(Beckett 1989) It is not possible however to attribute this
finding to pro-social modelling by police.
4.14.21. Therefore at best, the micro evaluation concept of
hypothesised behaviours must be considered as untested.
Although is interesting to note that despite the
unattractiveness of the approach to the evaluators, public
surveys undertaken during the evaluation (Turner 1989)
reveal a strong public liking for ideas such as community.
crime prevention schemes that bring residents and
neighbours together. This could be interpreted as
community development as originally hypothesised.
However, the link between this phenomena and the
incidence of crime is cannot be established with certainty.
4.14.22. Regrettably, neither Irving or Turner in their evaluations of
N.P. considered the interactions that take place between
the police and public at contact points. N.P. proposed that
the starting point for improving the popular image of the
police and thus starting the process of improving
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community involvement was at the contact points where
police and public most frequently interact viz.:
i. the front counter of the police station,
ii. telephone and written communications to the police
station,
iii. patrolling officers on the street.
4.14.23.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt was not until1988 that a report prepared for the M.P.S.
by Wolff Olins identified similar issues concerning
corporate image and external communications. This in
itself was unsurprising as many observers would have
agreed that the M.P.S. was in need of a more businesslike
image at that time. What is surprising however, is that the
Olins (1988) report recommended solutions much along
the lines of the N.P. approach that had been fiercely
criticised by Irving and Turner.
4.14.24. Olins strongly recommended the systems approach to
holistic, cultural change of the organisation, advocating
changes to management systems, behaviour, attitudes
communication and visual identity. Amongst the
recommendations for action to improve the situation were
treatments that were entirely consistent with and similar to
the aims of N.P., viz.:
i. developing training programmes related to service
skills,
ii. ensuring that existing training reflected the values of
the organisation,
iii. implementing a system that monitors performance that
reflects the importance of the service concept and
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iv. clarifying the role and accountability of managers in
relation to tasks.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4.15 Evaluation Overview
4.15.1. In reviewing the formal evaluations of N.P. is becomes
difficult to point to positive outcomes that can be
unequivocally associated to N.P. treatments. The overall
tone of both the major contributions is negative and both
conclude that N.P. was not in general a success, either with
regard to the aims, or cost effectiveness. The evaluations of
others who contributed to the assessment of elements of the
scheme tend to be more positive in tone and more optimistic
as to the value of the approach if not the trial results.
Beckett (1989), Atkinson and Wilmore (1984), Stapley
(1986) et al.
4.15.2. The evaluators leave no doubt that they were not
comfortable with the systems approach adopted for N.P.,
either specifically in relation to N.P., or more generally asan
approach to real world problem solving, To them it conflicted
with the more conventional scientific methodologies for the
social sciences. (Turner 1987 pgs. 1-2, Irving et al 1989 pg.
191)
4.15.3. Turner repeatedly asserts that one modest change should'
have been implemented at anyone time, tested, assessed,
then followed by another single change and so on until the
entire N.P. programme had been implemented. All this
should have taken place, according to Turner, against the
background of a control condition, as originally proposed by
the authors (Section 2.21 and Chapter Three)
4.15.4. Irving's (1989) review includes a rather trivial analogy of the
systems approach, likening an open system to a ship at sea
effected by the world on shore. He concludes that proposingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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an open system model for a policing •... zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmay be attractive
fromzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa theoretical point of view, but hardly represents the
political, psychological or sociological reality. • (pg. 191)
4.15.5. Irving and Turner's critique (ibid.) of the systems approach
adopted for N.P. seems to arise from their unwillingness or
inability to conceptually embrace anything other than the
established methodologies of their disciplines. The
evaluators continually comment on their inability to
adequately reduce the elements of N.P. into discreetly
measurable activities and then ascribe causality to the N.P.
treatment. Although they appear to have little difficulty in
ascribing causality to the N.P. project treatments when
they perceived outcome as negative.
4.15.6. The logic that is argued by the evaluators (Irving et al1989
pgs. 191-2) for the inappropriateness of a systems
approach to policing operations broadly follows the
sequence:
i. if policing is an open system then there should be a
balance between police system inputs and outputs,
ii. this balance will not occur because the public in inner
city areas are not altruistic insofar as they will not
help each other to prevent crime and thus input to the
policing system,
iii. a policing system cannot be open, due to the strong
internal culture of a twenty-four hour occupational
community, the degree of management autonomy and
the limited power of external agencies to influence
police,
iv. hence an open system concept is inappropriate to
police operations,
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v. therefore the systems approach and systems analysis
is dismissed as inappropriate because:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...systems analysis is primarily used for tackling
mathematically determinate relationships between
variables. Used in this context it leads a
determinate air to complex arguments which are
highly probabilistic." (pg. 188)
4.15.7. As has been demonstrated throughout, each of the N.P.
elements were designed to co-ordinated with other features
of the total policing system, resulting in more open, and thus
more effective policing system. (Paragraph 3.5.2) Irving et al
dismiss this approach without advancing anything other
than value laden opinion.
4.15.8. It will be argued in Chapters Five and Six that many of the
outcomes of the N.P. trial, that have been reported in
negative terms by the evaluators might be explained by the
dynamics of major change within the Surrey and
Metropolitan Police, and not by any inherent weaknesses in
either the systems approach or the N.P. treatments.
178
CHAPTER FIVE
SummaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Chapter Five is the first stage in the development of the series of
models that build towardszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa syste of ch nge in police
organisations. The desirability of adopting the systems approach is
justified in the light of the contemporary schools of management
thinking and the absence of any unifying or overarching theories of
change. A macro model of change is proposed that comprises three
major elements of the change process, (i) the stimulus for change,
(H)the target for change and (Hi)the type of implementation. Each
element of the macro model is analysed in turn and the attributes are
examined in relation to other relevant contemporary work. Models of
three basis implementation methods are discussed and variations
are advanced. Comparative advantages and disadvantages are
examined in the police system context.
5.1 The Approach to ChangezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
5.1.1. The processes and dynamics of change in the functioning,
structure and work force of organisations is a well
documented subject from Basil & Cook (1974) to the more
recent works of Moss-Kanter (1989), Senge (1991) and
Pedler et al (1991). Most writers on organisations, it seems
advance some comment on the phenomena and
consequences of change from their own particular
perspective.
5.1.2. Theories of change management however, are far from
complete and the phenomena of change management is
relatively poorly explained. (Evered 1980) In relation to both
change interventions at an overall organisational level and
changes at an individual task level there is little commonly
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agreed material in the form of action guides for either
participants or managers. This absence of any unifying
theories that explain the change .as a dynamic systematic
process might be justified, or at least explained, by the
number, complexity and variability of the factors involved.
Issues as diverse as individual psychological phenomena to
macro economic and political theory all potentially have
their place in explaining organisational change.
5.1.3. A recurring theme of many writers, is that the effects and
consequences of organisational change can be widespread,
even from the most seemingly insignificant alteration to a
task or procedure, through to major organisational re-
structuring and re-sizing. The consequential effects of either
the prospect of change, or the actual implementation of
change are often found to extend far beyond the immediate
issue that is the focus of the change itself. (Beardshaw and
Palfreman 1990)
5.1.4. This phenomena presents a major dilemma for both the
rational and human relations approaches to the management
of organisations. (Flood and Carson 1993) Both conceptual
approaches view the change process from a single
perspective. Because of this, and despite the insight they
bring, they cannot encompass all the ramifications and
outcomes of what are invariably complex processes
involving the interactions of humans with work procedures,
organisational structures and relationships.
5.1.5. The rational model of organisations, that is principally
derived from the structural and procedural epproaches,'
does not extend to encompass the major psychological and
social psychological phenomena that are also Significant
during the process of change.
1Typified by the work of Taylor, Weber, Fayol, Urwick and other writers in a
similar vein - summarised in Pugh et al (eds. 1971)
180
5.1.6. The human relations approach, typified by the work of
McGregor (1960), Argyris (1964), Hertzberg (1968), and
Perrow (1972) whilst considering the effects on staff of
changes in their work and work environment, does not
extend to consider the more mechanistic aspects of the
management of organisations.
5.1.7. It is frequently apparent in daily life that a change to an
established plan, albeit a regular occurrence, has the
potential to be one of the most unsettling events in everyday
life. A change arising from an alteration to a trivial routine
such as a journey to work, or a more substantial or dramatic
change, such as those affecting lifestyle, job, family etc. all
seem to possess the potential to produce a de- stabilising
and potentially negative, or detrimental effect. In terms of
the individuals' reaction to what is perceived as negative
change, or alteration to a steady state, it is widely reported
that stress will be experienced by the individual. This stress
in turn produces reactions such as frustration,
defensiveness in 'fight or flight', a general rise in levels of
anxiety and a lowering of self esteem. (Davis and
Shackleton 1975, Bass and Stogdill 1990, Brown and
Campbell 1994, Carnall 1990).
5.1.8. It may be demonstrated that within organisations, these
reactions frequently produce antagonism towards the source
of the stress, which may rightly or wrongly be perceived as
the change. When the change relates to work associated
procedures, or structures, the negative outcomes can range
from a temporary and marginal reduction in productivity,
through to internal sabotage and/or major industrial action.
The outcomes will be dependant upon a large number of
inter-relating factors and competing individual objectives
such as the security of employment, future
potential/remuneration, type of work etc. (Bass and Stogdill
1990)
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5.1.9. From this brief analysis, it is suggested that in order to
understand and describe the. process of change in
organisations, it is necessary to consider not only the human
reactions to change, but also the mechanistic
organisational functions and processes that bring about
those effects in humans. Any attempt to disentangle
functional, process and structural issues from the social and
psychological aspects of the work force will result in an
incomplete analysis.
5.1.10. Such an approach would ignore many of the dynamics that
are critical to the functioning of organisations. These
dynamics mainly arise and develop from humans beings
within the system interacting with structures, functions,
processes and procedures, in fact their entire work
environment. (A distinction is made here between the
concept of the 'work environment' and the 'external
environment' associated with the work of the contingency
theorists, Lawrence and Lorsch. 1967,1969)
5.1.11. In relating these propositions to large, multi functional and
complex organisations such as police forces, it seems
appropriate to adopt a unifying approach that enables the
process of change to be tackled holistically. Jackson and
Keys (1984) in their proposition of a 'system of systems
methodologies' described difficulties similar to those
encountered by taking a single theoretical standpoint. They
point out the inappropriateness of such an approach and
further suggest that some analytical methodologies are
inappropriate to some problems.
5.1.12. This issue is addressed in more detail at Section 5.5, but in
summary, they suggest that if a problem is examined from a
particular (single) methodological perspective then it is
unlikely that either the full situation will be understood, or
that the resulting changes will be appropriate.
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"DifficultieszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAare almost certain to occur when
methodologies suited to particular problem contexts are
transferred and adopted for use inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa problem situation
for which they are not designtfJd." (Jackson and Keys
1984 pg. 5)
5.1.13. Similarly, Checkland and Scholes (1990) describe the
difficulties and limitations of adopting a 'scientific' approach
in order to understand the complexities of managerial and
organisational systems. For instance, they suggest that in
order to accommodate such limitations, management
science has "...moved [away from aspirations to be
scientific] to try to increase its relevance to the world of
management ... " (pg. 15)
5.1.14. As explained by Checkland and Scholes (1990), it would
be doubtful whether an engineering methodology would be
wholly appropriate to the understanding of an organisational
system. It is similarly argued here, that single social science
methodologies, are inappropriate to the holistic
understanding of complex organisational issues, such as
policing systems.
5.1.15. The systems approach to the study of organisations (Kast
and Rosenzweig 1981) was found appropriate for the
original N.P. study, including the soft systems methodology
(S.S.M.) applied to the development of the N.P. project
itself. (Checkland 1972, 1981)
5.1.16. The principles of systems thinking were successful in
understanding the overall situation that had to be tackled,
designing the necessary changes and planning the
implementations.
5.1.17. Therefore in understanding the processes involved in the
overall N.P. change programme and in the light of the more
contemporary work on systems methodologies (Jackson
and Keys 1984, Flood 1988, Elohim 1993), it would seem
appropriate to maintain the same approach in order to
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analyse the process of change. Jackson and Keys concludezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
inter alia that each problem to be tackled requires separate
consideration of an appropriate .approach. In the absence
of any general theories of change, (Cummings 1980) the
benefits of the established N.P. approach (ibid.) are seen as
appropriate to a holistic understanding of the considerable
complexity (Chapter Seven) involved in implementing a
lengthy and widespread change programme such as N.P.
5.1.18. If the change process were fragmented and reduced to
analyses of individual features of the process which
correspond to existing micro theories, then it is unlikely that
an holistic analysis could subsequently be assembled. Such
a product would more probably amount to a set of unrelated
observations of the change programme that could not be
related together in any meaningful way. An overarching
macro approach is therefore required.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
5.2zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOpenness and Unplanned Change
5.2.1. It was shown in Chapters Two and Three that police
organisations could be considered as open systems and the
concept of their 'degree of openness' was introduced.
(Section 3.5.2) Here it was suggested that that the greater
the amount of information shared by a policing system with
its environment, the greater the degree of openness.
5.2.2. This proposition was linked to the N.P. design aim, that a
police system that showed open characteristics, was more
appropriate to the contemporary policing environment. It
was shown that policing systems needed to be responsive
to both their human and physical environments as well as
being locally accountable.
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5.2.3. This being the case, it is argued that police systems that are
more open, will inevitably change more than others that are
not. If an open organisation is in.constant interaction with
its environment, then it will be responsive to external
influences through the openness of the system boundary.
(Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) This in turn implies that a
more open system will potentially experience high levels of
unplanned changes as the organisational system will not be
in sufficient control of its environment to prevent such
events.
5.2.4. Ironically the simplest means of avoiding such unplanned
changes would be exclude inputs from the environment, thus
limiting the stimuli to change. Change of this type to the
system characteristics would alter the degree of openness
and move the system towards a more closed mode of
operation, which has been argued to be undesirable in
policing systems. Such closed policing systems being
typified by the characteristics described at Section 2.2, as
well as by Scarman (1981) and Smith et al (1983), whereby
the policing system was not responsive to inputs from the
human environment.
5.2.5. The degree of openness of the system boundary implies that
some interactions which take place between the system and
its environment will be appropriate to the systems'
behaviour, whilst some will not. e.g. It would be appropriate
for a policing system to be responsive to inputs from a
Community Police Consultative Committee that sought to
reduce crime in a particular area, but perhaps not so
appropriate for police to be responsive to an informal
residents association's wishes to reduce policing in their
area in order that unlawful activities might flourish.
5.2.6. Further, it might be suggested that some interactions
between the environment and the policing system might be
forecast and therefore the policing system response might
be potentially planned, whilst others might be morezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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spontaneous and the response unplanned. e.g. It is
regrettable, but nevertheless highly probable, that a new
housing estate in an inner city area will become a target for
criminal activity unless preventive measures are taken at
the outset and incorporated into the design of the buildings
and infrastructure. The police system response to such a
development may therefore be planned, possibly through
direct involvement with the architects and developers.
5.2.7. Spontaneous incidents of public disorder are however
virtually unpredictable in terms of time and location and the
response of the police system is therefore based on general
contingency plans and a general level of preparedness,
rather than specific detailed plans for a known situation.
5.2.8. This notion that the stimuli for change can arise externally
and be either welcome or unwelcome, planned or
unplanned, introduces a further level of potential complexity
to what might otherwise be seen as a rational process that is
internal to the organisational system.
5.2.9. It is likely that welcome or beneficial change, whether it is
planned or unplanned will be seen as advantageous to the
organisation. Unwelcome change that is forecast at least has
the potential of some ameliorating, or "damage limiting"
action to be taken in advance of the worst or dysfunctional
effects of the change.
5.2.10. Unplanned change however, of an unforeseen nature is
potentially the most damaging to the performance of an
organisational system. Such changes would be
characterised by sudden and wide ranging changes to
system objectives, as opposed to an adaptation of
objectives. For instance the policing of the Miner's dispute
during 1984-5 required both the officers involved, as well
as organisational systems
considerably.
and structures to alter
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5.2.11. The objectives of policing such a dispute were in direct
contrast to those described at Section 2 for policing
residential communities and it is arguable that this sudden
change irrevocably and adversely changed conventional
policing systems (Reiner 1991). It was suggested that:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
'The generally accepted view was that the strike had
profoundly damaged police-public relations....It had
also changed the image of the police in an unfortunate
direction...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAn (Reiner 1991 pg. 182)
5.2.12. Unplanned and unforeseen change to an organisation will
generally arise if the organisation does not have sub-
systems designed to monitor leading or key indicators of
environmental activity that critically influence the systems'
performance. Despite disciplined and careful environmental
scanning, police organisations might still be victims of
unplanned change arising from:
i. environmental crises that in themselves were
sudden and unforeseen,
ii. systems entropy either internally or externally such
that the known, gradual decline in a systems'
performance suddenly and unpredictably
accelerates with a catastrophic effect, forcing
sudden change,
iii. sudden and unforeseen psychological and
social/psychological factors effecting either staff
internally or the public externally.
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5.3 The Macro Model of Change
5.3.1. The degree of complexity involved in the organisational
change process thus gives rise to the need for the
specification of a simple macro model of the change
process. Figure 5.1 shows three elements of the change
process:
i. the stimuli for change,
ii. the target for change,
iii. the stages of the implementation.
STIMULUS
for Identifies
CHANGE )-
TARGET
for
CHANGE
TYPES
and STAGES
of
CHANGE
IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 5.1 The Macro Model of ChangezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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5.3.2. The individual elements of the model of change are analysed
in detail at Sections 5.4 to 5.6, but at the macro level, Figure
5.1 initiateszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAat the point wh re a stimulus for a future
change leads to the identification of the target for change.
The target is the actual system or procedure that is to
change and is thus the subject of the change implementation
that will be achieved through one or more stages. As
implementation progresses, so observation and evaluation of
the results will feedback to the original situation which
originally gave rise to the stimulus for change.
5.3.3. If the system outputs satisfy the need for change, then the
stimulus for change will reduce or disappear. If not, then the
stimulus to change will modify, perhaps identifying a different
target for change implementation and so on until the need is
met and there are no further stimuli to change. The model
is therefore iterative and dynamic, in that repeated passes
will bring an alteration to both the system and the situation in
need of change.
5.3.4. A steady state will only be achieved when there are no
inputs from the environment, or further internal inputs to
create stimuli for change. This is a most unlikely situation
for policing systems that are seen to exist in turbulent social
environments (Jackson and Keys 1984) and are thus subject
to frequent environmental stimuli to change, if they have
open characteristics. (Section 5.2)
5.3.5. Additionally, a steady state would only be achieved if every
change implementation were wholly successful in respect of
achieving design objectives. It is argued later, that a process
of adjustment to systems is likely to be necessary after
implementation. (Paragraphs 3.9.2-6)
5.3.6. Therefore whilst the macro model of change might be
argued to be stochastic, it is more probable that in relation
to policing systems it is perpetually dynamic.
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5.4 Macro Model - Change StimulizyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
5.4.1. The principle that open systems exchange signals through a
boundary with their environment, gives rise to the concept of
inputs to a system that stimulate and motivate change -
these may be termed 'change stimuli'. Kast and Rosenzweig
(1981) adopted the synonymous termzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt••• sources of impetus
for change...n (pg. 565) and noted that they arise from many
sources, namely:
i. environmental, iv. psychological,
ii. technical, v. managerial,
iii. structural, vi. goals and values
5.4.2. Moss-Kanter (1991) used the expression 'forces for change'
to convey a similar idea which she suggested arose from:
i. a departure from tradition
ii. a crises or galvanising event,
iii. strategic decisions,
iv. individuals who are 'prime movers',
v. action vehicles - the mechanisms that practically
achieve change.
5.4.3. Similarly, Senge (1990) describes the inter-relatedness and
linkages of elements in the change process in suggesting
that 'levers' canzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe identified to assist in the process.
Beckhard and Harris (1987 pgs. 10-18) also describe the
concept of the inter relatedness of external factors as
"...multiple constituencies...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAn and refer to "...forc s in the
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environment..zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAnzy vutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAwhich might help or hinder the process of
change.
5.4.4. These propositions are essentially similar in concept, in that
they imply that inputs to an open system can be identified
which stimulate and encourage the process of change. This
point can be developed conceptually to encompass inputs
arising from the system environment, (external stimuli), and
those arising from within the sub-systems of the system of
interest, (internal stimuli).
5.4.5. Additionally, Moss Kanter (1984 pg. 289) adopted the term
.....building blocks...in corporate changes.n to describe the
amalgamation of issues giving rise to change. Although the
words 'building blocks' in the change process have an
apparently more mechanistic meaning than 'change stimuli',
the implied meaning is of a similar concept. She suggests
that small events and accomplishments build over time to
create the point at which 'breakthrough' changes occur
which are an accumulation of the building blocks of change.
5.4.6. In general terms, it seems that leading writers have
identified similar phenomena and ascribed a slightly different
emphasis to their explanations.
5.4.7. For the purpose of examining change in police organisations
the expression 'change stimuli' has been chosen to
amalgamate the ideas of the above writers with changes
effecting police systems arising from anyone or more of the
following sources, either internally or externally:
i. managerial initiative and/or 'fashion in management'
ii. social and/or psychological factors of staff and the
public, including criminals, victims, other involved
individuals, as well as opinion formers,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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iii. cultural factors - assumptions by staff as to how the
organisation operates,
iv. structural design - the relationship between parts of
the organisation,
v. technological developments
vi. organisational goals and values
vii. political and/or economic factors, national, regional
or internal.
5.4.8. The diagram at Figure 5.2 shows the origins of the major
types of change stimuli that input to policing systems and
start the process of change.
5.4.9. It is suggested that change stimuli do not either exist, or
bring about change in isolation, whether internally from other
organisational sub-systems, or externally as discrete inputs
from the environment.
5.4.10. Rather, change stimuli are likely to be complex mixtures of
pressures and motivations that have arisen from a number of
apparently disconnected sources. This proposition is
expanded by Senge (1991) in his description of
'connectedness' and 'interdependencies' between systems
and their environments.
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INTERNALzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
V.F.M. measures
Cost cutting
Reaction to unexpected
events
Higher workloads
and demands
Management trends
IT and similar
technological
implementations
Response to
organisational
strategy i.e.
quality of service
higher performance
Directive from higher
authority
Better way of doing
things is envisaged
E TERNAL
Reaction to changes in
the physical
environment i.e.
new roads, estates
criminal opportunity
Failure to meet public
needs
Reaction to changes in
- the human/social
environment Le.
changed levels of
criminality, public
expectations, norms,
values etc.,
Reaction to changes in
politicalzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& economic
environment and
government goals,
Reaction to changes in
the technological
environment i.e.
communications & IT
development, energy
supplies and the
criminal use of
technology.
Implementation
Internal and External
Change Stimuli
(A) Feedback after
Change Implementation
Elements of
the Macro Model
of Change
Direction of Influence
Boundary of Policing System Environment
Figure 5.2 Internal and External Change Stimuli
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5.4.11. Figure 5.2 distinguishes between internal and external
origins of change stimuli, but it is not the case that the
headings shown are mutually exclusive. It is likely there will
be some degree of external influence on every internal
feature. For instance, trends or fashions in management
approaches and style usually have their origins outside the
police service, but through the process of learning and
experience, police managers adopt the principles of a
particular 'style' and implement the corresponding changes.
Thus the origin of the change is external to the police
system, but the stimulus arises internally.
5.4.12. Change stimuli may emerge from a strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, threats (S.W.O.T.) analysis of the political,
economic, social, technological and environmental
(P.E.S.T.E.) factors arising around the organisation's
activities. Alternatively, the change stimuli may impact
directly upon the Service in the form of new legislation or
government directives. In either case the effect is similar in
that the Service has to respond to an externally stimulated
change, rather than an internally identified need for change.
5.4.13. The issue being that the police service as an open system
will, by definition, change through time by virtue of inputs
from the human/social environment. These inputs may act
directly upon, and influence existing members of the
organisation and therefore be reflected in the attitudes and
culture of the staff. (Section 5.6) Thus changes in society
brought about by changing values, education and social
norms would progressively bring about changes to policing
systems.
5.4.14. Policing systems are however principally constituted of
police officers who are continually leaving the system,
predominantly through retirement, whilst new recruits join
the system. The organisation is volatile and thus becomes
increasingly subject to the values and attitudes of the
newer members.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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5.4.15. Models of social evolution may add a further potential
complexity to the analysis of .stimuli for organisational
change. (Khandwalla 1977) For instance, if the police
service is constitutionally representative of the society it
protects (Critchley 1967), then if society changes through
time, then so too will the police service. If the policing system
is open as suggested, then it is argued that whether
societies are subject to evolutionary or revolutionary change,
then the changes occurring in the policing environment will
be reflected in the characteristics of the policing system.
5.4.16. In societies with closed policing systems, it is suggested that
the policing organisation would probably peruse its own
goals and objectives despite changes in the human
environment. Examples of policing systems where this
seems to be the case are widespread in totalitarian regimes.
(Alderson 1979)
5.4.17. The more obvious examples of such long term change
stimuli would be those coinciding with cultural changes in
wider society. i.e. attitudes to equal opportunity issues, race,
gender and age, as well wider employment issues relating
to leisure time, 'NOrk re-location and the
manufacturing/service industry ratio.
5.4.18. The motivation for intemal change in the police service may
often be seen to be the dominant characteristic of a change
programme, whereby the achievement of the change is seen
as an end in itself. For example, such a situation would exist
where more staff energy was applied to the implementation
of a computerised information system than to the use of the
data subsequently produced.
5.4.19. This example although trivial in itself appears to be similar in
principal to many problems commonly found within the
commercial organisations described by Moss-Kanter (1991)
and Senge (199Q) and it serves to illustrate a significantzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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principle. As a first step towards implementing change, it is
highly desirable that the change stimuli are correctly
identified, prior to analysing t~e current situation and
designing the changes. Failure to do so is likely to lead to
unsuccessful implementations, or inappropriate changes that
will not correspond to the original problem situation and thus
the address the stimuli for change.
5.5 Macro Model - Change Targets
5.5.1. The concept of a 'target for change' arises from the
proposition that whether organisational change is planned or
unplanned (Section 5.2) the focus of attention
(manifestation) of the change will be apparent. Whether or
not the stimulus for change arises externally or internally to
the organisational system, it can be suggested to have
direction and thus have an apparent target. Kast and
Rosenzweig (1981) used the expression 'foci of attention' to
convey a similar idea and suggested the concept of 'levels
of foci'.
5.5.2. These commence at the individual level of people and
ascend through roles, interpersonal issues, inter-team and
inter-group factors to the final level of the whole
organisation.
5.5.3. However this definition seems to omit many of the
relationships, information flows and dynamics that are vital
attributes of the functioning of organisational sub-systems. A
more complete concept can be developed using Checkland's
(1972, 1981) methodology as a starting point, where the
notion of a 'root definition' and a 'rich picture' are advanced.
The idea being that a system, or a part of a system, that is
relevant to a problem situation can be defined precisely
and then elaborated to incorporate significant elements and
relationships. This is much closer to the concept of a changezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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target in that the root definition would encompass all
relevant attributes and the rich picture would relate these to
other sub-systems and the environment, or system climate.
5.5.4. Other writers make similar distinctions in order to isolate the
portion of an organisation that is the centre of attention. For
example, Flood and Carson (1993) explain the value of
making a distinction between a 'narrow system of interest'
which forms part of a 'wider system of interest'. Jackson and
Keys (1984) refer to the notion of the 'problem context',
which incorporates the sub-system itself, the relevant
decision makers and the problem solvers.
5.5.5. As summarised earlier, Jackson and Keys (1984) arrive at
their notion of the 'problem context' on the basis of the
inappropriateness of some (O.R.) methodologies to some
problems. The solution they suggest is for problem solvers
to initially examine situations from a variety of
methodological perspectives and to determine which is the
most appropriate on that basis before proceeding further.
The difficulty, of course being, that in doing so, the
boundary of the 'system of interest' mayzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe drawn too wide
for ease of analysis. Thus essential detail may become
inconspicuous behind the broad picture.
5.5.6. Despite the practical complexities surrounding this
approach, the concept of a target for change is considered
important. The target for change provides a focus for
where the change is to take place within the organisation,
whilst allowing a full understanding of what it is that has to
be changed and the consequential effects. It helps the
problem solver to avoid considering change in isolation from
other significant features of the system.
5.5.7. The concept of a change target may be illustrated by an
example from police systems. An external change stimulus
from the public exerting pressure for a greater number of
high visibility police patrols would inexorably lead to
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consideration of the officers' duty roster system, as the
device that governs officers' deployments, as the target for
change. Practically, it may be that a police patrol activity
analysis would reveal that officers customarily patrolled
areas where demands for their services were greater, though
not necessarily where they could be seen by the most
people.
S.S.S. In other words they were dealing with incoming demands,
rather than the public perception of problems that might be
prevented by high visibility patrolling. The target for change
would be where the attention for change became focused
and in this example it may not be the duty roster but the
public information or demand management sub-systems.
5.5.9. The target for change is seen as the actual sub-systems,
including all procedures and staff that are subject of change
or alteration. Targets for change are seen as occurring in
three generic groups as shown at Figure 5.3.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
STRUCTURE
CULTURE
SYSTEMS
FigurezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA5.3 Types of Change Target
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5.5.10. Figure 5.3 implies that the targets for change although
occurring within three identifiable groups, interact to
produce the actual situation that is to be changed, more
conveniently described as the 'narrow system of interest'.
5.5.11. On the basis of the work arising from the major schools of
organisational theory, it can be proposed that organisations
will have change targets within the three broad generic
groups shown which broadly correspond to the major
schools of theory as follows:
i. culture - essentially the human relations school,
incorporating social, psychological and human
features and phenomena,
ii. structure - incorporating the rational approaches,
including power, authority and accountability
relationships, operating procedures and rules,
iii. systems - the unifying approach that understands
the organisation to be interacting with its own sub-
systems and environment.
5.6 ChangeTarget - Organisational Culture
5.6.1. The concept of organisational culture is complex. By
definition, it consists of a large set of taken-for-granted
implicit assumptions that encompass how members of a
work group view both their internal and external
relationships. (Schein 1985)
5.6.2. If the group, which may be an entire work force, have a
shared history of any length, these assumptions about how
their environment behaves and how they behave towards
each other will have become aligned with one another. They
will have created a pattern that reflects a set of assumptionszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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about 'how things are', i.e. time, reality, space, people,
relationships etc. This pattern of basic assumptions
amounts to 'organisational culture',and will be very strong in
long and well established organisations. It reflects the basic
human need for consistency and order in working life.
(Schein 1985, Kilmann et al 1986)
5.6.3. It seems that if an organisation has a highly developed
culture in this sense, it is most likely that the culture will
effect most, if not all features of its functioning including:
i. strategies, policies and objectives,
ii. structures - the established pattern of formal and
informal relationships,
iii. people - staff internally and people who associate
with the organisation externally,
iv. processes - the way things are done,
v. control systems - the way people and processes are
controlled,
vi. reward systems - who benefits and how.
5.6.4. An example of how culture might negatively shape police
organisational processes would be the widespread incidence
of a tough, uncompromising, task-driven, autonomous, law
enforcement oriented, self image amongst police officers.
The internalisation of such a cultural stereotype by officers
would strongly effect how the police organisation undertook
its work. In this case away from the service concept of
policing towards a sharply defined non discretionary, law
enforcement model. Such a culture would include behaviours
which were rewarded by peers, the organisation of the work
groups and the style of strategies they pursued.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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5.6.5. If such a culture vvereto be encouraged, or even tolerated
by the wider organisation, then the.norms of behaviour of the
officers seen as successful would be copied by new arrivals
and others trying to emulate their success. Thus the
negative culture would spread and become the
organisational norm. If such a situation persisted, then in
time, nothing would be seen as untoward or unusual and the
organisation would have developed a culture that was self
sustaining and reinforcing and extremely difficult to alter. As
individuals who are recognised as typifying the culture are
rewarded and advanced, so the strategy and outlook of the
organisation becomes more aligned to the culture. The
process is then self re-enforcing and self-perpetuating and
highly resistant to change. (Byars 1991) In this particular
example the process would have
organisational goals to the contrary.
occurred despite
5.6.6. Kilmann et al (1985) provides a number of similar examples
from commercial organisations where the organisational
culture has become the dominant feature. Smith et al (1983
[a, b & c)) in studies of the Metropolitan Police during the
early nineteen-eighties provided timely evidence of the
emergence of strong cultural traits within some officers and
features of the organisation that vvere not widely different
from the foregoing example. Fielding (1991) suggests that
the police culture is both resistant to change and resilient
in the face of external pressures to change.
5.6.7. Sathe (1985) provides a model of the process of how culture
tends to perpetuate itself within commercial organisations
and which appears to be equally appropriate to police
organisations. The model is shown in an adapted and
extended form at Figure 5.4.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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-A-
New and Existing
members of the
organisation are
socialised to conform
to the organisational
culture
-8-
Removal and/or
rejection of
members who
deviate from the
organisational
culture
j
ORGANISATIONAL CULTUREzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
-
-C-
Behaviours
-E-
Cultural
Communications
-o-
Justifications
of
Behaviours
Entry to and Exit from
Organisational t----t.
Culture
Cultural
Re-inforcement
Sub-system
Figure 5.4 How Culture Tends to be PerpetuatedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
(Developed from Vijay Sathe 1985 )
5.6.8. Figure 5.4 shows the process already described of new
individuals being influenced by existing members of the
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organisation. This may be as straightforward as older
members passing on information to the newer members, or
the more subtle acquisition ~f standards, etiquette's,
demeanours etc. by behaviour modelling.
5.6.9. At minimum it is the acquisition of knowledge of how things
are done by a process of socialisation. (Byars 1991) It is the
case that some new members quickly absorb the cultural
norms of an organisation whilst others do so more slowly, or
not at all. In Sathe's (1985) analysis it is suggested that
only two options exist for an employer whose staff do not
acquire desirable features of the organisational culture.
Firstly getting people to accept the pattern of beliefs, or
secondly, removing them from the organisation.
5.6.10. In the case of a work group, this notion canzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe extended to
encompass the rejection by a group of individuals who do
not display the appropriate cultural attitudes and
behaviours. Some will acquire the necessary traits whilst
others will not and will be ostracised by the group for either
positive or negative reasons. Thus there is a flow of people
from box 'A' through the cultural process to box 'B'.
5.6.11. The cultural re-enforcement sub-system takes place from
box 'C' through to box 'E'. Conventional wisdom is that
beliefs and values influence behaviour. However a
substantial body of social science literature indicates that
one of the most effective ways of changing a persons beliefs
and values is to change the corresponding behaviours.
(Sathe 1985) However, behaviour change does not
necessarily produce cultural change because of the
intervening process of justification of behaviour, box '0'.
Here, Sathe sees individuals justifying the new behaviours
in the context of the previous situation or some external
factor. This is summarised as compliant behaviour without
commitment to the culture.
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5.6.12. Box 'E' in the process encompasses both implicit and explicit
communications that take place within organisations about
the way things are. Cultural communications range from
straightforward messages sent by, say, logos headed
paper, corporate uniform and dress, to the explicit
communications of both managers and staff designed to
secure adherence to the organisations' or work groups'
values.
5.6.13. Figure 5.4 therefore demonstrates that the organisational
culture will be self perpetuating and increasingly resistant to
alteration without external interventions to influence the
process. Thus when change to an organisation is tackled, it
is likely that a number of well established practices and
habits which derive from the culture will have to be
addressed. In so doing, the culture will become a target for
change.
5.6.14. Such well established practices may be associated with the
values of many experienced and long serving members and
change to such practices and habits may well produce
negative reactions from the individuals concerned.
However, it is the older more conservative elements of work
groups that provide the stability and perpetuation of
traditional values and it may be that such attributes are seen
by the organisation as desirable. Such cultures do however,
have the potential to be a power for disruption, as well as for
consistency and stability. It seems to be the case that such
cultures are more resistant to change than perhaps those
typically associated with apparently more challenging, but
more outward looking groups.
5.6.15. In such circumstances it is possible that a counterculture
can form amongst those who advocate change in order to
overturn the existing practices (Schein 1985) It is possible to
see how such a development could be very harmful to an
organisation. The conflicting values would quickly consume
the full attention and energy of the protagonists and thus the
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organisation would become more and more introspective
and less open. In the case of a police organisation, exactly
the opposite of the desired effect.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
5.7 Change Target - Structure
5.7.1. At its most basic, the structure of an organisation might be
considered as the established pattern of relationships
among the component parts of the organisation. (Kast and
Rosenzweig 1982) The term structure in this sense is used
to emphasise the relations between the parts, as well as the
identity of the parts which constitute the whole organisation.
(Beer 1972)
5.7.2. The organisation's structure is typically associated with the
ubiquitous organisation chart that schematically represents
people, job titles or functions in boxes which are linked by
lines indicating responsibility and accountability. Frequently
such charts are drawn to indicate hierarchies and used to
emphasise superior/subordinate relationships. Such
diagrams allow both managers and staff to have a
straightforward visual representation of what is essentially
an extremely complex set of relationships in anything other
than the smallest organisation. (Cleland and King 1972)
5.7.3. Size is probably the most important variable influencing the
structure and shape of an organisation (Kakabadse et al
1987) and since police organisations within the UK are all
'large' in comparison to the majority of other organisations it
will be useful to consider the common features of the
structures large organisations. Kakabadse (1987) drew the
following conclusions:
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i. Larger organisations usually have the most
formalised systems and procedures,
ii. larger organisations tend to develop a network of
complex interrelations between a number of
different specialist groups,
iii. larger organisations require extensive systems of
co-ordination as much as of control,
iv. size in itself does not seem to determine either
efficiency or quality of output,
v. size is an important determinant of the
predominantly held attitudes amongst staff. (i.e. in a
large organisation with a 'tall' structure, the
culture may be formal and authoritarian, whereas
the leadership style may be more informal in
smaller, 'flatter' or matrix style organisations.
5.7.4. For the purpose of analysing the nature of organisational
structure a distinction is often made between the formal and
the informal structure of organisations. The formal structure
being the planned structure representing the deliberate
attempt to establish a pattern of relationships to achieve
the organisations goals and the informal being those
aspects of the organisation that occur spontaneously out of
the interactions and activities of the participants.
5.7.5. The analysis of the formal structures of organisations is
usually associated with the rational approach to the study of
organisations and informal structural analysis with the
human relations school. The following lists are drawn from a
variety of sources (Kast and Rosenzweig 1982, Cleland
and King 1972, Cummings 1980) in order to define the
characteristics of the formal and informal organisation:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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FORMAL
i. The pattern of formal relationships and duties - the
organisation chart plus job descriptions, role
definitions and lor position guides,
ii. the way in which various activities or tasks are
assigned to different departments and/or people in
the organisation,
iii. the way in which separate activities are co-
ordinated and integrated,
iv. the power, status and hierarchical relationships with
the organisations authority systems,
v. the planned and formal policies, procedures and
controls that guide the activities and relationships
of people in the organisation.
INFORMAL
i. social, psychological and social-psychological
factors influencing managers and staff,
ii. inter and intra work group/team dynamics,
iii. personal relationships and objectives.
5.7.6. Although the distinction between the formal and informal
attributes of organisational systems is useful for analytical
purposes, in large and complex organisations thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtwo ypes
of structure merge inextricably together. It may be seen from
the foregoing characteristics that none can exist in isolation,
or are mutually exclusive.
5.7.7. It may thus be appreciated that it is not possible to precisely
determine how the nature of the formal organisation
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operates without an understanding of the informal relations
and unofficial norms. (Blau and Scott 1962) The obverse is
also true in that the formal organisation will effect the
behaviour, attitudes and performance of individuals within it.
(Senge 1990)
5.7.8. In terms of managing change this point is crucial. It ean be
assumed that an organisation is a goal seeking system, by
definition (Cleland and King 1972). There is also
considerable agreement that the formal structure of an
organisation is the means by which strategy is pursued and
objectives achieved. (Senge 1990, Kakabadse 1987,
Cummings 1980, et al) This being the ease, then the target
for change in many circumstances will be the formal
structure. Simply, if the organisation's strategy shifts or
changes, then it is axiomatic that the formal structure will
have to alter to more appropriately pursue the new aims.
5.7.9. However, it does not necessarily seem to be the ease that
the reverse process will follow, due to the existence of the
informal structures. If the target for change is an alteration
to the formal structure alone, the result will not necessarily
be an alteration to the output in terms of the organisations
performance and objectives.
5.7.10. This proposition is reinforced by Senge's (1990) observation
that different people will produce qualitatively similar results
within the same structure. Hence, if the structure is changed'
and the people remain the same, then it is likely the earlier
outputs will continue until other change targets are altered,
i.e. culture or systems.
5.7.11. Cummings (1980) and Senge (1990) both offer the
explanation that organisational structures must be
harmonised not only with other organisational sub-systems,
but also with their environment in order to be at their most
productive. This implies that if changes are made to
structures that are incompatible with other features of thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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organisation, or are inappropriate to the organisations'
environment, then individuals within the system will simply
perpetuate the previous order of things. In other words
things will be done the way they always have been, despite
the structural changes.
5.7.12. This amounts to the most satisfactory explanation as to why
organisational structures are so frequently the target for
change, but when the structural Changes are implemented,
there is often little observed alteration to the outputs.
5.7.13. It is arguably the case that an organisation's structure should
facilitate the accomplishment of organisational objectives
rather than to detract from achievement. It is in this latter
regard that the motivation for change to organisational
structures in the police service probably arises. It is clear
that too many management levels make communication and
co-ordination needlessly difficult. Too many meetings
attended by too many people are classic symptoms of an
inappropriate structure, as is too much attention directed
towards 'proper procedures' and inter function/department
conflicts. (Byars 1991)
5.8 ChangeTarget - Systems
5.8.1. The third interrelating target for change shown at Figure 5.3
are 'systems'. Here the word system is used in the dual
sense of being both an intellectual discipline for the analysis
of organisationszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(inter alia) but princip lly in this section, as
a sequence of actions, such as a set of connected activities
or procedures designed to achieve some organisational
objective. The latter sense may be more appropriately
explained as being similar to the concept of organisational
standard operating procedures. (S.O.P.s) However to use
the expression S.O.P. would be to ignore the other
characteristics of a 'system' in the former sense. The wordzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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system is therefore used with the dual meaning in this
section.
5.8.2. A group of organisational activities, seen as a sub-system
produce outputs which are largely determined by the
purpose of that particular set of S.O.P.s. For instance,
administrative procedures largely produce administrative
outputs, transport procedures produce movement of goods
or people, criminal court procedures produce verdicts and
soon.
5.8.3. Each of these sequences of activities may be defined in
terms of systems concepts and taken to include both the
cultural and structural factors previously discussed. Here,
the meaning is more precise in that cultural and structural
attributes are considered as separate sub-systems inter
relating with a sub-system called 'systems'. It is the
organisational systems that comprise those activities that
actually produce the current output that amounts to the
'narrow system of interest'. Thus leading to the definition of
the word 'system' in this context, as the elements of the
S.O.P.s and the relationships between them. (i.e. 'the
police prosecution system is the officer activities, paperwork
and relationships that result in a file capable of prosecution
in court. Similarly, the police community liaison system
comprises mutual stored knowledge and police
communications with a community.) Identification of the sub-
systems and systems boundaries will always be problematic, .
(Flood and Carson 1993) but it is the concept that is
considered significant to the model of the target for change.
5.8.4. Examples of changes in commercial organisations where the
target for change has been systems are numerous in the
majority of management texts. Such changes are typified by
an alteration to, say, a proforma, a manufacturing
procedure, or any work routine that is made in isolation. The
consequential effects of the change are not fully experiencedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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until after implementation when the systemic effect
produces unforeseen outputs.
S.B.S. Similar effects can be seen inside police organisations.
Alterations to the many legal and procedural systems which
constitute a large portion of the 'business' of the Service are
commonplace. Changes to reporting procedures, new or
amended legislation, changes to criminal justice
procedures and rules etc., are very frequent and amount to
systems changes.
S.B.6. A small alteration to the way in which a particular element of
information is transmitted from, say, a police division to a
court in terms of timing or style of presentation may have
substantial influences on other aspects of the police or court
system. Such a change could have a significant impact on
the routine of how police officers, civil servants, court
officials, advocates and the bench pursue their own
functions as well as having a considerable effect on
efficiency.
S.B.7. Therefore in considering targets for change, 'systems' are a
vital area for analysis if unwanted consequential effects are
to be avoided and the organisation's potential is to be
maximised.
S.B.B. This proposition is not new or even original in respect of
commercial concerns. The discipline of systems thinking is
the fundamental theme of Senge (1990) in his description of
'The Fifth Discipline'. Here it is emphasised and reinforced
with evidence of case studies, that to change an element of
an organisation without considering associated sub-systems
and the environment is to court disaster in terms of
effectiveness.
S.B.9. EveredzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(19BO) i his consideration of the use of systems
thinking for organisational development cites what he
believes to be the 'beneficial fallout' of systems thinkingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
211
which encapsulates the major features of the approach
which are seen as:
i. studying the characteristics of organisations at a
higher level of abstraction, enabling a strategic
approach to be taken,
ii. providing a language for describing organisational
phenomena,
iii. thinking in terms of relationships between entities,
rather than in terms of things in isolation,
iv. stimulating a holistic approach that encourages
consideration of the entire organisation in the
setting of its environment,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
v. modifying science away from a reductionist causal
approach, towards a more synthesising, transactive,
contextual discipline,
vi. highlightingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAt o kinds of xplanation and reason,
firstly deduction derived from logical analysis and
secondly the kind stimulated by systems thinking,
that of pattern recognition and creativity (gestalt) on
the part of the observer.
5.8.10. It is argued that the above list of advantages for systems
thinking about organisations are as appropriate to police
organisational systems, as they are suggested to be for
commercial type organisations. This analysis has argued
that whilst the goals and objectives of policing systems may
be less precise than those for commercial organisations, the
nature and characteristics of the organisational structures,
cultures and systems have much in common.
5.8.11. Police organisations in common with many service type
organisations have people as their principal resource. This
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implies that those features of organisational systems that
involve the organisation of people and the way in which they
function, both individually and collectively, are probably
similar. Therefore it is argued that the conceptual approach
of systems thinking and associated analytical methods that
are successfully applied to commercial organisations, have
the potential tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe equally succ ssful when applied to
policing systems. The anticipated benefits are as potentially
appropriate to police organisatrons as they have been to
other concerns.
5.9 Macro Model - Types of Implementation
5.9.1. The actual changes necessary to bring about an alteration to
the target, have to be subjected to a process of
implementation for the change process to be complete. It is
only when the changes have been made and the outputs
from the new processes are fed back to the change stimuli
(Figure 5.2), that it becomes possible to determine whether
there is a continuing need for change and/or adaptation.
Cleland and King (1983) referred to this feedback process
as the 'project control sub-system'.
5.9.2. The process of implementation is conceptually more
straightforward than either planning for change, or
subsequently making the new system operate according to
expectation. It might be argued that if a system is not
performing according to design and/or expectation then it
has either not been fully implemented, or it is not an
appropriate system to realise the expected or desired
change.
5.9.3. It is argued here, that there is a distinction to be made
between the type of processes of planning, designing and
organising for change, and the later stages of implementing
the changes and then actually stimulating/adjusting the new
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system to produce the required results. It is suggested that
the earlier stages are essentially intelectual processes,
whilst the later stages need the addition of leadership and
motivational skills (Bass 1990) to actually produce the
changes.
5.9.4. The transition from designing change to a process of
implementation is described by Checkland (1972, 1981) in
stages 5 and 6 of his soft systems methodology (S.S.M.).
He suggests a comparison is made between the problem
situation and the conceptual models of the new system in
stage 5; then feasible and desirable changes are identified
at stage 6. ThesezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAt\NO stages of Checkland's S.S.M. are
broadly similar to the concept advanced here of delivery
systems (Sections 4.1 and 4.2) that harmonise and co-
ordinate individual police system treatments prior to the
actual process of implementation.
5.9.5. Implementation then follows, which is considered here to be
the process of actually changing what is happening now, into
the new system, and is broadly similar to Checklend's
S.S.M. stage 7 in that it involves actions to make changes.
5.9.6. As suggested above it is also considered here that there is a
further distinction to be drawn between implementing a new
system and actually stimulating and adjusting the new
system to produce its designed performance. It is argued •
that this requirement is achieved by studying the series of
feedback comparisons between what is required/designed
and what is actually happening, i.e. 'the project control
system' (Cleland and King 1983) This process is analogous
to a new aircraft or ship that has to be operated by an
experienced crew whilst detailed modifications are made
before the vessel can be considered to be operating
optimally.)
5.9.7. Here, three basic models of change implementation will be
considered:
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i. abrupt system change whereby the old procedures
stop and the new start immediately,
ii. phased implementation whereby the old procedures
are gradually replaced with the new,
iii. and parallel operations whereby both old and new
systems run simultaneously for a period before the
old is terminated.
5.9.8. These basic models of system change implementation
although conceptually straightforward have many possible
variants which are appropriate to different change targets.
5.9.9. The models of change implementation at Figures 5.5 to
5.13 have been developed on the basis of S.S.M.
(Checkland 1972, 1981) in order to examine the major
variants and to explore the possibilities of adapting the basic
change models to suit particular organisational needs.
5.9.10. Each type of implementation has advantages as well as
disadvantages in terms of time, resources and complexity,
but additionally, each has advantageous features for
differing situations. Thus, using the models it is possible to
make comparisons between 'what is' in real situations and
what is desirable or feasible in planning changes.
5.9.11. A basic model of abrupt change is shown at Figure 5.5 The
horizontal axis represents time from any point in the systems
evolution t[n] through arbitrary increments to t[n+3]. The
vertical axis represents systems utilisation which is the
proportional amount of a system that is functioning at any
particular time. A fully functioning system is thus shown as a
horizontal line at the 100% level. Abrupt change is therefore
simply represented by the vertical straight line at the
arbitrary point of change, t[n+1].
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Figure 5.5 Abrupt System Implementation
5.9.12. The advantage of implementations of this type is that it can
be a fast process that enables new system to be potentially
fully functioning as soon as possible. The period of transition
and uncertainty associated with the change process is
reduced to a minimum and it is potentially cheaper in terms
of resources allocated to the change process. Abrupt change
is attractive in situations where there are few individuals
involved and where speed and cost are high priorities.
5.9.13. However, the approach carries with it considerable
disadvantages that make it less attractive in many settings.
Once the old system has been discontinued, complete
reliance has to be placed on the new system, unless it is
possible to revert to the old system.
5.9.14. The abrupt change method presents only limited
opportunities to ensure the new system will operate
satisfactorily prior to replacement of the old system. Such
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opportunities are confined to testing the new system in an
artificial environment, i.e. by exercise or simulation which
may not address a further difficulty in that the consequential
effects of change may be largely unforeseen until after
implementation in the real 'world setting'. Staff training and
familiarisation with the new system may be beneficial, but
the staff involved with making the new systems function in a
'real world' operational environment will have a limited
opportunity to adjust at the point of abrupt change
5.9.15. Figure 5.6 illustrates an approach that overcomes many of
the problems of abrupt change - the parallel system
operation. Here the old system continues to fully function at
100% output, and at t[n+1] the new system is implemented
alongside to run Simultaneously, until t[n+2] when the new
system fully replaces the old.
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Figure 5.6 Parallel System Implementation
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5.9.16. Although parallel system implementation may be seen to
diminish many of the disadvantages of the abrupt change
model, it has potentially more than double the cost
implications until the new system replaces the old. Such
costs, are likely to be justified only where:
i. continued satisfactory operation of the system is
essential,
ii. the risks associated with even a marginal loss of output
are unacceptable.
5.9.17. Figure 5.7 shows a variant of the parallel system
implementation whereby only selected sub-systems are
operated in parallel in order that combined system utilisation
does not exceed 100%. The boundary lines between the
new and old systems represent an abrupt cessation of the
old sub-systems and replacement with corresponding sub-
systems from the new system, or a more gradual transition
shown by the sloping lines.
5.9.18. The model implies that combinations of these
implementations are feasible in that a gradual
implementation of new sub-systems at t[n+1] could be
followed by an abrupt termination of the old system at t[n+2].
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Figure 5.7 Parallel Sub-System Implementation
5.9.19. The advantages of parallel sub-system implementation are
that new and old critical sub-systems can be run
simultaneously, whilst satisfactory functioning of the new
sub-systems is verified or adjusted. Thus the risk of failed
system output is substantially reduced, whilst those less
critical features of the system are changed without
unacceptable risk to the operation of the overall system.
The cost advantages of this model combined with the
reduced risk of failure will make this approach to change
attractive in many situations.
5.9.20. The model at Figure 5.8 is the third basic system
implementation type - a straightforward phasing of the
elements of change through time.
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Figure 5.8 Phased System Implementation
5.9.20. Figure 5.8 shows that the change process might be
progressed quickly, line (1), or extended over a longer
period of time, line (2). The shorter the time taken, the
greater will be the likelihood of disadvantages accruing
associated with the abrupt change model. However, the
longer the time taken, the greater will be the risk of
developing dysfunctional effects that might limit the success
of the system implementation.
5.9.21. At worst, the outcome would be that the complete new
system might never be fully implemented. This and other
potentially unsatisfactory outcomes might arise because the
implementation process was progressing so slowly that:
i. staff attention becomes distracted from the main
change objectives and becomes focused on minor,
consequential effects, to the detriment of the overall
systems operation and output,
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ii. changes are insignificant and take so long to
achieve that the new system/process is discredited
and resistance to change increases,
iii. changes in the systems' environment influence
operation of the new system to a level that the
earlier planned changes become inappropriate,
iv. the notional cost of human energy and skill
expended on the change process exceeds that
directed towards the operation of the system itself.
5.9.22. The model at Figure 5.9 demonstrates a variation of phased
system implementation YJhereby the output of the old
system, line (a) is not maintained at 100% YJhenphased
implementation of the new system, line (b) commences at
t[n+1]. Here, before the new system is functioning at 100%
the old system is phased out, with the resulting drop in
output either side of the phasing intersection.
5.9.23. It would be feasible to plan a similar implementation YJhereby
the old system was phased out and the new system phased
in parallel so as to avoid a drop in output. Such an
approach would incur the increased costs associated with
any form of parallel implementation, but would not be as
high as those implied by the model at Figure 5.6.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 5.9 Phase Out - Phase In System Implementation
5.9.24. An implementation that corresponded to the model shown at
Figure 5.9 would only be appropriate where the
maintenance of 100% system output was unnecessary.
5.9.25. An extreme variation of such a model is indicated by vertical
lines (c) and (d) where the old system output ends at t[n+1],
either through entropy or design and a time lag occurs
before implementation of the new system at t[n+2]. The
system output would thus fall to zero for the duration of the
lag, (t[n+1]-t[n+2]).
5.9.26. Figure 5.10 develops the variation of a time lag between old
and new systems by introducing the concept of a prototype
system that is fully implemented between the old system
ending and the finalised new system starting. The
expression 'prototype system' is used here in the sense of a
preliminary system, or model that it is known will have to be
adapted, or modified during the prototype phase before it
might be considered to be the finalised new system.
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5.9.27. A prototype system may contain known weaknesses, albeit
that it is capable of achieving full output for the limited
duration of the prototype trial. Such weaknesses may only
be possible to correct with the prototype system functioning
in its real environment, thus making such an approach to
implementation the only feasible option, if the risks of
implementing a completely untried system are to be
avoided.
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Figure 5.10 Prototype System Implementation
5.9.28. The principal difference between a prototype system and a
trial, or experimental system is that it is known at the outset
of implementation that a prototype system will be adapted
during operation within the context of its environmental
influences.
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5.9.29. Thus experimental causality, in a rigorous sense,
(Fairweather and Tomatzky 1977) is not an outcome of the
prototype period. Rather, data will be generated
representing whether the system meets its design criteria
within its operating environment and information as to how
output might be improved.
5.9.30. A trial, or an experiment with a social system implies that the
system of interest in its entirety will be tested against a set
of objectives, or test criteria, with the environment held
steady, so as to determine causal relationships.
(Fairweather and Tomatzky 1977) (Difficulties with this
approach in relation to policing systems are discussed in
Section 3)
5.9.31. In respect of change targets and their interaction (Figure 5.3)
it is not possible to isolate the relevant sub-systems and test
them in controlled conditions, so such trials -are not
experimental in the classical sense. However, this does not
mean that non-experimental research in this classic sense,
is not scientific. But it does imply that controlled
experimentation is not an option and that other methods
have to be used. (deNeufville and Stafford 1971)
5.9.32. Two such approaches of parallel and phased trial
implementations are shown at Figures 5.11 and 5.12 where
trials are taking place either alongside the fully functioning
old system, or where selected sub-systems replace
corresponding sub-systems from the old system.
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Figure 5.11 Parallel Trial System Implementation
5.9.33. At Figure 5.11 a trial of selected sub-systems is taking
place in parallel to the old system. At a point when sufficient
information has been generated from the trial, the old
system can be phased out to be replaced by a development
of the trial system into the new system.
5.9.34. The benefit of such a model is that the trial can take place
without effecting the systems' output which in turn provides
the opportunity to develop and implement the new system
with the knowledge gained from the trial. The cost
necessarily being that of the parallel trial.
5.9.35. Figure 5.12 illustrates how such costs might be reduced by
incorporating the trial within the operation of the existing
system.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 5.12 Phased Trial System Implementation
5.9.36. The model at Figure 5.12 might initially seem attractive in
combining the benefits of experimentation without the
corresponding costs of parallel operations. However, the
data generated from the trial is likely to be weaker than that
obtained from trials that are not an integral part of the
functioning system. The functioning system will be
influenced by its environment and thus any trial that takes
place as a connected sub-system, must also be influenced
by the environmental inputs. Therefore if the system is to be
replicated elsewhere in similar environments, it is likely that
the additional costs associated with a parallel trial are likely
to be 'vVOrthwhilein terms of achieving a closer to optimum
design for the new system.
5.9.37. Figure 5.13 provides a schematic representation of non-
linear possibilities that may apply to all the foregoing models
of implementation. It intuitively seems unlikely that most
implementations would follow the linear implementation
routes used for the benefit of simplicity in the forgoing
models.
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Figure 5.13 Non Linear Phased System Implementation
5.9.37. The three curves illustrated are representative of the many
possibilities that could exist. Curve (1) approximates to a
steep exponential whereby the rate of implementation
increases as a function of elements already implemented
and approximates to the model, x.a where a > 1.0. In other
words, the more implementation that has taken place, the
faster will be the rate of subsequent implementation.
5.9.38. Curve (2) is representative of implementations that do not
progress at an even or steady rate. Rather, periods of
achievement are followed by periods of either slower
implementation activity, or much faster progress. The rate of
implementation is shown to slow perceptibly as 100% system
utilisation is approached.
5.9.39. Curve (3) typifies the implementation programme that has a
very slow rate to start, but which increases quickly once
progressively more elements are implemented and
approximates to the model x.a where a < 1.0. The rate of
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increase is shown to be greatest as 100% system utilisation
is approached.
5.10 The MacroModel of Change- Conclusions
5.10.1. The macro model of change has sought to identify and relate
together the major elements of the change process. In doing
so a number of key characteristics of organisations have
been introduced, culture, structure and systems. The macro
model of change is iterative in that the process of feedback
from the implementation stage will determine whether or not
the stimulus for change continues to exist and whether or
not there is a need for further change.
5.10.2. The model is dynamic in that through each iteration the
elements will have adapted to the original change stimulus,
change targets identified and appropriate changes
implemented. If the feedback does not cancel out the
stimulus, then a steady state will not be achieved and the
process will continue. Each iteration changes the system
and bringing it closer to a steady state. In practice, such a
steady state might never be wholly achieved, as the stimulus
from a turbulent environment will invariably promote
continuous change in a police organisation. But like the
organisation itself, the model reflects these dynamic
characteristics.
5.10.3. A feature of the change process that is not considered by the
macro model are the internal changes that arise during the
process of change and which are not directly connected with
the stimulus for change, These factors are largely the
psychological and social psychological factors affecting staff
that form a pattern during the process of organisational
change. Although culture is a legitimate consideration at the
macro model level and culture has been shown to be a
product of individuals' psychological attributes or
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perceptions, the individuals' needs and those of the
organisation are clearly a major factor in the process of
organisational change.
5.10.4. The degree to which latent human capability can be utilised
to achieve corporate goals is often the key to successful
organisations. Therefore changes to morale and motivation
in individuals and groups brought about by the process of
change can be critical in this regard.
5.10.5. Chapter Six analyses this important feature of the change
process and relates the dynamics of psychological and
social psychological factors to the macro model of change.
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CHAPTER SIX
SummaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The significance of the outputs from an individuals' psycho social
sub system to the process of change are considered in this chapter.
A process model of change is suggested and the conflicts and
contrasts in the change process are examined fromzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa managers'
perspective. The issue of resistance to organisational change arising
from both organisational and human factors is discussed and a
model of an individual's dynamic response to the process of change
is advanced. The predominant skills and needs of individuals are
examined in relation to various stages of change and these are
related to the three change targets suggested in Chapter Five. The
resulting complexity of the change process is noted and described in
the context of the 'change cube' model.
6.1 The Human Dimension of Change
6.1.1. The outputs of the human psychological and social
psychological (psycho social) sub-system are seen as
crucially significant to the process of implementing change,
whatever the change stimuli. If the change requires
individuals or work groups to make some adaptation to their
routines and procedures at work, then psycho social factors
will have a major influence on the outcome. (Brown 1954,
Argyle 1972)
6.1.2. If staff support for change is required and is not forthcoming,
the impact of a technical change can be zero, or even
negative. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) Therefore an
understanding of the common human processes of change
that are repeated throughout organisational change
programmes is essential for achieving successful
implementations. Thus benefit for the organisation might be
derived and organisational goals achieved.
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6.1.3. The macro model of change described in Chapter Five
provides the basis for the development of a generalised
process model of change that incorporates the role of
managers. The inclusion in the model of an organisation's
manager's role is vital to the process of change, as it is only
through staff and their effective direction, motivation and co-
ordination that the organisation's goals might be
approached. (Koontz and O'Donnell 1976)
6.1.4. Such a model might be seen as a manager's process or
action guide for addressing change. Figure 6.1 assembles
the minimum necessary management activities for achieving
change associated with the elements of the macro model in
the form of a flow chart.
6.1.5. The process shown at Figure 6.1 initiates with identification
of the change stimuli. This will enable decision makers to
determine whether changes are to be of a systemic nature at
a strategic level, or confined to limited tasks and
procedures that may take place without management
intervention. In such an event, managers will need to be
aware of alterations to tasks as the consequential effects
may not be clear from the operational level.
6.1.6. The management and staff communication sub-systems
include all the formal and informal information routes
customarily utilised within the organisational system for the
exchange of information between staff and managers, as
well as for providing managers with system output
performance information. In the case of major change the
communications sub-system is likely to include special
communications procedures and arrangements designed to
promulgate information specifically relating to the change
programme.
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6.1.7. Management information will enable the target for change tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
be identified and decisions made as to which aspects of the
system need to be changed. ~urther research may be
necessary at this stage and systems thinking will enable the
consequential effects of the proposed changes to be
managed appropriately. (Senge 1990)
6.1.8. The implementation method may then be selected from the
feasible variations (Section 5.9) and action plans prepared
that will allocate tasks to people or work groups. There will
always be costs associated with change, even if these are
only notional or opportunity costs of staff time. Resourcing
issues must therefore be considered before implementation
can commence.
6.1.9. The counter resistance sub-system continually interacts
with the implementation process in such a way as to
facilitate the implementation at every stage. It will be shown
(Sections 6.3 - 6.8) that resistance to change in
organisational systems by staff and managers is a very
common phenomena which can be relied upon to emerge in
one form or another during most change programmes. (Kast
and Rosenzweig 1981) It is therefore desirable to provide for
the eventuality by planning effective counter measures.
6.1.10. Various measures might be more or less appropriate at
different stages of implementation, depending. upon
progress. Such measures might include one or more of the
following:
i. the provision of a dedicated or enhanced internal
communications system to promulgate change
information to the work force,
ii. regular, persuasive demonstrations of the positive
features of the change by describing the
advantages and benefits accruing to those
involved,
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iiL presentation of a rational analysis of the
inappropriateness of the old /existing system,
iv. association of achievement of change with the
internal reward systems i.e. advancement,
recognition, financial rewards and/or tangible
inducements,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
v, association of non achievement of change with
internal sanctions system, Le. threat to security,
lack of advancement, worsened financial prospects,
loss of, or reduced status/position, use of formal
disciplinary procedures.
6.1.11. Finally, when implementation is complete, Figure 6.1. shows
a decision point where a judgement is made as to the
suitability of the new output. If the output is not meeting the
design requirement and the stimulus for change remains
present, then more research may have to be undertaken and
the process re-started.
6.1.12. If a marginal improvement is observed then it is possible that
an inappropriate target was selected, or the new system has
only been partially implemented. In such an event, the
change process should re-commence with identification of
the target for change, which in any event, may have altered
since the first change process.
6.1.13. For police managers, as with others, change is an issue
that may be relied upon to frequently recur, bringing with it
many predictable challenges, especially regarding staff.
Managers and leaders are by definition agents of change;
they are people whose acts affect other people, more than
other peoples' acts affect them. (Bass and Stogdill 1990)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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6.1.14. The management of the change process is therefore one of
critical significance to managerial effectiveness. It is also
potentially the subject that poses the greatest threat to
managers, as so often change involves a shift from the
known and comfortable, into the unknown and
uncomfortable. Clearly, managers themselves are not
immune in any way from the adverse effects that change
and stress can produce.
6.1.15. It is a common and long established phenomena for
managers to experience excessive and damaging levels of
stress as a direct result of changes arising in their working
lives. (Basil and Cook 1974) Although recent research
indicates that some stress may be beneficial and if handled
correctly can improve performance and self esteem. (Camall
1990)
6.1.16. It seems probable that much of this stress may arise not
only from the nature of the change itself, (the change target),
but from the conflicting expectations of both managers and
staff inherent in the process of change, whatever the target.
Not only is the manager faced with leading the change as a
change agent (Bass and Stogdill 1990), he or she is
confronted with a number of inherent conflicts within the
change process itself.
6.2 Conflicts and Contrasts in the ChangeProcess
6.2.1. A great deal is written about how managers should manage
in their daily working lives. Generalist and specialist
literature ranging from popular bookstall publications to
detailed organisational case studies and theoretical texts
offer much insight and advice to individuals in managerial
positions. The police service in common with many other
large organisations, places much emphasis on management
training.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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6.2.2. A situation is thus created where a manager is likely to have
many normative expectations of the management role. Many
of these expectations will be potentially realisable and
many will be clearly out of reach. Additionally, staff
themselves will have expectations of their managers, some
of which will be legitimate and achievable, whereas some
will be perceptual and inappropriate.
6.2.3. Within this plethora of learning, experience, advice and
expectations, there are a number of issues that are
brought into conflict with one another as a result of the
process of change. Some learning will conflict with some
experiences, some advice will conflict with some legitimate
expectations.
6.2.4. A situation is thus created where the manager is not only
confronted with managing the change target and
implementation, but also the conflicts and contrasts
generated by the change process.
6.2.5. In order to illustrate the foregoing propositions, a
representative summary table of the many possible types of
conflicts that might be presented to a manager during the
change process is set out below. The issue in column (A)
contrasts and potentially conflicts with that in column (B).
6.2.6. Figure 6.2. needs little by way of commentary as the
principles advanced are generally well known and seen as
desirable in contemporary management practice in the
police service, as well as in other organisations. (Bradford
and Cohen 1984, Cleland and King 1983)
6.2.7. The conflicts demonstrated are not necessarily
irreconcilable. A long established major role for managers is
the harmonisation and reconciliation of apparently
competing priorities and objectives. (Cleland and King 1972)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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6.2.8. For instance, it is not a trivial assertion that individuals
shouldzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe 'hap y' at work as far as possible. (In this
context, 'happy' is considered to be an individuals' state of
mind which reflects pleasure, harmony and a contentment
with work circumstances.)1
6.2.9. It is desirable, if not in terms of productivity, but in terms of
the social content of work, that individuals derive some
happiness from their work experience. Change to this
routine state of contentment may be suggested to create
some 'unhappiness' which, as will be shown later (Section
6.9) may manifest in many different ways.
6.2.9. It may be argued as not unreasonable for the manager to
/ forsake the individuals' immediate happiness for the
achievement of the change. Then to look for some other
stimuli to recreate, or re-introduce a degree of happiness at
a later stage. It might be entirely consistant, in the short
term, for a manager's objectives to put the needs of the
organisation above those of an individual's happiness.
Although it would be probable, that if this situation
persisted, an adverse reaction would arise in the
individual(s) concerned. (Le leaving the organisation andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAlor
sabotage in extreme cases) (Dubois 1979)
6.2.11. So, whilst the conflicts and contrasts are presented as
potential difficulties for managers to overcome in the.process
of managing change, they should not be taken as
irreconcilable although some will be easier to tackle than
others, as in the foregoing example.
1The term 'happy' has been used in order to differentiate from 'job satisfaction'
and 'motivation' that have more-precise meanings in the context of similar
research.
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Conflicts and Contrasts in Managing Change
(A) (B)
Understanding current day to Maintaining a strategic view and
day issues direction
Effective, high profile, Maintaining distance
charismatic leadership, with an from day to day issues
empathetic style, whilst providing
(management by effective leadership.
walking about!)
Understanding staff Allowing staff sufficient freedom
and the psycho social to develop solutions in order to
problems associated promote individual development
with work and ownership of changes.
Identifying personally with the Encouraging delegation and staff
necessary changes. ownership of the changes.
The need for and The desirability of constructively
desirability of corporacy. challenging existing practices.
Maintaining staff and Making changes happen
self happiness. in reality.
Implementing solutions to Creating a dynamic organisation
'today's' problems that will tackle 'tomorrow's'
problems 'today'.
Possession of necessary Such attributes are
attributes for implementing dysfunctional in other key
effective change. aspects of change management.
i.e. determination, confidence, Le. team building, delegation,
certainty, robustness etc. trust , corporacy etc.
Figure 6.2 Conflicts and Contrasts in Managing Change
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6.2.12. Of greatest potential difficulty is the conflict between styles
of management necessary for day to day, strategic or
routine management and the management style required to
achieve effective change. Most writers seem to agree that
modern management and leadership styles are to a great
extent situational. (Bass and Stogdill 1990) However, there
has been a gradual but steady trend over the last four
decades or so, to move away from authoritarian and
autocratic styles towards more participative and democratic
approaches to management. (Moss-Kanter 1984 & 1989,
Senge 1990) This trend has been reflected in commercial,
as well as public service organisations and has extended to
bureaucracies that are largely rule bound, such as the
police service and other quasi military style organisations.
6.2.13. The benefits of participatory styles are well known in
achieving motivation and commitment to corporate and work
group objectives, including the creation of opportunities for
greater productivity. (Vroom and Deci 1978) There is
substantial evidence to support the trend to greater
participation and the benefits to be achieved by this
approach. (Robson 1982, Bradford and Cohen 1984)
6.2.14. The contrast arises in that there appears to be much
agreement that the operationalisation of major change
requires a clear strategy and management attributes of
determination and robustness. This is necessary in order to
sustain change activities in the face of the trend of 'staff to
dilute or moderate the changes, especially by those who
perceive they will be adversely affected for whatever reason.
6.2.15. The assertive management style thus conflicts with the
experiences of many modern middle managers who have
become habituated to more participative styles. Moss-Kanter
(1984) identified a similar conflict and found that middle
managers and staff were reluctant to invest energy in their
work when faced with the conflict between a robust topzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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down change programme and their normal corporate style
of participation and involvement.
6.2.16. The conflict was found to be exacerbated by the tendency of
managers to focus on short term objectives when faced with
the prospect of further change without involvement or
participation. Thus the opportunity of harnessing managerial
skills and energy to translate strategic necessities into
operational changes waszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAH••• constrai ed...and...inhibited..."
by the conflict in management styles. (Moss-Kanter 1984
pgs.47-58)
6.2.17. Advocates of a participatory approach to management
would claim that communication and consultation should
take place in advance of the change implementation in order
to secure the commitment of the work force. (Francis 1987)
However, it may be demonstrated that individuals will strive
to find reasons to minimise change if they do not perceive
them to be directly in their interests, whether or not they are
involved in a consultative or participatory system. (Tichey
and Devanna 1986, Bass and Stogdill 1990) It is possible in
such cases that participation and debate in advance of the
proposed changes has the potential to harden resistance to
change, rather than to facilitate it.
6.3 Resistance to Change - The Change Balance
6.3.1. Despite the commonalty of organisational change, typified by
the assertions of Handy (1984 pg. 10) that organisational
life is changing "...fast and dramatically...", Carnall (1990
pg. 28) "In a changing world, an organisation must change
to survive..." and others in a similar vein, (Evered 1980,
Porras 1987) people in organisations often seem to resist
the process.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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6.3.2. It may be that in generations to come, or possibly sooner,
people in organisations will consider change to be the norm.
But for the time being, and despite the inducements of
material rewards associated with profit policies of both
government and commerce, individuals persistently
demonstrate a resistance to change in their working lives.
Senge (1990 pg. 88) notes that sudden resistance to
changes can seem to "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAcome from nowhere...H, but adds
that resistance to change is predictable, in that it invariably
arises from threats to traditional norms and ways of doing
things.
6.3.3. It is inaccurate to assume that resistance to change is
always a negative phenomena, although it is frequently
perceived in that way. Organisations whether commercial or
public service, have a need to pursue multiple objectives for
survival and amongst these is likely to be a need for some
stability, balanced with a need to change. (CarnaIl1990)
6.3.4. Police organisations, especially those operating within
conurbations, carry out their function within an extremely
turbulent human environment (Scarman 1981, Jackson and
Keys 1984) where both public and government opinion can
fluctuate rapidly and widely.
6.3.5. To correspondingly react to such fluctuations would severely
curtail the ability of the police to strategically and efficiently
tackle crime and other issues. The same argument may be
said to be true for government departments who see their
role as providing stability in the face of political changes in
government.
6.3.6. Similarly, it might be argued that a commercial organisation
that tried to continually adapt its product to suit every market
opportunity, might discover the desirability of some stability
in order to consolidate its position. In the extreme, a
situation could be envisaged where all the energy of such
an organisation could be consumed by managing changes,
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rather than generating output; the organisation having
become totally introspective. Carnall (1990 pg. 28) describes
this situation as follows:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...while we are changing, we must still deploy people to
produce goods or services as normal, even if we are
demanding extra effort from them as they experience
change."
6.3.7. Senge (1990) introduced the concept of 'balancing loops'
to convey the management desirability of a balance between
a static system without change and a dynamic system that is
continually changing. Kast and Rosenzweig (1981) refer to
the 'dynamic equilibrium' of organisations, which is the state
in which an organisation is stable to environmental
perturbations, but which is also adaptive and innovative.
Therefore, if a state of balance is desirable, then a degree
of resistance to change in an organisation is also desirable.
6.3.8. At Section 5.6, reference was made to the stability created
by long serving members of staff who continue to exhibit the
traditional values of the organisation and who are highly
resistant to change. In organisations where traditions are
significant to the operation, i.e. the market or trading
position, corporate image, corporate integrity, then a high
turnover of such staff would be undesirable.
6.3.9. In such circumstances resistance to change would amount
to a corporate asset rather than a constraint. In order to
stimulate change under such conditions it would therefore
be necessary to bring about gradual alterations to the
corporate culture that was being sustained by the long
serving members. Such a process is described at Section
5.4. and by the model at Figure 5.4.
6.3.10. Here, the organisational balance would be towards
resistance rather than change. Whereas in an organisation
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that was dependent upon a creative reaction to it's
environment, the balance would favour adaptive staff, who
are possibly younger and less inclined to exhibit values
associated with established norms of 'how things are done'.
6.3.11. Resistance to change can therefore occur as a result of the
characteristics of the particular organisation or industry.
Contemporary examples of such a style of organisation and
their workers are common i.e. dock workers, car assembly
operators, miners, railway drivers and signal operators.
6.3.12. In such cases, resistance to change has been high when it
has been seen as necessary by the workforce to resist
technological progress and to retain traditional practices in
order to preserve job security and standard of living.
6.3.13. The majority of explanations for resistance to change do not
however arise through characteristics of a particular
organisation or industry, but through the people in the work
place, both individually and collectively.
6.3.14. The human and social factors contributing to a resistance to
change form a complex psycho social sub system, the
elements of which may be categorised as follows. Each will
be discussed in tum:
i. psychological factors,
ii. psycho-social factors,
iii. sunk costs,
iv. personal strategies,
v. confusion.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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6.4 Resistance to Change - Psychological FactorszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
6.4.1. The following table presents the frequently encountered,
major psychological factors that may be apparent singly, or
in combination to produce an individuals' resistance to
organisational change. There are many unusual, or even
abnormal psychological conditions that may occur in people
that will create a resistance to change, or constrain them
from tackling unfamiliar circumstances, i.e. psychopathy,
acute paranoia, schizophrenia. (Sacks 1985)
6.4.2. Such conditions are exceptional and the list presented here,
drawn from the following sources, does not attempt to be
exhaustive in this respect. (Brown 1954, Davies and
Shackleton 1975, Lupton 1978, Vroom and Deci 1978,
Brown and Campbell 1994) Rather those conditions shown
are attitudinal phenomena that exist in the majority of
humans at work. (Argyle 1972)
i. Uncertainty - Staff not knowing in sufficient
detail what has to be done, or what the new
system requires of them may create a
situation where change will be resisted.
Uncertainty can arise due to:
(a) poor internal communications,
(b) staff inattention to new instructions,
(c) an inability or reluctance to understand
what is required,
(d) a situation that is inherently uncertain
and cannot be made more certain.
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ii.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAConfidence - a lack of confidence in
individuals that they will actually be able to
perform the new tasks or procedures will
militate against implementation of change.
Poor levels of confidence may arise from:
(a) inadequate training or communication,
(b) the absence of an opportunity to
experiment in a safe environment.
iii. Anxiety - a condition exacerbated by poor
confidence and uncertainty which manifests
as worry, which in turn may create
unacceptable levels of stress in staff.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt i
natural for humans to strive to reduce the
source of anxiety and if this is perceived to
be the impending change, then the changes
may be selectively ignored and/or resisted.
iv. Stress - a potentially severe constraining
condition that may limit the performance of
routine activities and in such severe cases,
will result in inactivity, a loss of self esteem
and a disregard of new or unfamiliar
challenges or changes.
v. Confusion - a state of mental disorder
brought about by not being able to relate the
present activities with the new requirements.
Likely to be compounded by poor internal
communication and/or a failure by managers
to agree clear objectives.
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vi.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAFear - a emotion brought about by the
prospect of imminent danger the reaction to
which is either to fight or flee. Fear of
impending but unknown change will limit
current performance and create future
resistance to change, even before proposals
are drafted. The implementation of new
technologies have demonstrated how some
staff have 'fled' from the prospect of
assimilating new skills.
vii. Depression a personal mood of
helplessness, excessive melancholy and
inadequacy often associated with other
physical or mental conditions. Will severely
constrain an individual's motivation to
progress current work and especially to
develop and/or implement changes.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
6.5 Resistance to Change - Psycho Social Factors
6.5.1. In Section 5.6 the concept of organisational culture was
described and the importance of culture to the change
process was recognised and developed as one of the targets
for change. The significance of organisational culture to the
change process principally arises from the potential of
people in groups to have common set of values that can be
applied to disrupt or resist change. (Gahagan 1975)
6.5.2. Culture in the broadest sense is no more that a combination
of psycho social factors interacting with organisational goals
in the workplace to produce observable effects. The
elements of a cultural sub-system have been identified from
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a variety of sources by Schein (1985) and may be
summarised as follows:
i. observed behavioural regularities - language,
rituals, dress, demeanour,
ii. the norms that evolve in working groups - fair day's
work for a fair day's pay,
iii. dominant values - quality of service, adherence to
the law,
iv. organisational philosophy - the vision or knowledge
that guides an organisation towards its staff andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAlor
customers,
v. the rules - that have to be learnt by a newcomer in
order to be accepted,
vi. feeling or climate - the impression created by
physical layout and how staff interact with
outsiders.
6.5.3. Both Schein (1985) and Bass and Stogdill (1990) show
evidence that where the above factors develop into an
organisational culture that is resistant to change, it becomes
difficult to envisage how successful development and
innovation may be achieved. Examples are particularly
striking in this regard where technology has dramatically
altered the nature of certain tasks and change
implementation has been resisted at a high cost to all
concerned. i.e. the newspaper and printing industries,
television and video services, railway signalling and robotics
in production industries.
6.5.4. From a management perspective the prospect of
implementing change against such resistance would
represent a considerable challenge. If the stimuli for change
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were clear and strong, then the pressure on a manager to
implement change would be likely to be considerable. But
ironically, when such change .is tackled, a worsened
situation is probable for the manager.
6.5.5. This presents a personal dilemma for managers. Is the
change to be avoided and the short term prospect improved,
leaving the long term position at risk? Or, is the change
tackled with probable high personal costs in the short term,
with the long term outcome possibly remaining uncertain?
6.5.6. If the manager is experiencing stress from other aspects of
working life, then in the face of such a dilemma, it would not
be surprising to find the manager adopting methods for
avoiding change as a deliberate strategy. (Basil and Cook
1974)
6.5.7. The view that organisational cultures tend to persist and
are resistant to change was put forward in Chapter Five, but
there is not a straightforward solution to avoid the
managers' dilemma and to achieve successful
implementation of cultural changes. Kilmann et al (1985)
suggests that if managers wish to change cultures they need
to consider three steps:
i. minimising the opportunity for external justification and
the minimal use of extrinsic forms of motivation,
rewards, punishment,
ii. giving individuals the opportunity to see the inherent
worth of what they are being asked to do, intrinsic
motivation,
iii. providing a way out of the organisation for people who
cannot accept the new pattern of values and beliefs.
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6.6 Resistance to Change - Sunk Costs
6.6.1. The 'sunk cost' concept refers to the situation where time,
energy and/or money have been invested in an existing
system by key individuals who retain some influence. Sunk
costs can include vested interests, but may also represent
the considerable investment of personal resources in the
current systems made by an experienced manager. (Kast
and Rosenzweig 1981)
6.6.2. This may mean that regardless of the merits of a proposal,
an experienced manager may be highly resistant to changing
the situation in which he has a sunk cost. Thus attempts to
alter the status quo by either external consultants, or internal
innovators is likely to encounter this difficulty. The sunk cost
concept may therefore explain why it appears to be more
difficult to bring about changes in an organisation that is
predominately populated by older, more experienced
individuals. They are simply more likely to have sunk costs
in existing systems.
6.6.3. Moss-Kanter (1984) refers to a similar phenomenazyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
("Innovating Against the Grain" pg. 69) and suggests that it
is rare in any long established, traditional organisation for a
manager to be positively innovative.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAu•• .in such rganisations,
most people never bother to peruse ideas for improvements. "
(pg.70)
6.7 Resistance to Change - Personal Strategies
6.7.1. The following categories, drawn from a variety of sources,
(Hyde 1990, Basil and Cook 1974, Schein 1985) show some
methods by which managers might form deliberate personal
strategies to avoid~change. It will be argued that whether or
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not they are successful will depend to a large extent on their
prevailing psychological condition and how far the manager
might be committed, either individually, or conspiratorially to
resisting change.
6.7.2. It will be noted that the first three methods are also the
involuntary means by which humans cope with other
unpleasant psychological effects. For instance, ignoring the
obvious, or blocking out is the brain's reaction to high and
excessive levels of stress. Looking backwards is a means of
coping with present unpleasant emotions, (such as
bereavement) and simplification is a short term solution to
coping with an excessive number of simultaneous difficulties
of many types. (Davies and Shackleton 1975)
6.7.3. The issue here is that these three methods are natural
human responses that are a part of the brain's programmed
defence mechanisms. These defence responses help to
protect individuals from unpleasant and potentially damaging
effects, which make the identification of what is an
individual's deliberate strategy and what is a natural
reaction, difficult to separate.
i.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBABlocking out - by adopting a 'closed mind'
which selectively rejects any input associated
with the subject of change, it is possible for
the individual to ignore any issues that are
thought likely to be conflictual or troublesome.
A problem can be compounded when
potentially manageable changes are avoided
to the extent that the problems build to a point
where they present an insoluble crises to the
individual.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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ii.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBALooking bac wards - the individual adopting
this method relies upon earlier experiences by
applying 'yesterdays' solutions to 'today's'
problems. The approach may be seen as
potentially safe, but frequently the problems
will be significantly altered through time within
open organisations. The environment in which
the problems exist will also probably have
changed to a point where existing solutions
may be inappropriate. It is highly probable that
neither problems or solutions in social systems
remain the same. There may also be a
tendency for individuals to reflect upon
successful strategies that have contributed to
personal success and achievement in the past.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
It may be tempting in such circumstances to
consider that similar strategies might always
produce the same successes.
iii. Simplification - the when the situation to
which the change relates, is made easier to
understand and tackle by narrowing and
simplifying the issues to a point of over
generalisation, trivialisation, or superficiality.
In the search for a straightforward and non
fallible change, the individual may reduce the
complexity of a seemingly insoluble problem to
a simple and safe change that is not too
threatening to herself, himself, or others.
Superficially it may look as though change has
taken place, whereas in reality any change is
marginal. Such an avoidance approach may
be seen as the opposite to a systemic
approach to change.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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iv. Tokenism - a more sophisticated version of
simply doing nothing. Typically the individual
will agree to changes, debate implementation
programmes etc., but practically, only the
most superficial change will occur. This
avoidance method is often associated with an
apparently highly .active approach to the
changes, designed to persuade others (and
perhaps the individual?) that change is
progressing. However, once the activity has
ceased, little will have changed in practice.
v. Specialisation - involves concentration on a
narrow subject to the exclusion of all other
information and issues. It is another method
that can be successfully adapted by the
individual to demonstrate that change is taking
place, whereas in reality little is occurring.
Changes in the area of speciality have the
potential to be successful in the short term.
Ultimately, it is probable the changes will
affect other elements of the system and wider
more adventurous changes will have to be
tackled, with the perceived attendant risks to
the individual.
6.8 Resistance to Change - Confusion
6.8.1. Whenever individuals do not clearly understand the purpose,
mechanics, or consequences of a change they are likely to
resist it. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) If individuals involved
in the implementation process, especially line managers, are
tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe effective, then it is essential that they know exactly
what it is that has to be achieved.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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6.8.2. Of crucial importance is confusion or uncertainty about what
lies ahead. In the absence of any knowledge about the
changes that have taken place, or which are about to take
place, rumour and speculation regarding negative
consequences are almost certain to develop.
6.8.3. It has been argued in this chapter that organisational change
is frequently perceived by staff in a negative context. Given
that this occurs, it would not be surprising to find that where
individuals are confused as to the future, resistance to the
change develops faster than otherwise.
6.8.4. A potential solution to this situation would be to increase
communication and thus learning about the change. The
relationship between learning and confusion as a feature
of the change process is presented in the model at Figure
6.3.
6.8.5. Here levels of learning and confusion are ehown in an
inverse relationship through stages of time. As learning
about change increases, so confusion is reduced' and thus
resistance is also potentially reduced. Often associated with
high levels of confusion are high levels of anxiety, but as
confusion reduces, confidence will increase and anxiety will
reduce.
.
6.8,6. Implicit from Figure 6.3 is the notion that the reverse
situation applies. If there is only little or ineffective
communication, then there will be limited learning and thus
the state of confusion and resistance to change will persist.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
254
HIGH
LOW
Learning
ConfusionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Change
Occurs TIME
Figure 6.3. Relationship Between Learning and Confusion
Following Organisational Change
(Adapted from W H. Newman, 'Constructive Control', Prentice-Hall 1975)
6.9 Resistance to Change -Individual's Dynamics
6.9.1. The variety and intensity of the human factors affecting the
process of change have been shown to combine together to
form a highly complex psycho social sub system. This
complexity is compounded by the varying responses from
individuals as the change process progresses through time.
This progress and an individuals, response to it may be
termed an individual's dynamic response to change.
6.9.2. It is suggested by a number of writers, especially from the
Human Relations school of thought, (Trist 1968, Glen 1975,
et al) that if an individual perceives he or she has ownership
of the change then they will feel able to exercise some
control over the situation.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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6.9.3. Similarly, if an individual is at least allowed to participate
and influence the change process, then some degree of
ownership and control will be felt. (Williams 1994)
6.9.4. However if the perceived level of an individual's control over
a change process is low, then it might be suggested that
many of the elements and outputs of the psycho social sub-
systemwill manifest as a resistance to change.
6.9.5. The cause of the resistance to change may alter through
time, thus amounting to a continuum of obstacles to the
change process. To an observer, it will not necessarily be
possible to determine which particular output of an
individual's psycho social sub system is causing the
resistance at any particular time. Although it will possibly be
apparent if the individual(s) display any behaviours
associated with the resistance, Le. anger, depression,
stress.
6.9.6. Figure 6.4 adapted from Carnall (1990) shows the
suggested relationship between stress and performance or
self esteem. It is argued by Carnall that gradually increasing
levels of stress might indicate an increasing level of
performance. But it is suggested that the curve is parabolic,
such that a point is reached when if stress continues to
increase, performance will decline.
6.9.7. It is also suggested that in addition to these performance
effects, where there is significant organisational change, a
decline in self esteem will become apparent in many of those
staff directly affectedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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stress increasingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAwith change through tim
> Stress
Figure 6.4 Relationship Between Performance, Self Esteem,
Stress and Change through TimezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
[Adapted from Camall (1990) Page 140J
6.9.8. Carnall (1990) suggested that a relationship exists between
the stress following change and an individual's self esteem
and performance. The model at Figure 6.5. shows an
adaptation of this relationship. Here it is suggested that after
a significant organisational change occurs, an individuals
self esteem may significantly reduce through time, resulting
in a later, but corresponding alteration in performance. As
self esteem is regenerated, so performance rises after a lag.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Perfonnance
and
Self Esteem
HIGH
.t n+3zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Performance
5eIfEsteemzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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TimezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Change Occurs
Curve representing alterations to an individual's self esteem
following an organisational change
Curve representing changes to an individuals performance
at work, following alterations to self esteem through time.
Figure 6.5 Model Representing the Relationship between an
Individual's Self Esteem and Performance
Following Organisational Change.
Developed and Adapted from Camal/ (1990)
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6.9.9. Through this process of the lowering of self esteem
following change, Camall (1990) suggests there are five
stages, namely, denial, defence, discarding, adaptation
and internalisation. These stages are shown as points on
the model at Figure 6.6 together with other possible staff
reactions. The points are not discreet events that may be
precisely observed, nor is it suggested to be necessary to
move from one to another in sequence. Rather the model
represents a continuum of responses that may occur
singly, or in combination throughout the change process.
(Paragraph 6.9.5)
6.9.10. Figure 6.6 illustrates how an individual's performance
might alter through points in time associated with different
outputs from the psycho social sub-system. If a change
occurs shortly after t[n] and the individual perceives a loss
of control over the situation, then a state of shock will set
in. (Moss-Kanter 1989) This shock may result in feelings of
helplessness, indecision, being overwhelmed, or a
devaluing of previously highly regarded skills. (Williams
1994)
6.9.11. The shock frequently gives way to 'denial' (Camall 1990),
or rejection of the changes, (t[n+1]) which often becomes
apparent from a negative and uncooperative attitude. It is
suggested by Tyson and Jackson (1992) that when people
are faced with the prospect of change, they often place a
high value on their present circumstances and seek to
defend the existing situation. This is the stage referred to
as 'defence' by Camall (1990).
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Change Occurs
Curve representing alterations to an individual's performance at work •
through time, associated with the individual's reactions following change.
Figure 6.6 Model Representing the Alterations to an Individual's
Degree of Control During the Process of Change
[Developed and adapted from Camalt (1990), Tyson and Jackson (1992) and a
presentation from Clive Williams and Associates,
Management Consultants 1994.}zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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6.9.12. Such attitudes can develop into anger, resulting in an
active blocking of the changes, which in the worst
manifestation may amount to sabotage of the changes,
(Dubois 1979) as indicated between t[n+1] and t[n+2]. This
is the stage referred to as 'discarding' by Carnall (1990)
6.9.13. From the incentive and motivation theories of Herzberg,
Maslow and Alderfer (in Kakabadse 1987) it may be
suggested that such a situation would be likely to lead to
dis-satisfaction, a lack of motivation and a state of
depression. (t[n+2])
6.9.14. Depression and stress may occur at any stage of the
change process (Davies and Shackleton 1975, Brown and
Campbell 1994), but will be more likely when a sense of
complete helplessness is experienced as a result of failing
to gain some control over the changes. (Bass and Stogdill
1990, Senge 1990) It is reasonable to suggest that if the
state of acute depression persists as a result of
organisation changes then an individual is likely to seek
ways of alleviating it by one means or another, i.e. leaving
the organisation, and/or finding alternative work, alcohol
abuse, legal or illegal use of drugs. (Senge 1990)
6.9.15. However, if as a result of taking stock of the situation, the
individual remains at the task and resolves to cope with
the changes, then much of what has occurred will be put in
perspective and justified through cognitive dissonance.
This is the psychological process whereby the perceived
incongruity between a person's attitude and behaviour is
resolved by them making changes to attitudes and beliefs.
(Aronson 1976) This means that a person who stays with
the job and starts to perform tasks in accordance with the
required changes, will rationalise their behaviour by
changing their attitude towards the changes from negative
to positive. This is the stage referred to as 'adaptation' by
Carnall (1990).
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6.9.16. At this stage an individual may even seek to convince
others of the appropriateness of preceding decisions and
actions, becoming positively progressive in advancing the
changes as a means of demonstrating self justification.
(Aronson 1976) There will be a restored feeling of having
gained some control over the situation and in this state,
further creativity and innovation may become possible.
(Moss-Kanter 1989) This final stage is that referred to by
Camall (1990) as 'internalisation'.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
6.10 Skills and Needs for Change Through Time
6.10.1. The foregoing sections have demonstrated that resistance
to change might arise from both the characteristics of the
organisation and the dynamic nature of an individual's
psycho social sub-system. The potential for resistance to
organisational change has been shown to be considerable.
Therefore, if the change process is to be successful, it
follows that a series of counter resistance measures are
necessary as indicated in the managers' process model of
change at Figure 6.1..
6.10.2. Evered (1980) advanced the view that "zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAorganisations
were in a continuous state of changezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAn and the
management of the change process remained "...one of the
most difficult and least understood of the management
functions." (pgs. 6-7 in Cummings et al 1980) He went on
to advance the view that "...systems thinking...offerszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa real
prospect for understanding and managing change in
organisations." (ibid. pg. 12)
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6.10.3. On the basis of these assertions it is desirable to examine
the foregoing analysis of resistance to change in order to
determine:
i. the management skills potentially capable of
preventing or minimising resistance to change,
ii. any ameliorating actions by staff or managers that
might lessen the effect of resistance to change,
iii. the staff or management (human) needs that are likely
to reduce resistance to change.
6.10.4. It is argued here that human needs and skills appropriate
to the process of change are likely to vary and change
themselves through different stages of the process of
change. Tyson and Jackson (1992) suggest, for instance,
that during the 'discarding' stage shown at Figure 6.6. the
appropriate leadership style would be empathetic, whilst
during the 'adapting' stage, a style based upon support and
recognition is appropriate.
6.10.5. At Figure 6.6, a model is suggested of a concept of the
dynamics of human responses to change. Figure 6.7
extends this concept by examining changes in three
periods of time, the past, present and future and relating
these stages to managers and staff skills, human needs
and an organisations needs.
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Managing Managing Managing
Changes in Changes in Changes in
the Past the Present the Future
Managers Objective Supportive Creativity and
Skills analysis of leadership ideas
performance
Human Job Reassurance Opportunity to
Needs enrichment and security participate
Organisations Feedback on Commitment to PESTE/SWOT
Needs performance change analysis
Figure 6.7 Matrix of Principal Skills and Needs Through the
Process of Change
6.10.6. Each cell within Figure 6.7 gives the title of a principle
need or skill that has been shown to be significant during
the process of change. The complexity of the change
process has been discussed, from which it might be
implied and argued here, that both individuals and the
organisation itself will have need for and apply a range of
skills and resources through a change programme.
6.10.7. It is not therefore suggested that each of the attributes
shown at Figure 6.7 are either applicable singularly, or are
the only attributes appropriate at a particular stage in time.
Rather the matrix conveys what has been shown to be the
principle and common characteristics.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
264
6.10.8. Column 1 shows that where a change has taken place
during a period in the past, it is necessary for managers to
examine the operation of the system in relation today's
needs and objectives. This will necessitate an objective
analysis of the situation, which is as far as possible, free
from any value judgements, or subjective beliefs about
what used to work satisfactorily in the past. (Checkland
1981 et al). Rather the emphasis should be on what is
necessary at present.
6.10.9. Individuals that were involved in the process that have
settled into the change may be seeking minor alterations to
their working practices, procedures and roles that will more
fully meet their work objectives. Such alterations may be
termed job enrichment (Koontz and O'Donnell 1976
Kakabadse et al 1987) whereby both the individual and the
organisation gain from the alterations.
6.10.10. Job enrichment in this context is seen as comprising the
three factors suggested to be crucial to both job
satisfaction and motivation by Hackman and Oldham (1976
in Kakabadse et al 1987) They suggest that the more an
individual experiences the following states, the greater will
be the degree of intrinsic motivation and hence the higher
the level of positive feelings about the work:
i. the person must experience the work as meaningful in
respect of his/her own values,
ii. the person must experience responsibility for the
results of the work in order that he/she is accountable
for the work outcomes, (if the quality of the work done
is more dependant on external factors than own efforts,
there is no reason to feel personally proud)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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iii. the person must have knowledge of the results of the
work in order to provide a base for positive feelings
about having done well, .or unhappy about doing
badly.
6.10.11. The final cell of column 1 indicates that the organisation
itself has a need for feedback on the performance of the
mature system and how it is functioning in comparison
with other units. This amounts to internal management
information as to how the system is functioning and
should, at minimum, be timely, reliable and in sufficient
detail to enable appropriate corrections to be made if
necessary. (Lincoln 1990)
6.10.12. It has been argued that police organisations comprise a
number of interrelated and interdependent sub-systems.
In order for each sub-system to approach optimal
performance, it is necessary for each section to have
information about how other sections are performing.
Additionally, managers who are seeking to control the
organisation and its processes will need feedback on
overall performance.
6.10.13. Thus the sum of the attributes shown in column 1 represent
an organisation that is effectively managing systems and
objectives that were established as a result of changes
made in the past.
6.10.14. Column 2 relates to the present time and links the human
need for reassurance during a period of uncertainty, such
as having just come through a period of change, to the
management attribute of supportive leadership. (Bass and
Stogdill 1990) Such a style of leadership may be shown to
be the most appropriate when managing the
organisations' need to secure a commitment to maintain a
continuous process of change. (Carnall 1990, Senge 1990,
Bass and Stogdill 1990)
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6.10.15. Column 2 in conjunction with column 1 represents an
organisation that is actively pursuing currently appropriate
objectives and providing effecti~e leadership of its human
resources, recognising that the organisation will have to
undertake a reappraisal of its goals and then design
systems to achieve new objectives.
6.10.16. Column 3 adds the future attributes. The organisation
needs to be continually aWareof its strengths, weakness,
opportunities and threats (S.W.O.T.) whilst being aware
of inputs from its political, economic, social, technological
environment, as well as its natural environment.
(P.E.S.T.E.) Managers will need to respond to future
circumstances with ideas and creativity. (Moss-Kanter
1984) Further changes will become necessary and if
resistance from staff and managers is to be avoided,
opportunities to participate will have to be provided for all
those likely to be involved.
6.10.17. On the basis of the findings so far, the matrix at Figure 6.7
if considered as a whole, provides an initial focus for
management attention during the process of change.
However, in Section 5.3, the concept of targets for change
was introduced which were suggested to exist in three
types, cultural, structural and systems.
6.10.18. Therefore in order to meet the purpose set out in
Paragraph 6.11.3, it is necessary to relate the dependant
characteristics shown in Figure 6.7 to each of the three
types of change target.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
. 6.11 Skills and Needs for Differing Types of Change Target
6.11.1. The matrix model at Figure 6.8 shows the predominant
attribute in managers' skills, human needs and
organisational needs for each type of change target.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Managers' Human Organisational
Skills Needs Needs
Cultural Effective Reassurance Consistency
changes leadership and of
security approach
Structural Flexibility and Effective Appropriate
changes adaptability dedicated information
communications systems
Systems Knowledge of Job and Performance
changes new operating task indicators
procedures descriptions
Figure 6.8 Matrix of Principal Skills and Needs for Differing
Types of Change Target
6.11.2. The first column, headed managers' skills, shows that
leadership is the principle skill associated with cultural
change. (Kilmann et al 1985, Schein 1985) The point is
made in both sources that confusion (and thus resistance
to change) will result if managers have different outlooks
towards the implementation of cultural change. If one
manager views cultural change as evolutionary, another
sees it as adaptation and another sees it as a process tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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direct, Schein suggests they are likely tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtI••• end up in
confusion and disagreement. II (Schein 1985 pg. 309)
6.11.3. The solution is that effective leaders must have the ability
to articulate and sell new visions and concepts in order to
change the cultural assumptions of an organisation.
(Section 5.6) Schein (1985 pg. 324) refers to this process
as leaders inducing tI... cognitive redefinition ... II and is seen
as vital to effective cultural change. Kilmann (1985)
suggests that "Managers engaged in cultural change must
communicate the new pattern of beliefs and values and get
people to adopt them. II (pg. 248)
6.11.4. Flexibility and adaptability are the management attributes
associated with structural change due to the frequency of
this type of change and the direct de-stabilising effects
associated with altered lines of responsibility and
accountability. (Section 5.7) A manager who is unable to
quickly adapt to changes in an organisation's structure is
unlikely to be successful either in personal or
organisational terms. (Moss-Kanter 1989)
6.11.5. Knowledge of an organisation's new operating procedures
is vital for a manager if he or she is to be effective at
conirotlinq and co-ordinating the efforts of other staff
throughout systems changes. (Beckhard and Harris 1987)
If change is introduced to a system and staff have to
perform tasks differently, or produce different outputs, it
will be necessary for their manager to have knowledge
in some detail as to how the new objectives are to be
achieved. Failure to master such knowledge, or to
effectively communicate it to the work force would result in
little learning by staff (Figure 6.3) and a negation of the
management function. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981)
Confusion would result as to what exactly was expected
and resistance to the change would almost certainly follow.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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6.11.6. Human needs shown in the centre column of Figure 6.8 will
be many and various, according to the particular
individuals' personality, attitude to work and overall psycho
social sub-system outputs. (Argyle 1972, Davies and
Shackleton 1975, Brown and Campbell 1994) On the
basis of the foregoing analysis of resistance to change, it
may be argued that the attributes shown represent at
minimum, the most frequently apparent and predominant
human needs which are likely to require fulfilment at most
levels within organisations during change processes.
6.11.7. Reassurance and personal security will be high on an
individuals list of needs when the working culture is
changed. (Kilmann et al 1985) Effective communications
will be important in satisfying this need and also when
new lines of accountability and responsibility are created
in a structural change. (Porter and Roberts 1977, Francis
1987)
6.11.8. It has been previously discussed that the absence of
effective communications and leaming will bring about
confusion and thus resistance. However it is significant to
note at this point that Kilmann (1985 pg. 246)
demonstrates that "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbehaviour compliance ... " does not
necessarily imply "...cultural commitment. II The motivational
theories of work ( Vroom and Deci 1978, Kakabadse 1987)
indicate the significance of security to high motivation in
the workplace. Therefore reassurance that securfty will
remain at least at the same level as earlier, must be a
welcome message for most staff undergoing major
changes at work.
6.11.9. Similarly, the provision of a new job description is a
significant feature of a changed work role. By a process of
straightforward written communication many of an
individuals' most pressing psycho social needs might be
met. In terms of a systems level change, a job description
will provide both__communication of what is required and azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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means of control, in terms of lines of responsibility and
accountability. Conceivably a job description might be so
brief as to be of little value, or so detailed that every task
is specified and flexibility thus reduced.
6.11.10. The following list drawn from Thomason (1991) and Byars
(1991) suggests the minimum contents and advantages of
a job description which would meet the major purposes
associated with the management of change:
i. improved productivity by specifying information about
the nature of the exact task(s),
ii. improved personal job evaluations by providing
expected performance standards associated to (i)
above,
iii. improving recruitment in that information is provided
from which inferences might be drawn about the most
suitable person,
iv. identification of training needs, in that it will indicate
what demands are tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe made which are either not
currently being met by personnel performing the jobs,
or are not likely to be capable of performance by
recruits without training,
v. improved judgements as to the worth of a job in that
demands on the job holder are identified in a rigorous
fashion.
6.11.11. The benefits of a job description are clear as a feature of
the change process to each of the types of change target.
However, it is apparent from the established authorities
conceming organisational culture, (Schein 1985, Kilmann
et al 1985) that such devices alone, are insufficient to bring
about cultural change in organisations.
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6.11.12. Cultural change as an organisational need requires a
consistency of approach as shown in column three at
Figure 6.8, by providing continual intrinsic motivation and
reinforcement to the work force. (Section 5.6) It is unlikely
that cultural change will occur in the short term, rather a
sustained, clear and consistent message to the work force
is required. (Kilmann et al 1985) It is arguedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) that this
approach to behaviour change with a minimum reliance on
rewards and punishments is the most appropriate way to
bring about cultural change. "Essentially, this means
people must be made to see the inherent worth of what it
is they are being asked to do." (ibid. pg. 246) Finally it is
suggested that people who do not accept the new pattern
of beliefs should be given the opportunity of "...leaving and
transferring to another organisation." (ibid. pg. 248)
6.11.13. The organisational need for structural changes is shown in
Figure 6.8 to be 'appropriate information systems'. New or
adapted information systems will be a prerequisite in order
to determine whether or not the new lines of control and
responsibility are functioning correctly and whether new
objectives are being achieved. (Lincoln 1990) It is also
likely that in large, complex organisations, the project
management system for planning and co-ordinating a
major change programme, will need to be based on a
computer based information system, with appropriate
project control software. Implementing structural change
without corresponding management information systems
would deprive managers of the opportunity of knowing
whether the organisation was meeting, or even
approaching its output objectives.
6.11.14. A refined version of a straightforward information system,
whether manual or I.T. based, is shown in Figure 6.8 as
appropriate for system type changes. Here, the provision of
output performance data or performance indicators derived
from an analysis of the overall functioning of the new
system would be provided. Such information would enable
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comparisons to be made with previous system outputs to
determine relative efficiency and effectiveness.
Alterations may then be made to. current planning to take
account of this knowledge and provide valuable feedback
to the staff involved. (Lincoln 1990)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
6.12 Complexity and the Change Process
6.12.1. If the interactions are considered between each of the
features of the cells of the matrix models at Figures 6.7 and
6.8 it may be considered that the complexity of the change
process builds very quickly. One feature or attribute
influences another, then both effect a further feature, and
so on, whilst feedback from some feature to others, further
complicates the process.
6.12.2. In order to aid the clarity of display and explanation, the
models at Figures 6.7 and 6.8 have been shown in two
dimensions. However it is proposed that a combination
model can be conceived in three dimensions, represented
by a three, by three, by three cube, offering a minimum of
twenty-seven possible attributes for consideration.
6.12.3. Conceptually the 'change cube' would have the three
dimensions of:
i. stages through time,
ii. skills and needs,
iii. targets for change.
Such a model is represented diagramatically at Figure 6.9.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Stages Through Time
Figure 6.9 'The Change Cube'
6.12.4. It is suggested by Patching (1990) that each of the twenty -
seven small cubes that constitute the visually similar, but
mechanical 'Rubies Cube', may be considered as
interrelated sub systems which constitute the overall
system. This analogy applies appropriately to the model at
Figure 6.9, although clearly not mechanical system. It is
suggested that each small cube here, has a dimension of
time, a change target and a skill or need.
.
6.12.5. Thus, for example, drawing from Figures 6.7 and 6.8, a
cultural change, that had occurred in the past, could be
considered as a manager's skills sub system, a human
needs sub system and/or an organisational needs sub
system. Each amounting to a differing perspective of the
process of cultural change, but interacting to produce an
overall, larger sub system of cultural change.
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6.12.6. The concept illustrated by this example is similar to that
described by Flood and Carson, (1993) in that the situation
(cultural change) is seen as a dimension of complexity in
itself, that may be "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAappreciated by dif rent people in
different ways ... " and amounts to the "People Range" (pg.
35)
6.12.7. That is not to say that it is the "same" situation being
appreciated from different viewpoints, as suggested to
frequently occur by Checkland (1981) Rather, there are
three different situations to be appreciated in this particular
example. Similarly, it is argued that there would be three
separate situations to consider in respect of structural and
systems targets for change. Thus when these targets are
integrated with the other dimension of the 'change cube',
the twenty-seven separate sub-systems may be seen to
have been identified.
6.12.8. Therefore, it is argued that is appropriate to view the
'change cube' (Figure 6.9) as a complex set of
interrelating sub systems that in total amount to the
process of change in police systems. (This suggested
complexity and associated dynamics is further analysed
and discussed in Chapter Seven.)
6.12.9. Conceivably however, yet greater complexity might be
introduced if the basic models of implementation from
Section 5.9 are added to the 'change cube' producing a
four dimensional model with a minimum ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA34, or over 81
identifiable change sub-systems.
6.12.10. Such a model would associate the three dimensions
shown at figure 6.9. with the suggested fundamental
methods of change implementation, viz., abrupt change,
parallel operations and phased implementation.
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6.12.11. A number of variations to these basic models of
implementation are suggested at Section 5.9 that would
further increase the potential complexity of the change
process. For instance, a non linear, phased implementation
system is suggested at Figure 5.13 that would have the
effect of introducing fluctuating, as opposed to steady rates
of change, within each of the suggested twenty-seven
change sub -systems.
6.12.12. Such a situation would be considerably more complex than
the suggested approximate linear equivalents used for the
purposes of illustration in this chapter. It may be argued
that there are few linear relationships in human activity or
social systems, which would imply that a police
organisation change process system, would largely consist
of non linear relationships. It is stated by Weinberg (1975
pg. 232) thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAHNo system we know is strictly linear. H
6.12.13. This assertion seems to be especially relevant to police
change systems that have been shown to be non linear in
a number of significant respects. The suggested non
linearity is argued to arise from both within police systems
themselves (i.e. human dynamics of the change process,
Section 6.9) and from the policing environment (i.e. open
systems interacting with a turbulent policing environment,
Section 5.2)
6.12.14. A further example of considerable complexity could be
envisaged where a new system was implemented in
parallel with an existing system (Paragraphs 5.9.15 - 19).
If there were interaction between the new and old systems
during the implementation stage (as would be probable in
policing systems) the number of active sub systems would
be effectively doubled. Conceptually this situation might be
represented as two change cubes simultaneously
interacting with one another, creating 272zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA= 729 possible
interactions. i.e. every sub system in the old system,
affecting every other sub system in the new system.
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6.12.15. The significance of this suggested complexity to the system
of change, is that it is not possible to isolate and bring
about change to one feature of a policing system without it
affecting some other aspect of the sub system, or overall
system. The likely consequences of such an approach
being unwanted and potentially damaging outcomes in
other parts of the policing system. It will be argued in
Chapters Seven and Eight that this attribute of policing
systems and the dynamics of change within them,
precludes an element by element, sequential change
process or evaluation.
6.12.16. Rather, it is argued that the concept of change delivery
systems is appropriate (Paragraphs 4.2.5-7) in order to
achieve successful implementations and overcome
resistance to change. Thus allowing policing systems to at
least keep pace with the rate of change in the environment,
in a similar way as suggested to be necessary for
commercial organisations. (Hitchins 1992)
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SummaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The elements of the suggested system of organisational change are
summarised and restated in order to lead to models of the dynamics
of change at the overall police organisational level. The models are
described in the context of the implementation options advanced in
Chapter Five and developed in order to advancezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa model f the N.P.
implementation process.
From this position, a model of a system of change for police
organisations is advanced. It is argued that this system is inherently
complex, thus presenting considerable challenges in order to bring
about change. Individuals' motivation to change is described in the
context of a system of motivation, which is developed into an
analysis of the options available to police managers for
implementing change.
7.1 The Elements of Change ComplexityzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
7.1.1. In Chapter Four, (4.2.2, Figures 4.2 and 4.3) the concept of
police delivery systems was introduced whereby groups of
N.P. elements were associated together for the purpose of
evaluation and implementation, viz.
i. demand management,
ii. police organisation and efficiency.
iii. the police public contract.
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7.1.2. The delivery system concept was developed from the
premise that each change treatment was dependent upon
others in the sub-system for success. Hitchins (1992)
advances a similar proposition with the concept of anzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
uenabler system" (pg. 180) A similar distinction is made here
between the system that produces the set of changes that
are dynamic throughout the process of change (change
delivery system) and the system of change management
that Hitchins (1992 pg. 1980) calls a -director/co-ordinator
system"
7.1.3. The argument was developed previously (Chapters Two and
Three), that it was inappropriate to implement a single
treatment, evaluate it and then proceed to the next in
sequence. Such a process was suggested to limit the
potential benefits of the systematic approach to change
envisaged by N.P. (Sections 2.16 and 3.3)
7.1.4. As a means of describing and associating the major
characteristics of the change process, Chapter Five
introduced a macro model of change suggested to have
three elements, (Section 5.3) viz.
i. the stimulus for change,
ii. the targets of change and
iii. the types and stages of implementation.
7.1.5. Experience of the N.P. project implementation indicated that
three types targets for change might be identified (Section
5.5 and Figure 5.3) viz.
i. culture,
ii. structure,
iii. systems.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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7.1.6. It is now suggested that the above change targets in
general terms broadly correspond to the N.P. delivery
systems approach:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
TARGET for CHANGE DELNERY SYSTEM
Culture Police Public Contract
Structure Police Organisation
and Efficiency
Systems Demand Management
7.1.7. Chapter Five expanded the third element of the macro
model and developed the three basic altemative types of
method of implementation viz.
i. abrupt change,
ii. phased change,
iii. parallel operations
7.1.8. Chapter Six introduced details of the human social and
psycho social reactions to progressive stages of the process
of implementation of change (Figure 6.4) and suggested
that individuals' skills and needs altered throughout this
process. (Figure 6.5)
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7.1.9. It was shown that different needs and skills were
appropriate for the suggested three change targets. (Figure
6.6)
7.1.10. Chapter Six concluded with an illustration of a conceptual
model in the form of a 'change cube' that related the human
dynamics of change to the identified change targets. It was
further suggested that the change cube model might be
extended into a multi dimensional concept.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
7.2zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe Dy amics of Change Complexity
7.2.1. It is now suggested that the remaining feature of the
dynamics of the change process itself might be added to
the models developed so far to produce the highly complex
overall 'system of change' for police organisations.
7.2.2. Figure 7.1 shows time along the horizontal axis and the
degree, or amount of organisational development activity
(Cummings 1980) along the vertical axis. Organisational
development in this context is taken to mean the collective
activity taking place inside a police organisation ariSing from
implementation of a change delivery system.
7.2.3. Each separate change delivery system is represented by the
horizontal bars (change 1, 2, ...n), in which the elements of
the macro model, represented by'S',zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'T and 'I' are shown in
sequence through time. The higher the position of the
change along the vertical axis, the more organisational
development activity taking place.
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Figure 7.1 Dynamics of the Sequential Change Process
7.2.4. Figure 7.1 represents the situation whereby each change
delivery system is implemented sequentially. Here the
consequences of the implementation of each change are fed
forward to the stimulus for the next change event.
7.2.5. The 'phased' method of implementation is represented
here where each successive change benefits from the
outputs and experience of the previous change, at cost of a
more protracted time scale and other dysbenefits identified
at Section 5.9.
7.2.6. Conventional scientific approaches for observing change
would progress in a manner illustrated by Figure 7.1 by
identifying cause and effect relationships and then
attempting to predict Mure behaviour of a system from that
basis. (Kaye 1993)
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7.2.7. It is suggested that complex systems such as those
encountered in the management of changes in large police
organisations cannot proceed in a.sequential process, or be
described in such a predictable manner.
7.2.8. The increasingly turbulent human and physical environment
in which policing, as a social system, is carried out (Jackson
and Keys 1984) has been described in Chapter Two.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is
argued that these environmental effects, as well as the
internal organisational and human change dynamics
(Chapters Five and Six) militate against a predictable, linear,
sequential change process.
7.2.9. Rather, the probable police system behaviour has to be
anticipated from the overall interaction of the many
elements of the sub-systems that produce the final system
output. (Flood and Carson 1993)
7.2.10. Figure 7.2 shows more than three changes taking place
simultaneously and the consequences of the
implementations of each change directly affecting each of
the others.
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Figure 7.2 Dynamics of the Abrupt Change Process
7.2.9. Such a process is associated with the 'abrupt' model of
change (Section 5.9.11) and represents each of the change
delivery systems being implemented simultaneously. In the
event of the existing system continuing to operate
throughout the implementation of the various change
delivery systems, the 'parallel' method of implementation
(Section 5.9.15) could be similarly represented by Figure
7.2.
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7.2.10. With abrupt and parallel changes, the change stimuli will be
the same for each change event. as they are occurring at
approximately the same point in time. The target for each
change will be different, but the effect of one change upon
another will be realised through the practicalities of the
implementation as shown by the double interacting links
between each of the implementation stages whereby each
change effects every other change. The relationship
between each of the implementation stages is transitive in
that 'I' of change 1 will effect 'I' of change 2 through to 'I' of
change 'n'.
7.2.11. It will be appreciated that the model illustrates the principle
difficulty with simultaneous changes in that it is not
necessarily possible to foresee the practical consequences
of a change until after implementation. (Section 5.9.14)
However, this practical difficulty has been shown to be a
necessary characteristic of a systems approach to change, if
unwanted and dysfunctional side effects of the change
process are to be avoided (5.9.20-21) and the benefits of
systems level changes realised.
7.2.12. It has been argued that if police systems are to operate
effectively, it is necessary for each sub-system to be
mutually supportive. The evidence from the N.P. trial
(Chapter Four) indicated that if change was made to one
feature of the system, without corresponding changes being
successfully implemented to associated sub-systems, then it
becomes difficult to achieve system level benefits and
further change is likely to become more difficult as human
resistance consolidates. (Section 6.9)
7.2.13. Checkland and Scholes (1990) suggest that this resulting
situation of complex implementations becomes in itself a
'problem situation'. They also suggest that as here, the
situation and systems might be conceptualised andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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modelled with a view to designing a system to make the
changes. (Figure 7.5 and Paragraph 7.2.29)
7.2.14. In order to benefit from the advantages of systems
implementations it is necessary for other changes taking
place simultaneously to proceed without the benefit of
inputs from the current change to their stimuli or target
stages. In effect, a state ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"deterministic chaos" is created,
(Kaye 1993 pgs. 3-8) in that a (policing) system has been
described in which all the major constituent elements have
been identified, but the interaction between them and the
resulting complexity is so complicated that they must be
studied holistically and experimentally, (Kaye 1993) rather
than theoretically, or by surface observation (Flood and
Carson 1993).
7.2.15. Kaye's (1993) definition of 'deterministic chaos' is therefore
appropriate to this situation. It has been argued that
conventional scientific determinism is an inappropriate
approach to the explanation of police organisational change,
due to the complexity of police systems' and their
environments. Similarly, a totally probabilistic approach
might be argued to be inappropriate, as police systems and
environments have been shown to be dynamic in nature,
making probabilistic predictions uncertain.
7.2.16. Therefore a concept of 'deterministic chaos' is argued to be
appropriate as it enables known and predictable outputs,
such as those shown tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe appare t in umans associated
with the system (Chapter Six) to be combined with those less
certain features of the change process such as those implied
by Figure 7.2, to be considered in an overall system of
chanqe.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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7.2.17. This definition is considered more appropriate for policing
systems than the definition of three ranges of complexity
advanced by Weaver (1948, in Flood and Carson 1993)
Here it is argued that complexity exists in three ranges:
i. organised simplicity,
ii. disorganised complexity.
iii. organised complexity,
7.2.18. According to Weaver (1948), organised simplicity is a
condition in which only a small number of elements in a
system are significant to the overall output, whereas
disorganised complexity occurs when a large number of
elements exhibit random behaviour. Organised complexity is
suggested to lie between the two extreme points of Weaver's
(1948) range. (Flood and Carson 1993)
7.2.19. It is suggested here that these two end point concepts are
inappropriate to policing systems. It has been shown
(Chapter Two) that many elements are significant to police
system outputs and to reduce police activity to '...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa small
number of significant factors ...' (Flood and Carson 1993 pg.
35) in order to conform to the concept of 'organised
simplicity', would be to ignore many highly relevant
attributes of police systems.
7.2.20. Similarly, there is very little activity within policing system
that is truly and wholly random. Therefore it is not possible to
suggest that '...there are many variables that exhibit a high
level of random behaviour' in order to meet the criteria for
'disorganised complexity'. (Flood and Carson 1993 pg. 35)
7.2.21. The concept of 'organised complexity' may initially appear
more attractive as it has been suggested that many social
and organisational systems exhibit such characteristics. (Klir
1985 in Flood and Carson 1993) On the basis of the N.P.
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experience (Chapter Four), it is argued here that ponce
system characteristics are more closely aligned to a highly
complex, holistic paradigm, predominantly consisting of
probabilistic, deterministic and teleological explanations.
Such a definition does not incorporate a large element of
randomness.
7.2.22. It has been shown how the elements of the N.P. policing
system were organised in such a way as to enable the
characteristics of the overall system outputs to be inferred
(Chapter Four). In Chapters Five and Six, models were
advanced which it was suggested would enable the process
of change to be understood on the basis of system inputs
and system dynamics.
7.2.23. Therefore it is argued that there is little within policing
systems, or the process of changes to them, that is truly
random. Rather, it has been shown (Chapters Five and Six)
that there is considerable complexity in which outputs occur
which combine deterministic (including deductive),
probabilistic and teleological (functional and purposive)
explanations.
7.2.24. It is argued that it should not be assumed that elements
within policing sub-systems, or their environments are
behaving randomly, when it is possible that the reason for
the behaviour is obscured by the complexityzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof the system
and its outputs.
7.2.25. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 may be seen as representing extreme
types of change implementations at opposite ends of a
change implementation continuum. Such a continuum may
be suggested to broadly correspond with Weaver's (1948)
range of complexity wherezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'organised simpli ity' is
represented by Figure 7.1 and 'disorganised complexity'
and unpredictability represented by Figure 7.2.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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7.2.26. Figure 7.3 combines these extremes and is therefore
potentially the basis of a model which more accurately
represents a practical situation.
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Figure 7.3 The Dynamics of the Phased Change Process
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7.2.27. The same conventions are used in Figure 7.3 which shows
the outputs from each change implementation influencing
the stimulus for next change as indicated by the heavy lines
and arrows. The implementation of earlier changes also
have the potential to effect both the target for subsequent
changes, as 'Nell as the implementation itself, as indicated
by the dotted 'conditional influence' relationships.
7.2.28. For example, at Section 4.11 a description and evaluation of
the N.P. participative management system explained how a
poor implementation of the working party arrangements
(Irving et al 1989) subsequently effected the motivation of
police managers to proceed with changes to other features
of the management system. Change stimuli arising from
other sources urged further change in management systems,
which in turn altered the target for change away from
operational to management levels.
7.2.29. Several separate change initiatives associated with
management procedures follo'Ned, eventually resulting in a
successful overall participative management system. Thus
the overall management system was not achieved by an
abrupt change of all the constituent elements, or a
sequential implementation of the management elements.
Rather a complex interaction of changes to different
elements and attributes of the management system,
proceeding at differing rates and with varying degrees of
development and success.
7.2.30. It has been shown to be appropriate for N.P., (Chapter Four)
that a number of different change initiatives have to be
planned for, and implemented both simultaneously and
sequentially.
7.2.31. It is further suggested that this is a necessary feature of
change implementations in police systems generally, due to
the complexity of policing systems, the change process and
human factors. (Section 6.12) However, this characteristic ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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the realities of the change in policing systems increases the
complexity of implementation dynamics considerably and
this situation is presented in the model at Figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4 The Dynamics of the N.P. Change Process
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7.2.32. Here, similar conventions show a combination of foregoing
implementation dynamics interacting together. 'ChangezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAl' is
phased with 'change 2' in order that the 'change 2' stimuli
may benefit from the 'change l' implementation outputs.
'Change 3' operates in parallel with 'change 2' and outputs
sequentially to 'change 4'. 'Change n' is phased with '4' in
order that both the target andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAimplementati phases receive
outputs form the implementation stage of 'change 4'. The
dotted 'conditional influencing' relationships indicate how
earlier changes might influence successive changes.
7.2.33. An example of such a process from the N.P. project would be
the implementation of geographic responsibility (Section
4.9), directed patrolling, (Section 4.10) and the participative
management system (Section 4.11) within the 'Police
Organisation and Efficiency' sub-system. (Section 4.2) Here,
a locally appropriate variant of geographic responsibility
could not be achieved without development by local
operational level officers. This required a functioning
participatory management system in order for officers to
feedback information to adapt the basic model to the
particular station environment.
7.2.34. The operational aim of geographic responsibility was, inter
alia, to focus the attention of patrolling officers to specific
local issues which could not be achieved without
implementation of a system of geographic responsibility.
Thus, each of these elements was dependant upon a
satisfactory sequential implementation of the other.
Geographic responsibility could not be tested without
directed patrolling and participative management required
cultural changes that could not be achieved quickly.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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7.2.35. Therefore the dynamics followed a pattern whereby the
implementation of participative management was phased,
the geographic responsibility model once developed was
implemented abruptly and directed patrolling implemented in
sequence.
7.2.36. Other elements with this particular delivery system
(targeting, surveillance and sector and divisional planning)
were implemented in parallel. Thus a situation developed
that approximates to Figure 7.4 and which is shown in
greater detail at Appendix 'A' and referred to at Section
4.1.5.
7.2.37. If the possible relationships between each stage of change
implied by the model at Figure 7.4. were to be developed to
represent each N.P. element within each delivery system,
then considerable complexity would result. If this situation
were then related to the change cube model at Figure 6.7
then azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'chaotic situation' envisaged by Kaye (1993 Chapter
1) would exist.
7.2.38. However, it has been argued that the resulting system of
change is not a 'randomly chaotic system' where there is a
complete absence of knowledge regarding thecontributory
causes. Rather the system of change has inputs from a
combination of probabilistic, deterministic and teleological
attributes that result in outputs that have the character of
'deterministic chaos and complexity'. (Kaye 1993 Chapter 1)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Figure 7.5 Characteristics of the Inputs to and Outputs
from the System of Change.
7.2.39. Similar propositions have been advanced in respect of non
police organisations by Checkland and Scholes (1990)
where it is suggested that implementations themselves are
problem situations. Such situations are complex in
themselves and it is argued (ibid.) that soft systems
methodologies (Checkland 1981) are appropriate in these
circumstances.
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7.3zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe System of Change in Police OrganisationszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
7.3.1. The foregoing elements of the change process and the
resulting complexity is represented systematically in the
model at Figure 7.6.
7.3.2. Figure 7.6 shows the three elements of the macro model of
change (Section 5.3) linked in a sequence as suggested at
Section 7.2. Each element of the macro model contains the
principle elements and attributes of the change process
that have been derived from this analysis.
7.3.3. Internal and external change stimuli are shown as interacting
which identify the target for change. (Figure 5.2) The change
targets of culture, structures and systems combine to
produce outputs to police delivery systems. (Section 4.2)
These change targets constitute the elements, relationships
and attributes that are synergetic and produce the co-
ordinated police system output.
7.3.4. The delivery systems are implemented according to the
chosen implementation method (Section 5.9) which have
been shown to follow a number of stages.
7.3.5. The dynamics created by the process of change
implementation makes varying demands upon human
resources at different stages of the change process.
Different skills and needs becoming more or less significant
at different stages of implementation. (Figures 6.5 and 6.6)
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7.3.6. The resulting dynamics of the change process in police
organisations is argued to be highly complex and the overall
system is suggested not to be amenable to traditional forms
of scientific, deterministic, or causal analysis. (Kaye 1993) It
is suggested by Beckhard and Harris (1987 pg. 116) that
managing change andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAn•• zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLK I CBA.interventi in large
[organisational] systems is largely an art. H although they
do add that such interventions are H••• becoming more ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa
science...n (ibid. pg. ) In this respect they suggest that
H••• systematic procedures and technologies in the planning
and management of large systems change can only be of
help. n (ibid. pg. 117)
7.3.7. It is argued that these assertions are consistent with and
support both the experience of the N.P. trial and the much
wider experiences of Checkland and Scholes. (1990) They
describe the advantages of systems and systematic
methodologies which have been used in various
organisational contexts to the benefit of corporate goals,
albeit in commercial as opposed to police service
organisations.
7.3.8. The final level of Figure 7.6 shows evaluation and feedback
as occurring at the end of the implementation stage. (In
respect of the overall process of change, these features are
considered in Chapter eight.)
7.3.9. It has been argued that the process of change in police
organisations, especially the stage of implementation, is
complex and thus difficult to plan and achteye. The
challenge for managers is therefore how to understand and
thus manage the complexity. Much has been written on this
subject, which has been frequently referenced throughout
this analysis. Therefore it is appropriate to review managers'
options and on the basis of the N.P. experience, to
consolidate the change management strategies most
appropriate for police systemszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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7.4 Implementation and the Managementof ComplexityzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
7.4.1. Beckhard and Harris (1987 pg. 115) advance the view that
organisational leaders must "zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAnderstand the
organisational system...". Moss-Kanter (1984 pg. 45)
suggests that managers should adopt a "new"management
style involving teamwork and participation in order to meet
the challenges of managing the transformation (change) of
organisations.
7.4.2. Senge (1990) and Argyris (1990 in Senge 1990) disagree,
suggesting that multi-disciplinary management teams who at
least appear to have the potential to tackle the considerable
complexity of managing large organisational challenges,
generally do not have the necessary resilience. They
suggest that eventually personal power, ego and other
personal and psycho social factors will militate against
effective team management. Argyris is quoted, "Most
management teams break down under pressure," (Senge
1990 pg. 24, Argyris 1990)
7.4.3. Tyson and Jackson (1992) describe how attempts to
implement effective change through employee participation
in experiential training programmes has generally been less
than successful. Their critique of such methods is
encapsulated in the expression, "...there iszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa major
difference between the intention to change and the actual
implementation of any agreed change."(pg. 197)
7.4.4. Checkland and Scholes (1990 pg. 52) suggest that changes
will only be implemented if "... they are perceived as
meaningful within the (human) culture..."This assertion gives
rise to their claim that changes will only be introduced if they
are "culturally feasible" (Checkland 1981 pgs. 180-182 &
313). Additionally, it is suggested that as organisational
systems are purposeful by definition, then change must also
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be perceived aszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"systemically desira le". (ibid. pgs. 180-82 &
318)
7.4.5. It is problematic therefore, in the face of such evidence,
(albeit not exhaustive), to suggest change strategies that
will lead to probable and predictable successful outputs,
even given known preconditions. Beckhard and Harris
(1987 pg. 117) encapsulate this conclusion by asserting that
successful intervention in large systems "...is not a cookbook
process"
7.5 Motivation and the Implementation of Change
7.5.1. On the basis of the foregoing analysis summarised in the
following points, it becomes problematic to advance a
detailed and reliable model of change implementation in
police organisations:
i. the absence of any robust, theoretical model of
organisational change (Cummings 1980),
ii. the empirical studies of systems and 0r.ganisational
development (0.0.) practitioners within commercial
organisations (ibid.),
iii. the evidence of the N.P. project trial.
7.5.2. Empirical, activity based models of change (e.g. Fig!Jres4.5
and 4.7) are likely to be too specific to be of general
applicability and process models (e.g. Figure 6.1) whilst
potentially useful in understanding and describing change
processes, are likely to become generalised and therefore
of limited value in .providing a guide for change
implementations.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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7.5.3. It has been argued that the complexity of the change
process builds very rapidly involving the environment,
organisational systems, structures! processes and psycho
social factors. The implementation of a change programme
in the knowledge of this complexity and in the absence of
guiding principles, either theoretical or empirical, may
therefore become a reactive process.
7.5.4. Many writers on organisations and successful 0.0.
practitioners have advanced the view over a long period
that planning is an essential feature of successful
management. (Marrus 1984, Below et al 1987) Therefore to
rely upon spontaneous management reaction to the
complexity of the change process, might be argued to be
reckless, if organisational objectives are to be realised.
7.5.5. The reactive approach therefore seems to be inappropriate
when managing change in organisations generally and
specifically in the case of police organisations. It is clearly
not possible to suspend police service delivery for a period,
whilst change takes place. It is neither ethically nor
practically feasible to close down a section of police activity
implement a change and then resume an altered, albeit
improved service. (Paragraph 3.3.2) Such a process of
abrupt change is described and discussed in more detail at
Section 5.9.
7.5.6. It seems therefore that Moss-Kanter's (1984 pg. 299)
conclusion becomes especially apposite for
organisations:
policezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...actions implied by changes cannot reside on the
level of ideas...but must be concretised in actual
procedures, or structures, or communications
channels, or appraisal measures, or work methods, or
rewards."
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7.5.7. A major difficulty is thus presented in that many of the
conventional motivational methods customarily available to
commercial organisations (Ka,kabadse, Ludlow and
Vinnicombe 1987) are not routinely available to police
managers.
7.5.8. It is argued that whilst the established theories of an
individuals' motivation to work are appropriate to police
employees (Vroom and Deci 1978), such theories do not
wholly apply to a individuals' motivation to change work
practices in police organisations. The model of a change
motivation system at Figure 7.7 illustrates this argument.
7.5.9. Figure 7.7 shows individuals' motivation to work influences
individuals' motivation to change, which feeds back to the
motivation to work, It has been suggested (Figure 6.4) that if
the motivation to change is not present, but change is in
prospect, then a range of personal strategies may be
adopted to resist the change and thus the motivation to
work may be adversely effected.
7.5.10. The individual is thus locked into a progressively
unproductive system that will, if un-corrected, become
disruptive and which is likely to eventually result in the
individual leaving the organisation, voluntarily or otherwise.
(Kakabadse etal 1987)
7.5.11. Figure 7.7 suggests that motivation to work might be
explained by one or more of the three established groups of
motivation theories:
L those based upon individuals' needs (Le. Maslow,
McClelland and Alderfer in Kakabadse, Ludlow and
Vinnicombe 1987),
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ii. those based on external influences or incentives
characterised by Herzberg's two-factor theory (Vroom
and Deci 1978)
iii. those based upon expectancy or instrumentality
theories, whereby individuals are suggested to
optimise their opportunities and then adjust
behaviour to achieve the maximum rewards. (Vroom
et al in Kast and Rosenzweig 1981)
7.5.12. An individuals' motivation to change in a police organisation
is shown in Figure 7.7 as being a function of the
organisational communication of one or more of a number of
change motivators. These change motivators may be
distinguished from the majority of work motivators, as with
the exception of individual satisfaction, they involve the
exercise of external power.
7.5.13. It has been argued that unless an individual perceives
benefit for him or herself in the change to an organisational
system, then the change is unlikely to be accepted without
the exercise of an external influence or authority.
7.5.14. The major external influences that are suggested to be
relevant to the implementation of change are thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"power
levers" .(Kakabadse et al 1987 pg. 246) This expression is
used by Kakabadse in the context of the straightforward
application of influence of one individual over others.
However, the concept of "power levers" is suggested to be
especially appropriate to the implementation of change as
used in a similar context to that by Senge. (1990 Chapter 1)
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Figure 7.7 Motivators and the System of Motivation
7.5.15. Power has to be communicated to be effective (Kakabadse
et al 1987) and the leverage effect is suggested to be
greater when the organisational communication systems are
operating at the most effective level. The influence and
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effect of a particular type or combination of powers, thus
being enhanced by the efficiency of the communication
systems.
7.5.16. In terms of actually making changes occur within police
systems, it is argued that police organisations do not
possess the opportunities to exercise the full range of
powers, or combination of powers implied by Figure 7.7.
7.5.17. Promotion and advancement are achieved only through
competitive examination and assessment, with financial
rewards being linked only to rank and experience. Only
limited leverage therefore might be obtained from the
conventional motivators applicable within many
organisations that are not constrained by statute in this
respect, such as public and private commercial
organisations.
7.5.18. Kakabadse (1987 pg. 147) adopted the expressionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"action
levers " to convey the concept of a range of work motivation
options available to managers. It is suggested here that
whilst these 'levers' are appropriate to motivating the
implementation of change in commercial type organisations,
it is argued that only a limited number (vii - ix below ) of
"action levers" are wholly appropriate to police
organisational systems.
i. recruit only the best person who matches the current
job,
ii. individuals should know how to become better
performers,
iii. individuals should be encouraged to stretch
themselves and be rewarded accordingly,
iv. the reward system should be applied fairly,
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v. individuals should understand the reward system,
vi. high performance should be followed up with
appropriate rewards,
vii. monitor individuals' performance,
viii. managers need to understand tangible and non
tangible reward systems,
ix. effective communication is vital.
7.5.19. With the exception of a regular performance review of each
employee, the use of recognition rewards as opposed to
tangible rewards and an effective communications system,
none of the foregoingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"action levers" ar entirely suitable or
appropriate to police organisations.
7.5.20. Considerable limitations are imposed by the various
statutory provisions governing the service conditions of
police officers. These regulations preclude the use of
many of the "levers" that offer the potential of direct
advantages to the achievement of change. Tangible rewards
and the threat of some direct punishment, such as a loss of
reward, or even employment, are often quoted as being one
the most effective means of introducing change and such
practices may be frequently observed in the aftermath of
commercial company acquisitions and take-overs. Yet thesezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
two fundamental motivators are not available withi.n police
organisations.
7.5.21. The relevant Police Acts and Police Regulations provide,
inter alia, for the continuous service of officers for generally
thirty years and only exceptionally, for a longer period.
Police officers and civil staff in police organisations are
largely salaried within pay bands defined through Statutory
Instruments (S.I.). The opportunity therefore to provide
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financial rewards for particular achievements or
performance is not a possibility at present.
7.5.22. Service within the police is subject to adherence to
disciplinary regulations1 that specify standards of conduct
and behaviour, not achievement, performance or motivations,
It may be appreciated therefore, that in implementing change
programmes, police managers have to rely upon a very
limited range of options, orzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAII/evers" to bring about the
change.
7.5.23. In effect, it is not possible to achieve change in police
organisations by adopting coercive or motivational
techniques that are common in commercial organisations,
viz.:
i. tangible rewards for achievement of change objectives,
ii. re-distribution of consequential financial benefits to
staff in the form of enhanced profit sharing or bonuses,
iii. threat or implication of dismissal or redundancy for
non-compliance.
7.6 Options for ImplementingChange
7.6.1. In practice, change in police organisations has to be largely
achieved by means other than reward and punishment. It
has been argued above, that monetary and other tangible
rewards are not a generally realistic option for police
organisations and similarly punishment, or sanctions for
non-compliance are only exceptionally feasible.
1 The Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985 (SI 518)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2 It is anticipated that during 1995 regulations will be introduced to cater for
unsatisfactory performance.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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7.6.2. The only exception to foregoing approaches arise from
external changes imposed by legislation, whereby the police
are required to adopt new procedures. In such event (Le.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1985, Police and
Magistrates Courts Act 1994, Criminal Justice Act 1994 etc.)
the police have to comply with detailed legal procedures
that are subject to scrutiny by courts and other external
agencies that are seen to be holders of legitimate power to
effect change. (Le. National and Local Governments, Crown
Prosecution Service, Police Complaints Authority, etc.)
7.6.3. Non compliance in such an event therefore becomes a
matter of public account and sanctions apply for non-
compliance, malpractice or negligence, either through the
formal police complaints and disciplinary procedures, or the
criminal courts.
7.6.4. The option of recourse to formal disciplinary procedures for
punishment purposes is always available for failing to
comply with a lawful order, or being inefficient through
negligence or malpractice. However the use of these
procedures necessitates a formal investigation and charge
that is progressed in much the same way as a criminal
enquiry. Such an approach would eventually result in the
appearance of the individual before an internal disciplinary
board. Here, the standard of proof to secure a conviction for
the alleged disciplinary offence would be the same as that
required to prove a successful conviction at a criminal court
viz., proved beyond reasonable doubt.
7.6.5. The standard of investigation and associated procedures
that are follo\Wd in such an event, make formal disciplinary
proceedings a lengthy and costly process. The protracted
nature of such enquiries, the rights to formal defence
against the changes and the standard of proof required
make the formal disciplinary process an inappropriate
management option for achieving organisational change,
even if coercion were seen to be a viable approach.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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7.6.6. The remaining options and strategies available to police
managers for potentially achieving successful change are
listed below:
i.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAManagement Styl - a participative management style
that recognises and reflects the views of the staff
affected by the changes. (BasszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& Stogdill 1990, Senge
1990)
ii. Leadership - a persuasive and supportive leadership
style, whereby individuals understand both the nature
of the change and the reason for it; leaders tend to be
more tolerant of change than followers and are thus
able to predict the consequences of some changes and
to impart information the future, thus reducing
uncertainty. (Bass and Stogdill 1990)
iii. Training - formal training programmes directly
imparting relevant information and helping affected
staff to understand the changes, gain commitment and
reduce uncertainty, (Beckhard and Harris 1987,
Kakabadse et al 1987)
iv. Job development - informal training in the work place
given by supervisors and managers as part of YJOrk
routines, which may be associated with a wider
programme of job enrichment. (Paragraph 6.10.10,
Bass and Stogdill 1990)
v. Organisational communications - the strategic,
planned and persuasive use of organisational
communication systems (brochures, posters, house
newspaper, open letters, videos etc.) to inform and to
progressively shape staff opinions, attitudes and
behaviours in respect of changes and the reasons for
them, (Porter and Roberts 1977, Kakabadse et al
1987)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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vi.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAInterpe sonal proc sses - one to one, one to several,
small group and cascade processes to introduce a
motivation and commitment to change, (Olsen 1982)
vii. Rewards - use of non-tangible rewards and
Herzberg's 'Motivators'zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) i.e. support,
encouragement, commendations, personal letters of
thanks and other positive leadership features that
publicly provide recognition for achievement, or
progress towards desired change objectives. (Kast
and Resenzweig 1981, Hodgkinson 1983, Bass and
Stogdill 1990)
7.6.7. Each of the foregoing options for implementing change may
be used individually or in combination. The options selected
are likely to be dependant upon a large range of situational
and circumstantial factors, the most frequently encountered
are as follows:
i. Time available - e.g. if changes are required to be
introduced rapidly, it may be inappropriate to develop
a supportive leadership style throughout the
organisation prior to implementing the change. (e.g.
The operation was a success but the patient died!)
ii. Skills available - e.g. the creation of persuasive
internal communications programmes is a specialised
activity, the skills for which may not be available
within a police organisation.
.
iii. Type of change - differing types of change are likely
to require different approaches to implementation
(Section 5.9, Figures 6.4 and 6.6 et seq.)
iv. Complexity of the change(s) - the more complex the
change and the greater number of associated changes
occurring, the greater the likelihood that a
combination of the above implementation options will
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be appropriate at different stages of the change
programme (Figure 7.4)
v.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAResource implications - it has been shown that
implementing major .organisational change to police
systems is likely to be a lengthy and thus costly
undertaking. The financial costs involved need to be
assessed before implementation options are selected.
e.g. In order to communicate information to staff, a
poster is likely to be less costly than a professionally
produced corporate video, but the effect may be
considerably different. Such factors wi" bear upon the
decision as to which implementation options are
selected.
vi. Opportunity costs - of finance, staff and time.
Implementing change has been shown to be a
demanding undertaking for managers and also
potentially for staff. As there is a natural but variable
limit to individual achievement during a VJOrkingday, it
is necessary to consider what is to be foregone, or put
back in order to implement changes. The opportunity
costs associated with finance and time wi" be no less
significant to the implementation options adopted.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
7.6.8. Change implementation options can be operationalised by
individuals or groups from either inside, or outside the
organisation and is arguably the most significant aspect of
the change process. Cleland and King (1983 pg. 60)
emphasise the importance of this stepzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'The literature of
planning is replete with descriptions of plans that have been
painstakingly developed and then 'placed in a file'..." In
deciding who wi" implement the changes, a major
consideration must therefore be who is most likely to achieve
the changes required, on schedule and within budget?
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7.6.9. As previously, the decision as to who is most appropriately
placed to put into effect the changes will depend upon a
wide range of factors and constraints, principal amongst
which will be those shown above. (Sections 7.6.6-7)
7.6.10. The following options exist in police organisations for
managing change programmes:
i. internal line manager(s),
ii. internal functional manager(s),
iii. internal project manager(s),
iv. external project manager(s).
v. external consultant(s),
vi. project team.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
7.7 Internal Line Managers as Change Implementors
7.7.1. The management of change by existing line managers was
shown to be problematic in the case of N.P. (Chapter Four)
This experience was analysed and developed in Chapter Six
where a table is provided (Figure 6.2) which suggests
some of the conflicts for line managers when implementing
change.
7.7.2. In effect, beyond intuition and a personal knowledge of the
strengths and attitude of a particular manager, there are a
very limited number of reliable approaches for determining
whether a future change will be seen by a line manager in a
positive light or not. If such an individual is selected to
implement the changes, it is possible that the changes will
be undermined, if the individual concerned does not
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perceive them to be in his or her best interest, or within the
prevailing work group culture. (Checkland 1981, Schein
1985)
7.7.3. Conversely and in general terms, if the individual does
perceive the proposed changes to be supportive to
personal goals and work group culture, then the change is
more likely to be conscientiously pursued. (Kakabadse
1987)
7.7.4. It argued by Camall (1990) that the situation may be even
more complicated. He asserts that if the degree of job
security felt by an employee is either high or low then the
response to change will be very much that of rejection,
suppression or distortion. Camall argues that it is only
managers who are mid-way between the extremes of job
security that are likely to positively respond to change, as it
is they who will listen, clarify and explore altematives.
Those at the lowest extreme of security seeing any change
as a threat, and those who are highly secure, not seeing the
necessity to make any change.
7.7.5. A further difficulty for the line manager may be that there is
simply insufficient time available to maintain the required
organisational performance, as well as implementing a
change programme. Therefore, benefits might be lost that
could have accrued by virtue of the line managers' detailed
knowledge of the tasks that have to be performed and her or
his value as a supportive leader of the change process.
(Camall 1990, Bass and Stogdill 1990)
7.7.6. Such circumstances may apply in situations where
management and supervisory jobs have been reduced as
part of an organisational restructuring and cost reduction
programme. In such circumstances a managers' motivation
to implement change may be very limited, due to the
acceptance of new and greater responsibilities associated
with restructuring (de-layering). The increasingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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management responsibilities associated with contemporary
organisational restructuring programmes is likely to result in
managers being more distant from the jobs they control.
(Handy (1994) This 'distance' may become apparent inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtwo
specific ways within policing systems:
i. physical, in the sense that work is not co-located with
the manager,
ii. intellectual, in the sense that the manager need not
have a direct knowledge of the work being
undertaken.
7.7.7. A number of solutions to these potential difficulties are
suggested in contemporary management textszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) the
majority of which tend to rely upon the manager
appreciating the value of adopting a fresh approach to the
survival of the organisation and the new organisational
regime. Methods for dealing with management and thus
change issues from a 'distance', are suggested to
incorporate employee motivation, participation and trust
strategies. (Senge 1990, Pedlar et al 1991, Handy 1994)
7.7.8. It has been shown however, that the imper~tives within
commercial organisations that are potentially likely to focus
the attention of a manager on the need to change, are not
necessarily available within police organisations. Where a
management acceptance of the need to progress change is
not achieved, as has been shown to be the case in the N.P.
trial and to be generally likely within in police organJsations,
(Irving et al 1989 pg. 196 "... the motivation to change
problem...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAn ) it becomes a possibility that line managers are
not automatically and necessarily the most appropriately
placed individuals to implement change.
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7.7.9. The approach adopted within the N.P. trial was to appoint a
'change agent' who worked alongside the divisional line
managers in order to assist with.the implementation of the
project. The main functions of the change agent was to be a
face to face communicator at the trial site. Informing and
explaining what was required by way of agreed alterations
to procedures and assisting those affected to achieve the
changes. In effect the change agent was a person who had
a good knowledge of the N.P. project aims and who was to
provide an additional resource to divisional line managers
to achieve the necessary changes. Whilst this approach
appeared to meet both the needs of the line managers and
the project designers, there is no evidence advanced by
either intemal or extemal evaluators to suggest that change
was achieved more or less easily as a result of the
appointment.
7.7.10. The concept of the role of the change agent is advocated by
Tyson and Jackson (1992) and there is evidence advancedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA3
by Checkland and Scholes (1990) that there is value in such
a role. The main functions of a change agentzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) being
seen as:
i. helping with the diagnosis of need,
ii. planning and undertaking training activities,
iii. initiating the change process and acting as a catalyst
in the management of intemal change,
iv. contributing knowledge of the change process and
helping to maintain the momentum of the changes,
v. co-ordinating the change activities.
3 Chapter 7 - "SSM in an Organisational Change Programme"
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7.8 Internal Functional Managers as Change Implementors
7.8.1. Internal functional managers within police organisations may
be described as those managers having charge over a
particular specialisation which involves the exercise of a
functional authority over specified procedures, practices, or
policies (Koontz and O'Donnell 1976) Le. crime, traffic,
personnel etc.,
7.8.2. Similar difficulties are presented for change implementation
for functional managers as for line managers. Additionally
however, functional managers will invariably have to cope
with change programmes that extend beyond their own
functional boundaries and which encroach into other
managers' areas of responsibility.
7.8.3. It has been argued that change within police organisations
cannot be confined to isolated areas of operation, but rather
must encompass the sub-systems within which the
task/operation is performed, as well as those other sub-
systemswhere inputs are conditioned by the functioning of
the sub-system of interest. This being the case, it is argued
that change cannot be confined within a single functional
area. Thus of necessity, the functional manager must
assume wider responsibilities if change is to be
implemented.
7.8.4. Such an expansion of a functional manager's
responsibilities, will in itself create additional dynamics
within the change process that may not be advantageous.
For instance, other functional managers may perceive that
change is being imposed on their areas of responsibility
without having the necessary participation and control within
the process. It is probable that in such circumstances the
necessary 'ownership' of the changes that have been shown
to be necessary will not be achieved. (Chapter Six)
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7.8.5. In order to overcome this problem, a change strategy that
attempted to confine change implementation to areas of
functional responsibility would ~eate a need for co-
ordination between the various functional responsibilities.
This would be necessary in order to ensure that the tasks
performed within the various functional divisions continued
to be harmonised towards overall organisational goals and
not limited to narrow functional goals or self interest.
(Katzenbach and Smith 1993)
7.8.6. The function of co-ordination in itself will invariably consume
additional organisational resources. Whether co-ordination
is achieved through hierarchical means Le. a more senior
manager co-ordinates the efforts of the functional managers,
or through administrative means, Le. formal paper/mail flow
procedures, additional costs will be incurred, at least in the
form of staff opportunity costs. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981)
Thus higher demands are likely to imposed on staff who
have to cope with the consequential costs of implementing
the change programme, as \Nell as their routine
responsibilities.
7.8.7. The avoidance of a many functionalised divisions within a
police organisation thus becomes desirable, if change is to
be a persistent feature of organisational development. A
large number of functional divisions relative to the overall
size of the organisation, would present a major problem of
co-ordination for even the most modest change to the
overall output.
7.9 Internal Project Managers as Change Implementors
7.9.1. It is suggested that many of the difficulties associated with
managing change within functionalised organisations and
the police in particular, may be overcome by adoption of the
project management concept. A project manager in these
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terms is one who heads a specific project which spans a
number of separate functions, departments and/or divisional
commands, involving the exercise of a 'matrix' type of
authority, horizontally as well as vertically through
organisational divisions. (Cleland and King 1983) i.e.
information technology projects, communications projects,
corporate image projects etc.
7.9.2. In effect this amounts to the systems approach to change
implementation.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) This eans that all aspects of an
organisational system are brought together in a temporary
structure designed to bring about co-ordinated change(s)
throughout the system which are mutually complimentary
and directed towards organisational goals.
7.9.3. A manager of appropriate experience and seniority from
within the organisation might be appointed as the project
manager for the change process. The advantage being that
a suitably experienced person would possess much
knowledge of the existing organisational practices and
culture, as well as being able to exploit knowledge of how to
operationalise changes through existing staff and systems.
7.9.4. Internal project management responsibilities may be in
addition to normal and routine work, or given as a full time
responsibility in respect of major change programmes. In
contrast to the role of the change agent, the project
manager's role may be characterised by the following
principles drawn from Cleland and King (1983), Carnall
(1990) and Tyson and Jackson (1992):
i. the project manager operates independently of the
organisation's normal chain of line command, this
may result in some staff having more that one
manager, one for functional purposes and one for
change issues,
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ii. the project manager negotiates directly with functional
managers for support and resources, (Cleland and
King (1983) suggest that. a deliberate conflict is
created here between the competing needs and
objectives of the functional and project managers, the
resolution of which is significant to resulting
ownership and success of the changes)
iii. a sharing of decisions, results, and accountability
between functional and project managers, together with
an emphasis on team .and task culture, although the
project manager is the organisations focal point for the
change project.
7.9.5. As indicated above, a major difficulty with the internal
project management approach is the potential for conflict
between functional, line and project managers. Although
such conflicts may have constructive outcomes, and indeed
some would argue that some conflict is essential, if lasting
progress is to be achieved, (Katzenbach and Smith 1993)
but it is nevertheless a strategy with risk.
7.9.6. Should managers fail to resolve their conflicts, long lasting
grievances may be nurtured, resulting in reduced
effectiveness. In the extreme, winners and losers may
emerge, or at least be perceived in that way by staff. Should
staff identify the winner with the established situation and
the looser with the change project, then the opportunity for
present and future organisational development will have
been severely impaired.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA4
"In respect of the N.P. Project,lrving et al (1989) implied that staff actively made
assessments as to whether the project was likely to survive within the organisation
in the face of other major influences. Judgements were made by senior staff
based upon the high level of resources applied to the project and thus the relative
importance within the organisation, when compared to other apparently important
initiatives. Irving implies that such judgements affected perceptions of future
success or failure, and thus how much active support the project would be given.
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7.10 External Project Managers as Change Implementors
7.10.1. The appointment of an external project manager is a means
of overcoming the potential difficulty of conflict when an
internal project manager is appointed. An appointment of
this nature may be made from another division of the same
organisation, where this opportunity exists, or from a firm of
management consultants. In either event the project
manager's term of appointment is usually fixed, even if this
means handing over the project to an individual with different
skills at some point. (Cleland and King 1983)
7.10.2. A project manager from within the same organisation, but
not from within the division or group is the option that
potentially maximises the benefits of the project
management approach without the attendant risks arising
from conflicts. For the police service, such an option is
realistic and practical, but has generally not been practised
in anything other than the larger organisations. Even in the
largest organisations however, there does remain a risk of
long term grievances arising from conflicts between
managers associated with the implementation of change
projects.
7.10.3. The concept and advantages of constructive conflict might
be argued, especially in relation to management team
development and the management of change. (Katzenbach
and Smith 1993) However, the opposite point of view may
alsozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe advanced, Carnall (1990) in a case study, describes
the negative effect on organisational goals of conflicts
between functional directors.(pgs. 3-7) . Senge (1990)
encapsulates this position "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmany people who get hooked
on conflict manipulation come to believe that only through
being in a state of continual anxiety and fear can they be
successful." (pg. 157) He develops this argument to a point
where it is suggested that individuals so motivated
associate willpo~r with success and strive to overcomezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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resistance to achieving their goals "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAat any price ...defeating
any opposition ...surmounting any obstacle. II (pg. 158)
7.10.4. The argument has been advanced that police organisations
need to be open in character and to develop and change in
accordance with the long term wishes of those being policed
- policing by consent. (Chapter Two, Sections 2.18 and 5.2)
Such a narrow and robust approach to police organisation
development as implied above, would thus be inappropriate.
7.10.5. Therefore in appointing an external project manager who
had an unequivocal remit to implement the changes within
a specified time, care would be necessary to ensure that
feedback on the changes was considered. Failure to
consider the effects of the police system outputs in this way
would amount to a closing of the police system as a result of
the change implementation process; arguably the opposite
of the desired effect.
7.11 External Consultants as Change Implementors.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
7.11.1. There seems no shortage of management consultants who
offer services associated with change management. Such
services clearly have a direct cost which is principally
based on the amount of consultant time involved, the degree
of expertise and experience required and the level of fixed
costs, i.e. printing, data processing and travel costs. A wide
range of services are advertised as available, ranging from
problem analysis, through development of options, plans,
communication and training strategies, to implementation
and evaluation stages. Group process facilitation, team
building seminars, culture modification projects,
management development programmes and many other
services all form a part of the overall management
consultants portfolio of products.
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7.11.2. For many public services and the police in particular, the
cost of extensive management constancy can be prohibitive
especially, if a complete change management programme
is commissioned from analysis through to implementation.
Therefore the use of consultants' services has to be
considered in relation to other priorities and in the context of
the organisations overall budget.
7.11.3. A dilemma for an organisation in considering whether or not
to employ consultants, will be the need to carefully consider
what exactly is required, whether appropriate skills are
available internally and recognition of the need to appoint a
manager to act as the liaison point if consultants are
appointed. Yet when this has been undertaken, the
organisation is likely to have already achieved much of the
work for which the consultants will subsequently charge.
7.11.4. This view of the role of management consultants should be
balanced against the benefits of having an objective external
advisor who will have experience of managing change and
possess the potential to prevent many costly mistakes from
arising. Additionally, many methodologies and techniques
that are highly appropriate to organisational development,
especially in relation to personal and team development
(Katzenbach and Smith 1993, Checkland and Scholes
1990) are only available internally within the largest
organisations and generally will have to be externally
contracted. Such techniques when applied to internal line,
functional and project managers have the potential to
stimulate the necessary commitment to change fro,!, within
the organisation and can be highly cost effective. (Carnall
1990)
7.11.5. A major limitation however that attracts to the extensive use
of management consultants is that the resulting
organisational changes may not be associated with the
current management regime and thus lack 'ownership'.
Rather the changes may be seen by staff as a passing trendzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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or fashion. Managers of doubtful integrity are then
presented with the opportunity of dis-associating themselves
with the changes, blaming negative outcomes on the
consultants.
7.12 Project and Management Teams as
Implementors of Change
7.12.1. Project teams are a group of individuals drawn internally or
externally who share a common organisational (project)
goal. A persuasive argument for the creation of a project
team to manage complex organisational change is that
identifying a single project manager with perfect
qualifications and experience is not a realistic proposition.
(Cleland and King 1983) Therefore it is desirable to draw
together individuals who have complementary personal and
functional skills in order that the team shares overall
knowledge of the organisations activities. Such a team may
include an external management consultant but should be
led by "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthe be t manager available...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAn (ibid. pg.354)
7.12.2. The work of Belpin (1981 and 1976 in Tyson and Jackson
1992) gave insight as to how teams might be assembled
that would be successful in relation to common objectives.
In summary, he concluded that an ideal team should
possess individuals who would accept people oriented
roles, task dominated roles and ideas dominated roles. He
also advanced a methodology that seeks to determine the
classifications into which any individual would be most
comfortable functioning. Belpin's original work (ibid.)
concluded that an overall balance to a team wouldzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe most
effective, but later work concluded that provided the nature
of an imbalance was known, then training and awareness
could correct shortcomings. Additionally, it was suggested
that teams with certain characteristics would be more
appropriate for certain tasks. (The techniques associatedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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with categorisation of team members and the identification of
imbalances are among those requiring registration and
licensing referred to at Section 7.~1.4 above.)
7.12.3. There seems little doubt that there are potentially
considerable advantages to the use of teams in the
management of organisational change. Katzenbach and
Smith (1993) advance persuasive arguments for the team
approach to management and advance the concept of thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"high performance team". Here, the performance of the team
is seen as extending beyond the advantages of
complementary skills of the individual members.
7.12.4. A "high performance team" is argued to be identified and
characterised by the degree of commitment of the, members.
Such commitment is seen tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAr .: exte d beyond civility and
teamwork...to achieve personal and professional goals ...
beyond company activities and even beyond the life of the
team itself." (ibid. pg. 65)
7.12.5. In contrast, Senge (1990) advances a warning of the "Myth
of the management team." (pg. 24) He argues that all too
often teams of managers spend their time "... fighting for
turf, avoiding anything that will make them look bad
personally...but maintaining the appearance of a cohesive
team." As previously noted, Senge (1990)· quotes Argyris
(1990) as asserting that teams function well for routine
management matters, but break down when they confront
complex issues. Argyris (1990) argues that teams find
collective enquiry inherently threatening and therefore avoid
it. The consequence is "....that teams full of people... are
increasingly proficient at keeping themselves from learning."
(Senge 1990) This is what Argyris (1990) calls "skilled
incompetence"
324
7.12.6. Thus in tackling the management of change in large police
organisations, which has been argued to be inherently
complex, it is difficult on the basis of Senge's and Argyris's
arguments to be totally confident about the benefit of
project teams.
7.12.7. It may however be suggested, that these arguments appear
only to be strongly significant to the management of change
in exceptional or unusual circumstances. Advocates of the
benefits of team approaches, typified by Kasenbach and
Smith, (1993) demonstrate that in most management
circumstances, team based methods of problem solving and
change management will probably result in an improved
overall performance and outcome when compared with
alternatives.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
7.13zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe System of Change in Police Organisations -
Conclusion
7.13.1. As implied throughout there is no clear prescription that
might be followed to achieve effective change in police
organisations. Carnall (1990) tackles the issue of managing
complex change by suggesting a menu of core
competencies for achieving change, viz.
i. decision making skills, including vision and intuition,
ii. coalition building skills, gaining support by persuasive
communication,
iii. achieving action by motivating staff and handling
opposition,
iv. maintaining momentum, including team building, being
flexible, trusting staff, giving feedback and sharing
problems.
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7.13.2. What is apparent from the above (summarised) list of core
competencies is that the management of major change is
suggested to demand a considerable array of personal skills
and attributes.
7.13.3. It is seductive to conclude therefore, that it is unlikely to
conveniently find the requisite skills in anyone individual,
and hence a well managed team should present the best
option for managing major change in police organisations.
Optimally, such a team might include external consultants,
line managers and functional specialists from every division
of the organisation affected by the change.
7.13.4. It is persuasively argued though by experienced academics
and management specialists (Section 7.12.5, Senge 1990,
Argyris 1990) that such a solution is doomed to failure in the
face of conflict and complexity.
7.13.5. The best solution that can be offered on the basis of current
research is the impact of the charismatic qualities of an
effective leader VIOrkingthrough a skilled and appropriately
balanced team. Carnall (1990), Senge (1990) and Tyson and
Jackson (1992), all finally place the emphasis on improved
organisational performance through satisfactory
achievement of complex change, directly onto the qualities
and competencies of the 'leader'.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SummaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The concluding chapter of this research suggests there are five
possible explanations for the apparent divergence between the
findings of the N.P. evaluators and contemporary policing practice. It
is concluded that whilst the N.P. systems approach, analysis and
design were generally appropriate, the implementation methods
were not adequate in the face of considerable individual and
organisational resistance to the changes.
It is further concluded that the N.P. evaluations were too narrow in
scope to be of value to the organisations concerned. Despite these
difficulties, implementation of widespread changes based upon the
principles of N.P. continued within both the Metropolitan and Surrey
Police. The research concludes by deriving six principles for the
introduction and management of change in police organisations. It is
noted that the principles and characteristics of N.P. are now fully
implemented throughout the Metropolitan and Surrey Police areas.
8.1 Explanations for the N.P. Findings
8.1.1. The work to improve policing services through the
Neighbourhood Policing (N.P.) project started from the
proposition that if certain principles were followed, (Sections
2.7 and 2.8) it would be possible to design and implement a
policing system that represented an improvement to existing
and previous practice. It was further suggested that if a
systems approach were followed to both the design and
implementation of the policing scheme, then benefits would
also accrue by virtue of this integrative and holistic
approach. (Section 2.16)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.1.2. It is evident from the summary of the evaluations presented
at Chapter Four that in the view of some assessors, (Irving
et al 1989, Turner 1987[a)) the. overall project was not
seen as successful. Similarly, it has been shown that the
evaluation of a number of the individual N.P. treatments did
not indicate the positive outcomes that had been anticipated.
8.1.3. The results of these evaluations contrast sharply with
contemporary police practice which has incorporated much
of the N.P. approach into day to day police work, as well
as many of the N.P. treatments. (Le. Chief Constable of
Surrey 1993, M.P.S. 1994)
8.1.4. A significant question that remains of concern is why, given
the reported largely negative assessments of the scheme,
(Turner 1987 [a-e), Irving et al 1989) is so much of the
substance of the N.P. policing system incorporated into
police organisations? In particular, the Metropolitan and
Surrey Police Organisations where the scheme is widely
recognised as the most appropriate system for delivering
community based policing services across a wide diversity of
policing environments. (M.P.S. 1994[a], Surrey Police 1994)
8.1.5. A partial explanation of this outcome may arise from the
argument that the major evaluations were too narrow in
scope. Turner (1987 [a-e)) and his team concentrated upon
the efficacy or otherwise of the individual N.P. treatments
and endeavoured to assess each in isolation from others.
There was no attempt made to assess the N.P. scheme
holistically.
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8.1.6. Tumer was particularly critical of the attempt to change a
policing system, as opposed to individual elements of it. He
states:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"Experiments (in policing) should be severely limited in
their individual scope.....no more than one aspect
should be changed at anyone place at anyone time
and the extent of the change should be modest..."
(Tumer 1987 [a] pg. 31)
8.1.7. In contrast, Irving et al (1989) provided an account of a
largely observational study of the work of the N.P. project
team and the process of implementation at Notting Hill
Division. This account is sub-titled 'The Natural History of
a Policing Experiment' which accurately describes the style
of evaluation.
8.1.8. Reliance is predominantly placed upon accounts and
commentary upon the meetings of the divisional working
party, the attitudes of its members and the behaviour and
attitudes of operational officers. Much of the evaluation
report is given to a review and critique of the original N.P.
theses (Hart 1981, Beckett 1981) In a similar vein to Tumer,
Irving widely criticises the systems approach in general, and
its use throughout the N.P. project in particular.
8.1.9. In consequence of the evaluators comments and findings,
the general propositions of this research are that the
results of the N.P. evaluations is unsurprising, given:
i. the arguments presented here about the nature of
change and its effect within police organisations,
ii. the characteristics of the systems approach and the
inappropriateness of the evaluation methods adopted
when applied to a 'systems concept' change
programme.
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8.1.10. The above propositions imply that a number of explanations
may exist which might assist in accounting for the apparent
divergence between the N.P. evaluations and modem police
practice.
8.1.11. It is suggested that none of the following explanations are
likely to completely account for the outcomes described.
In combination however, together with the evidence
presented here (Chapters Five and Six) regarding the
systemic approach to change associated with police
organisations, it is argued that a more complete explanation
of the N.P. trial is possible.
8.1.12. The following categories of explanations correspond to the
features of the elements of the process model of change
suggested at Figure 6.1. and the macro model of change
derived at Section 5.3 Each is discussed below:
i. N.P. Systems Analysis - the original police systems
analysis was incomplete or inaccurate, (identification
of the stimuli for change - Section 5.4 and Paragraph
6.1.5)
ii. N.P. Systems Design - the subsequent police system
design and N.P. treatments were. therefore
inappropriate, (targets for change - Section 5.5,
Paragraph 6.1.7)
iii. N.P. Systems Implementation - the implementation
of N.P. project treatments was inappropriate or
incomplete, (implementation of change - Section 5.9,
Section 4.1 and 4.2, Paragraphs 6.1.8 -16)
iv. N.P. Evaluations - the evaluations were narrow in
scope and did not therefore address the most
significant aspects of the N.P. system, (N.P.
evaluation concepts - Chapter Three)
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v. Systems Approach to N.P. - the overall systems
approach adopted for the N.P. project was an
inappropriate methodology. (~ectionszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2.16,4.1/2)
8.2 N.P.SystemsAnalysis
8.2.1. The original work in respect of the N.P. systems analysis
was undertaken between 1979 and 1980 and is
summarised in Chapter Two, drawn from Hart (1981) and
Beckett (1981). Fundamentally, it was argued on the basis
of work by Alderson, (1979) that the nature of policinq would
alter unless police formed partnerships with the
communities they policed and reflected the public's views in
their priorities. (Section 2.3)
8.2.2. If such changes did not occur, it was suggested that the
character of British policing would move away from the
principle of policing with the consent of the public. It was
further suggested that such a move would result in a more
imposed and reactive style of policing characterised by a
further distancing of the police from the public needs and
wishes. (Whitacker 1979, Alderson 1979, Paragraph 2.18.2)
8.2.3. It was argued that if this were to become the case then the
imposition of policing would be seen as inappropriate by the
public and resisted. (Alderson 1979, Beckett 1981) Further it
was argued by Hart (1981) that if police continued to rely
upon current reactive approaches to crime and demands
from the public, then the rate of increasing demands would
overtake the resources available to deal with them. The
solution was seen as involving the public and all relevant
agencies in preventive measures. (Section 2.4 and Figure
2.1)
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8.2.4. The original analysis, although not exhaustive, drew from a
detailed knowledge base. This included the views of some of
the most senior and respected offi.cers in the Service at that
time, senior academics, the professional and academic staff
at the Police Staff College and members of a number of
police forces who were active in police organisational
development. Additionally, a substantial number of reliable
published sources reinforced the N.P. approach and were
cited in the analysis, which was presented in considerable
detail. (Hart 1981, Beckett 1981)
8.2.5. The overall project analysis adopted Checkland's (1972)
methodology for problem solving in order to present a
systematic and integrated representation of the situation.
The analysis incorporated consideration of the policing
environment, policing structures, policing behaviours and
police standard operating procedures. Irving et al (1989 pg.
ix) comments:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
HIt (N.P.) was a remarkable document in its scope and
the systematic way in which synthesis of findings from
many different disciplines was directed at producing an
integrated policing strategy which....waszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa com lete
system, a major innovation."
8.2.6. Over six months after the production and submission of N.P.,
Lord Scarman's (1981) report of the Brixton disorders was
published. It is suggested here to be of considerable
significance, that this report of the inquiry that followed
these disorders of April 1981 entirely supported the N.P.
propositions. Irving et al (1989 pg. ix) notes:
"tn the aftermath of the Brixton riots and with the
prospect of Lord Scarman's inquiry concluding that
police strategy in London required overhauling, the
thesis (N.P.) was thrust into the limelight because it
offered a ready made new approach....that was not
merely theoretical but contained a detailed plan for
implementation..."zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.2.7. The methodology for the Scarman (1981) inquiry contrasted
to N.P. in that it followed a quasi legal process, whereby oral
and written evidence was collected and presented to the
inquiry by counsel. Although the Scarman inquiry had its
origins within, and its focus upon, the difficulties of policing
Brixton, the report did advance principles for policing
generally, that corresponded closely with those of N.P. The
main thrust of the inquiry's conclusions may be
encapsulated as follows,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAHit they (the police) neglect
consultation and co-operation with the local community,
unrest is certain and riot becomes probable. H (Scarman
1981 pg. 135)
8.2.8. Alderson (1979) and Scarman (1981) whilst advancing a
philosophy and some general principles of policing, both
stopped short of specifying a model of a system for
delivering policing services of a style implied by their
findings. (Section 2.3)
8.2.9. provided such a system specification, the root definition
(Checkland 1972) of which may be seen to correspond with
the approaches of Alderson and Scarman as follows,
H A policing system which seeks to optimise available
resources including al/ relevant agencies and the
community itself in order to prevent crime and
offences...H (Hart 1981 pg. 58)
8.2.10. It is argued that the congruence of the conclusions from two
separate and independent methodologies (Scarman and
N.P.), arising from two mutually independent studies, is
probably not coincidental.
8.2.11. It is further argued that the similarity of conclusions from two
differing perspectives provides mutual reinforcement and
confidence as to the accuracy of the analysis (Cook and
Campbell 1979[a)) undertaken by both examinations of
policing and the relevance of their findings.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.2.12. On this basis, it is suggested that it is probable that the
systems analysis for N.P. was appropriate and provided a
largely accurate examination and ,definition of the policing
'problem situation' (Checkland 1972) to be tackled, as
summarised here in Chapter Two.
8.3 N.P.SystemsDesign
8.3.1. The design of the N.P. project treatments was based upon
the police systems analysis which is summarised at Figure
4.3. The design of the treatments is considered here in the
context of the 'change target' in the macro model of change
(Section 5.5) The change target is suggested to consist of
three generic groups of targets, namely, structures, systems
and culture.
8.3.2. Changes to structures and systems essentially involved
designing alterations to existing police operational structures
(Section 5.7) and standard operating procedures (Systems-
Section 5.8) that were considered most appropriate for
achieving the N.P. strategic aims. (Section 2.7) ,
8.3.3. A number of police system models were studied in order to
determine whether existing and tested processes and
structures might be appropriate to co-ordinate together
within the overall N.P. system concept. Having achieved
this, the basic N.P. model was developed and the various
treatments specified. (Chapter Four)
8.3.4.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt was acknowledged at the time, (Hart 1981, Beckett 1981)
and has subsequently been restated, that there was little
within the N.P. project treatments (systems or structures)
that was in itself new or radical. (Turner 1987 [a], Irving et al
1989) The significant difference was that a range of policing
'best practice' procedures had been incorporated into and
specified as a unified policing system. Each treatment being
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designed to co-ordinate and harmonise with every other,
and all directed towards the achievement of specified and
common N.P. goals.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.)
8.3.5. There were two propositions that underscored the
development of the design of the N.P. system:
i. the project treatments sought to preserve and build
upon the most successful existing practices where
these corresponded'with the N.P. aims,
ii. every policing division and every policing
environment was different from every other, in
some significant respect. Therefore local officers
would need to adapt the basic project treatments
to suit local conditions, within the overall systemic
project principles and framework.
8.3.6. On the basis of the foregoing principles, it was accepted by
the Commissioner, the Chief Constable of Surrey and the
Police Foundation that the N.P. trial should proceed. A brief
account of parts of this decision making processes given by
Irving. (1989 et al)
8.3.7. It is acknowledged that there may be many unknown
reasons why it was considered appropriate to proceed with
the N.P. trial and it is also acknowledged that the Scarman
Inquiry (1981) report was known to be exerting pressure on
the Commissioner of the Metropolitan police in particular, to
review policing methods. (Paragraph 2.20.5)
8.3.B. It is argued here that despite the pressures on the police
decision makers to instigate change, if in the opinion of
these individuals and their advisors, the design of the N.P.
structures and systems had been so deeply flawed as to be
unrealistic or unrealisable, the project would not have
proceeded unaltered. The N.P. project could have been
conveniently ignor~d and other initiatives developed, if theyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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had not seen that the treatments themselves, or the system
design was unlikely to realise any benefits.
8.3.9. It is therefore concluded that the N.P. design, at minimum,
was seen to have the potential to change the various
experimental conditions to some extent.
8.3.10. It should be noted at this stage, but the paint is discussed
later, (Section 8.5) that Turner (1987[a] pg. 30) disagrees
with this proposition. He states without citing supporting
evidence,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"Most of the (N.P.) elements can be expected to have
onlyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa very sma l (if any) impact themselves on the
state of crime, or the views of the general public."
8.3.11. It is also worthy of note, that the results of the more recent,
national public survey, commissioned as part of the
Operational Policing Review (O.P.R. 1990 Sect. 4 - Harris
ResearchlM.P.S.) indicate that Turner's above assertion is
wholly incorrect. i.e.
"The public have a very strong preference for the
caring community style of policing....There is no
disagreement about what the priorities should be and
the public fully support the law enforcement role, but
would wish to see it implemented by the officer who
involves himself with the community and uses
discretion. II (O.P.R. 1990 pg. 8)
8.3.12. The feature of the macro model of change that is
acknowledged as not being fully considered during the
design stage of the N.P. treatments was that of the police
organisational culture. (Section 5.6)
8.3.13. It was considered by the N.P. authors and others, that the
implementation of systems, procedures and structures that
were designed to bring about altered patterns of work, would
gradually lead to changes in the attitudes of those
involved, i.e. behaviour change preceding attitude (cultural)
change. (Kakabadse et al 1987) However, this was shown
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to be far from the case. (Irving et al 1989) The police
operational culture proving to be resistant to rapid change,
despite alterations to working practices.
8.3.14. Irving et al (1989) provides a good deal of anecdotal
evidence from Notting Hill, that police officers were slow to
accept the necessity for the N.P. changes, despite changes
to their day to day routines and procedures. In some
instances, the changes being actively undermined and
resisted.
8.3.15. From the highest levels of both the Metropolitan Police and
the Surrey Constabulary, the management attitude to
implementing change was that if working practices had to
alter, then it would be sufficient to implement the structural
and systems changes and everything else would follow.
Such was the predominant style of police management at
that time. (Reiner 1991) This style being characterised by a
tendency towards promoting autocratic personalities and the
creation of mechanistic processes. This style contrasts to the
more participative, less mechanistic and organic procedures
that are common in the police service today.
8.3.16. Training in the new procedures and structures for N.P. was
provided, (Section 4.13) although it was not anticipated that
this would necessarily be effective in changing attitudes.
Rather it was intended to stimulate an interest and
awareness of the N.P. system, whilst being persuasive in
style. The evaluations indicated this to be the case. (Irving et
al 1989, Turner 1987[a]) It should be noted however, that
both evaluations are critical of the quantity, scope and
potential achievements the training provided for the N.P.
system; but not the inclusion of the training processes in the
N.P. design. (Section 4.13)
8.3.17. It has been argued that the strength of the police operational
and management culture to resist the N.P. changes was
apparently not appreciated by the most senior decisionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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makers, or the N.P. project team. (Section 6.6) It had been
considered by the authors that the progressive changes of
the N.P. system would gradual!y create a climate of
acceptance. In fact it was originally asserted that a radical
approach was not necessary. (Section 2.6)
8.3.18. Nothing could have been further from the truth. The
operational (relief) culture in both the Metropolitan Police
and the Surrey Constabulary remained strongly resistant to
the implementation of the changes, despite the eventual
certainty that N.P. was the required corporate style of
policing.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAnit was right (of the N.P. authors) to identify the
relief culture as an obstacle to organisational change... II
(Irving et al 1989 pg. 202)
8.3.19. There is no basis from which to speculate as to which of
the personal or group resistance strategies described at
Sections 6.8 to 6.10 were predominant amongst those
divisional officers involved. Suffice to say, that it is probable
that all, either individually or collectively, were adopted
either deliberately, or unconsciously by a large number of
officers at many levels involved in the N.P. change process.
8.3.20. From the basis of the two propositions at Paragraph 8.3.5. it
is difficult to propose that it was the N.P. treatments and
system that created the resistance to change. The N.P.
treatments themselves were little more, in most instances,
than extensions of existing police practices and were widely
recognised as such. Additionally, local officers had the
opportunity to refine and adapt the treatments to suit local
conditions.
8.3.21. The significant difference of the N.P. project was that the
individual treatments, instead of being applied in isolation as
hitherto, were integrated into an overall, systematic
policing scheme.(Section 2.16) It was this integration that
was claimed by the authors to offer the best opportunity of
tackling contemporary policing problems, without applyingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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substantial additional resources. (Section 2.4, Hart 1981,
Beckett 1981)
8.3.22. Irving et al (1989 pg. ix) comments that it was this synthesis
directed at producing an integrated policing strategy
amounting tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAH ••• zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa complete (policing) system... II that was the
"...major innovation." of N.P.
8.3.23. The implication being that it was the overall design of N.P.
that was seen as the 'major innovation' that was worth
pursuing by way of trials. It may argued from this basis, and
the assertion that there was little that was radically new
within the N.P. treatments, that it was not the N.P.
treatments, or N.P. system design, that stimulated the
resistance to change by operational officers, but other
factors or conditions.
8.3.24. In other words, it may be that the officers would have
resisted any change that threatened to disrupt existing
working practices and thus the work group culture. The
security of existing practices and being seen by some
officers as necessary for personal safety when working in a
policing environment perceived as threatening and hostile.
8.3.25. Following the evaluation of the N.P. trial at Notting Hill,
Irving et al (1989) report a different attitude towards the
holistic and integrative nature of N.P. It is argued by these
evaluators that systems analysis is "...primarily used for
tackling mathematically determinate relations between
variables." and thus used in the context of N.P. "...Iends a
deterministic air to complex arguments which are highly
probabilistic. H (pg. 188) This assertion is made despite the
cautions within the N.P. text that the systems models of
N.P. are not descriptions of reality, but a means of
structuring the elements and relationships involved. Irving's
argument then continues, that in a situation that is as
inherently complex as policing, where great "...political value
is placed in rendering the complexity comprehensible andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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manageable...",zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthe models become "...articles of faith, ways
of dealing with the world." (ibid. pg. 188) Checkland and
Scholes (1990 pg. 309) address. this concem, but in so
doing, highlight what seems to be Irving's
misunderstanding, or avoidance of the purpose of such
models, " ...the models are not models of real world activity,
they are models relevant to debating it. "
8.3.26. Irving's arguments do not criticise the N.P. system design
in itself, but rather infer that the analysis used to arrive at
the design was inappropriate. This being argued as the
case, because the considerable complexity of the social
and social-psychological processes involved in policelpublic
interactions were modelled in a such a way as to make the
complexity more manageable. (i.e. Figure 3.5)
8.3.27. This deduction, although arguably rational from a social
science perspective is not seen by some as a prerequisite
for a satisfactory system design. Checkland and Scholes
(1990) describe a methodology for transferring concepts of
"human activity systems" (pg. 309) into models of ''perceived
reality" (pg. 306) and then into "real world action". (pg.
289)
8.3.28. In a similar vein, Hitchins (1992 pg. 46) suggests that
despite the complexity of human behaviours, "It seems likely
that human behaviour is reasonably predictable given an
understanding of the situation, environment culture and pre-
cursor events." Precisely the argument originally advanced
by the N.P. authors. (Section 3.16)
8.3.29. It is argued here that although Irving et al (1989) make it
clear that they are uncomfortable with the application of
systems analysis to 'soft system problems' (Checkland 1981)
they present no evidence, other than opinion, to support
their assertions. More compellingly however, they do not
point to any features of either the N.P. treatments, or systemzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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design, that they consider to be inappropriate having regard
to the design aims.
8.3.30. In fact despite the overall negative assessments of the
Notting Hill trial it is reported that:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"The logic of the system linking demand control,
geographic responsibility and directed patrol has not
been dented by this attempt at implementation." (Irving
et al1989 pg. 208)
8.3.31. They do however advance some persuasive evidence and
arguments as to why some of the treatments were not as
successful as anticipated, i.e. the N.P. training, pro-social
modelling by police.
8.3.32. In contrast however, Turner (1987) does not mention the
phenomena of organisational culture and the difficulties that
it might present to the change process, he concludes:
"The changes intended in procedures, attitudes and
behaviour, were too great to be brought about by
training, persuasion and edict." (Turner 1987 [a] pg. 30)
8.3.33. From this observation it is difficult to appreciate how Turner
envisages that any significant organisational change might
be achieved.
8.3.34. It is argued therefore that the N.P. system design, based
upon an accurate analysis, potentially possessed the
necessary attributes to realise the projected benefits of the
scheme if fully and satisfactorily implemented.
8.4 N.P.SystemsImplementation
8.4.1. It has been argued above that both the systems analysis and
systems design of the N.P. treatments are considered
appropriate to the-N.P. 'problem situation'. (Checkland 1972zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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and Section 2.6) This being accepted as the case, it follows
from the macro model of change (Figure 5.1, Section 5.9)
that the remaining issue that might explain the outcomes,
would be that of the project implementation. The means by
which the actual changes were brought about.
8.4.2. Explanations have been advanced why N.P. was designed
by the authors as a complete system of policing , who as
serving police officers, were themselves, potential users of
the system. It has also been shown that N.P., although the
work of two individuals, was largely a synthesis of many
well established and conventional police practices.
8.4.3. In fact, N.P. drew from a great many reliable and informed
sources, as well as from accounts of previous policing
'experiments'. (Le. Keeton 1975, Critchley 1978, Whitaker
1979, Alderson 1979) The authors made a number of study
visits to police divisions throughout the country and were
personally advised by some of the most senior and
experienced police officers in the U.K. both in command of
police forces and at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. (Le.
Sir Peter Matthews, Sir Kenneth Newman, Brian Hayes,
Maurice Buck, John Alderson et al)
8.4.4. However, despite this level of analysis, experience and the
reliance upon established thinking, N.P. in its original form,
lacked the input of the eventual operational users of the
system at the locations where the trial scheme was to be
implemented.
8.4.5. At Section 2.20 it has been shown that N.P. was seen at
the most senior levels of The Metropolitan Police and Surrey
Constabulary as a new approach to policing with the
potential to improve policing services that were the subject
of public criticism.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.4.6.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt may be suggested therefore that there was a high level
organisational emphasis towards action in implementing
N.P. rather than in undertaking further development. This is
a point strongly made by Irving et al (1989) in respect of
N.P. and generally reinforced by Beckhard and Harris
(1987 pg. 116) who state:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"One of the biggest traps for large-system change
efforts is the failure of organisational leaders to resist
the temptation to rush through the planning process to
get to the 'action' stage."
(Interestingly, this contrasts with Checkland's view that it is
tempting for managers of change to linger in the intellectual
and modelling processes of change planning, rather than to
engage the practical difficulties of actually bringing about
change in the real world.(Checkland and Scholes 1990)
8.4.7. It is further suggested that the need to implement N.P.
however, only existed at the highest levels in the police
organisations concerned. At intermediate management
levels, (divisional and district command) and operational
levels, there is little evidence to suggest that such changes
would either be seen as welcome or necessary.
8.4.8. The attitude of the majority of operational police officers was
that they were in some way set apart from the bulk of
society. Whitacker (1979) They saw themselves as law
enforcers, engaged in a relentless struggle against an
increasing wave of criminality and public disorder. (Smith
1983[b])
8.4.9. The police task, and the training for it was understood by
most officers as providing protection through law
enforcement for a society that was experiencing steadily
increasing levels of crime and disorder. The major role
was seen in straightforward terms, being that of bringing
offenders to justice. (Whitacker 1979, Smith 1983 [b])
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8.4.10. It may be argued therefore that the police possessed a set of
informal organisational values and a culture that had
developed to resist moving with social trends. Such social
trends being perceived by the police to be encouraging
lawlessness and anti-social behaviour. (Le. Scarman 1981)
8.4.11. Additionally, it is argued that the police culture was not only
highly resistant to internal change at the operational level,
(Section 8.3) but similarly resistant to change at
intermediate levels, which is suggested to arise from a
learned resistance to external pressures to change. Scarman
(1981 pg. 60) addressed this point, finding evidence to
describe police of all ranks in London as "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAunimaginative
and inflexible in their relationships with the community ....and
in the methods of policing they adopted. "
8.4.12. This situation is similar to that described by Carnall (1990
pg. 112) who stereotypes the culture of such organisations
as characterised by "...stability, prescription, rules,
standards ... " Carnall suggests that such cultures can exist
and be very efficient in a stable environment, but are
inappropriate in a turbulent environment.
8.4.13. It was suggested at Section 2.2. that the policing
environment of the early 1980s was highly turbulent,
resulting in London in the Brixton disorders and the
subsequent Scarman (1981) inquiry and report. This report
was to give an impetus to many radical changes in policing
nationally, as well as the Metropolitan Police that had been
the focus of attention during the inquiry (ibid.)
8.4.14. The high level decision to implement N.P. did not seem to
take account of a police culture with 'stable characteristics'
and an environment with 'turbulent characteristics'. If this
mismatch had been recognised, the need for widespread
communication of the necessity for rapid change would
perhaps have been undertaken.
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8.4.15. Internal communication addressing the need to change was
not seen as a priority. The development of a culture that
was supportive of the need to c~ange was certainly not
promulgated throughout the Service at that time. This is
surprising in the light of the highly publicised Scarman
report in November 1981 and later, the report of the Policy
Studies Institute who were critical of many aspects of
policing in London. (Smith et al 1983) Both reports focused
on specific features of policing in London that needed to be
changed, many of which were already incorporated within
the N.P. project.
8.4.16. It is significant to note, in relation to the level of resistance
to change in the police culture, that nearly ten years later,
the Operational Policing Review (O.P.R. 1990) drew
attention to similar distinctions between the views of the
public and the police in relation to the police role. The police
were reported as continuing to see their role as
predominantly reactive, law enforcers, whilst the public have
a strong preference for a 'caring, community oriented style'
of policing. The O.P.R. did however report that there was
now (1990) little distinction between police and public views
as to priorities for police, which is an alteration since the
analysis stages of N.P.
8.4.17. The desirability of communicating to the organisation, the
need for change prior to implementation of N.P. was
recognised by the project team. This was undertaken
through individual presentations, seminars and classroom
training at the divisions who were to implement the trial of
N.P. Other groups at both operational and management
levels were recipients of N.P. presentations, if they were
considered to be significant to the progress of the project.
(Irving et al 1989, Stapley 1986) A significant comment is
made by Irving et al in this respect, (ibid. pg. 202) that the
senior members of the project team were "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtoozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
busy ....selling it (N.P.) to the organisation to provide on-line,
technical support to each site ... II
345
8.4.18. The communication of the need to change was coupled with
the outline description of the N.P.. principles and treatments.
It was a part of the implementation strategy that each
division would refine and modify the basic N.P. treatments to
suit local conditions and implement their own adaptations.
(Sections 2.7 - 2.9) Provided that the basic principles of N.P.
were adopted and followed, this approach was seen as
capable of achieving a balance between a pre-determined
package of changes and local innovation.
8.4.19. The detailed, pre-specified package approach was
considered by the authors to be too prescriptive in character
and unlikely to be accepted by local managers. Uncontrolled
local creativity and innovation however, was seen as
appropriate to secure the necessary 'ownership' for
changes, but carried unacceptable risks of changes being
made in an inappropriate direction, that would be difficult to
subsequently alter.
8.4.20. A similar distinction is described by Hersey and Blanchard.
(1972) betweenzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"coerced change" and "participative change"
They suggest a that coerced change cycle is fast in terms
of implementation effect, but that the change will only be
maintained as long as the leader is in a position to exercise
influence. Whereas a participative implementation cycle, is
slower and evolutionary, but is likely to be long lasting, since
those involved will be highly committed to the change.
(Kirkpatrick 1985)
8.4.21. The resulting dilemmas for implementing large changes in
police systems are summarised in the matrix model at
Figure 8.1.
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Organisational
Characteristics
Environmental
Characteristics
STABLE DYNAMIC
and and
CLOSED OPENzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
PARTICIPATIVE
SLOW PARTICIPATIVE and SLOW
to and
or
CHANGE SLOW
COERCIVE
and FAST
COERCIVE
COERCIVE and FAST
TURBULENT and developing into
FAST
PARTICIPATIVE
and FAST
Figure 8.1 Police Organisational and Environmental
Characteristics Associated with
Styles of Change Implementation
8.4.22. Figure 8.1. relates groups of stable and dynamic
characteristics of police organisations to static and turbulent
characteristics of their environments. Each cell of the matrix
suggests the type and corresponding speed of the most
appropriate implementation style.
8.4.23. It is argued that the model shows the limited opportunity for
adopting wholly participative methods for change
implementation in police organisations. It has been argued
that police organ1sations operating during the early 1980szyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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were predominantly stable and closed in character, whilst
their human and physical environments were turbulent.
(Sections 2.2 - 4 and 5.2)
8.4.24. The first cell of the top row in Figure 8.1 indicates that a
participative approach to implementation would be
appropriate where a 'slow to change' environment is
partially interacting with an organisation with stable and
closed characteristics. Here a police organisation would
have the opportunity to begin consultation with both public
and staff, develop and refine options and then implement the
most appropriate solution(s), confident in the knowledge that
the environmental characteristics would remain largely
unchanged, or only changing slowly, during the change
process. During this process, the N.P. experience suggests
that the organisation would become progressively more
open and move towards the second cell of the top row.
8.4.25. A police organisation with dynamic and open characteristics,
operating in a 'slow to change' environment, could adopt
either approach, or a combination of both. Here, the
predominantly static environment would tolerate either type
of change implementation, either participative and slow or
coercive and fast, provided the police system output
remained appropriate and did not conflict with
environmental factors in any inappropriate, or negative way.
8.4.26. For instance, the sudden and unexplained change (closed
characteristic) to the enforcement policy of minor
regulations where previously only discretionary enforcement
.
had applied, (open characteristic) i.e. parking enforcement in
residential roads. Such a change in the police output would
be likely to attract criticism and consequently a reduction in
support for police in other activities. (In such circumstances,
the benefit of the tactic would have to be weighed against
the potential dysbenefits.) Whereas, such a change might be
achieved after first ensuring those to be affected were
aware of say, the injury accident risk caused by the parking.
348
This straightforward example illustrates the more complex
issue, that changes in police output might be achieved
quickly and inappropriately or slowly and satisfactorily in a
relatively 'slow to change environment.'
8.4.27. A slow and participative process of change may be seen as
a particular type of an evolutionary approach to change.
(Kirkpatrick 1985) The participative model providing a
gradual and progressive approach to change, whereas the
coercive model would be more likely to produce a series of
more abrupt changes. Section 5.9 provides models of
implementation methods and Figure 5.13 suggests some
non linear variations of this concept.
8.4.28. It has been argued here, (Section 2.2) by Alderson, (1979)
and others that police organisations exist within highly
turbulent human and physical environments. This situation
is represented by the lower row of Figure 8.1.
8.4.29. If a police organisation tended towards closed
characteristics, as has been suggested was typical in the
1970s and early 1980s, (Sections 2.2 and 5.2) then the
organisation wouldzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe re istant to many changes stimulated
from the human policing environment. (Section 5.4) It follows
therefore that internal participative and evolutionary
processes would not be effective in developing changes
arising from such stimuli. Rather it is suggested that such a
police organisation could become introspective and self
serving by virtue of the process of the perpetuation of culture
described at Figure 5.4.
8.4.30. When the stimuli for change accumulated to a level that
could no longer be resisted by the organisation, the
pressure to change would be likely to be high, requiring
immediate improvements. Therefore, the implementation
style would need to be coercive and fast, despite the
consequential dangers of hostility and animosity from
affected staff. It is suggested that a broadly similar situation
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faced the Metropolitan Police in the aftermath of the
publication of the Scarman (1981) report. Change having
been avoided for a sufficiently long period, that the
resistance strategies had been internalised into the cultures
of the operational and intermediate management levels.
(Sections 5.6 and 6.4 - 9)
8.4.31. The second cell of the lower row in Figure 8.1. represents
the situation where a dynamic and open organisation
interacts with a turbulent environment. Here it is suggested
that in order to create the first changes to make an
organisation more responsive to environmental factors, a
fast and coercive change implementation style would be
appropriate. Such a style would be necessary in order to
rapidly reflect changing environmental needs within an
appropriate time scale.
8.4.32. It is suggested that a participative style would militate
against an initial change occurring, that was sufficiently
rapid to allow the organisation to retain open
characteristics. It has been argued that participative change
frequently involves a longer period for implementation than
alternatives. Therefore it is suggested that the elapsed time
necessary for an effective participatory process to take
place, would prevent the organisation from accurately
reflecting the environmental inputs. Effectively then, the
organisation would be displaying closed characteristics, the
changes occurring as a result of internal, rather than
external stimuli.
8.4.33. Hitchins (1992 pg. 239) relates this situation to a commercial
case:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...there is a need to overcome the natural resistance
to change withinzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa company, and its inertia must be
balanced against the rate of change essential to
catch up with the market."zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.4.34. In a police context, if the organisation's inertia regularly
prevented it from 'catching up' with the expectations of the
human environment, (its market) then it would effectively be
a closed police system and thus not meet the N.P. criteria.
8.4.35.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt may be proposed as possible though, for such an
organisation to develop a change culture that would
anticipate change as the normal state of affairs. An
organisation with these Characteristics might develop
participative procedures after significant coercive changes
have altered both the degree of openness and the internal
responsiveness of staff.
8.4.36. The aim being to develop both staff and systems to a point
where participative change procedures operate at a speed
appropriate to the environment and the goals of the
organisation. In the ideal situation the organisation would
be predicting the likely future changes and planning internal
action for those eventualities. (Pedlar et al 1991)
8.4.37. Such an organisation would be similar to that characterised
and described as thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAHlearning organisationH by Senge.
(1990) A dynamic organisation in an open relationship with
its environment incorporating human and physical systems
that are designed to promote continual development and
adaptation.
8.4.38. Hitchins (1992) describes a practical means of achieving the
necessary communication, co-ordination and change
evolution through a 'change management system'. Such a
system, similar to that envisaged by the N.P. design, would
continually monitor the environmental change stimuli and
co-ordinate the organisations response through all functions
and levels.
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8.4.39. Hitchins (1992) suggests that the change management
system would be essentially human in nature, but it is
further suggested here that the most significant feature of a
change management system in an open organisation, would
be teams, as opposed to individuals.
8.4.40. The advantages and disadvantages of project and
management teams as change implementors are discussed
at Section 7.12 and it is concluded that teams provide the
most reliable structure for progressing organisational change
in police organisations. As Katzenbach and Smith (1993 pg.
195) express the strength of the advantages, ''Teams and
major change, an inevitable combination."
8.4.41. It is asserted by Katzenbach and Smith (1993) that teams
play a critical role in the implementation of major change in
organisations. They state that "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAevery ingle major change
effort we know about has depended on teams." (pg. 211)
Others show (i.e. Kast and Rosenzweig 1981, Tyson and
Jackson 1992) that teams of managers and operational
staff in open organisations need to learn about the business
of the organisation and the environment in which it operates
in order to be successful. Senge (1990 pg. 10) argues that,
H••• unless teams can learn, the organisation cannot learn."
8.4.42. Environmental change stimuli affecting police organisations
will be significant not only because they will bring about
changes to the nature of policing, but also because they will
determine how fast changes are implemented. Kirkpatrick
(1985) suggests the speed at which change is implemented
may be as important as the change itself. He suggests that if
resistance to the change is likely tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbe st ong then the
change should be implemented slowly. Whereas if staff are
eager for change then it should proceed quickly.
8.4.43. However, this proposition ignores a significant feature of
the nature of change to police organisations. Major changes
to police systems may be stimulated from the environment
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(Figure 5.2) that necessitate sudden, internal organisational
change, despite the views of staff. (i.e. changes in
legislation, legal procedures, tre~ds in crime and disorder
e.g. police officers having to work a higher number of anti-
social hours in order to address a particular problem)
Policing is a publicly and legally accountable public service
and has no modern or historical remit to exist, or to organise
itself in defiance of lawful government, or public wishes.
(Critchley 1978)
8.4.44. It is argued that external stimuli created a growing pressure
to change police practices during the 1970s which
culminated in london with the Brixton disorders in 1981, and
resulted in the Scarman (1981) report. Thus, the situation
being faced during 1981 and 1982 by the police generally,
the Metropolitan Police in particular, and hence the N.P.
project team, is suggested to be characterised by the
following interrelated factors:
i. a growing environmental pressure on the police to be
more responsive to public wishes, needs and priorities,
ii. police organisations at this time exhibited
predominantly closed characteristics,
iii. the police culture and individuals were resistant to
change,
iv. the Brixton disorders and the Scarman reportzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.)
provided the 'trigger' for sudden major change.
8.4.45. Whilst the significance of the 'trigger' situation was
appreciated by the most senior decision makers of the
police, it is suggested that it was not appreciated by the
majority of operational officers and their managers who
largely considered that they could continue as before.
(Smith et al 1983)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.4.46. It is argued therefore that the implementation of the N.P.
project was undertaken against a culture characterised by a
substantial resistance to change at all, but the most senior
levels of the police service.
8.4.47. Irving et al (1989) does not tackle this proposition
specifically as an organisational cultural issue, but does
make reference to the very strong culture that existed at a
uniform operational (relief) level. (Paragraph 4.9.8,
Sections 5.6, 6.5,) Irving does however provide a number of
specific examples of both organisational and individual
resistance to the N.P. project that lend support to this
argument, Le.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"Senior officers at Scotland Yard gave it (N.P.)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa feint
blessing... ", (pg. 204) "...implementation of any
element of N.P.....(involved) ....selling the plan often
against fairly entrenched opposition..."(pg. 207)
8.4.48. It is concluded therefore that the methods of change
implementation for the N.P. project were not sufficiently
thorough and robust to overcome the widespread cultural
resistance. The need to change was not effectively
communicated by the most senior officers of tne Service,
with the result that intermediate levels of management could
argue they were unsure of what was required.
8.4.49. A small project team operating outside the principal line
management of such large organisations was unlikely to
influence such strongly entrenched cultures, without the
assertive and effective communication of senior and
intermediate level management support.
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8.5 N.P. Evaluations
8.5.1. Smith (1981 pg. 266) describes a concept of 'meta-
evaluation' as being anzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"e aluati of evaluations or
evaluators", undertaken in order to understand and improve
the practice of evaluations. He suggests a number of
methods for conducting such meta-evaluations ranging from
rigorous secondary data analysis studies, through to
comparatively informal and .unstructured methods, such as
public review and criticism.
8.5.2. It is intended here, to undertake a brief meta-evaluation
by means of a review of the evaluator's approaches, (Smith
1981) in the context of the N.P. project's aims and
methods. It will be argued that the methodologies of the N.P.
evaluators, whilst providing a degree of insight to the N.P.
treatments and behavioural hypotheses (Section 3.15), did
not address the overall N. P. system level factors. (Macro
evaluation concepts, Section 3.5 - 8)
8.5.3. It has been shown in Paragraph 8.2.5 that the N.P. project
attracted some recognition and acclaim for the integrative
and holistic properties of the policing system design. Yet it
is these attributes, that were not addressed by any of the
evaluations. (Section 8.3 and Figure 3.3) It will be argued
that this amounts to a partial explanation as to why many of
the N.P. treatments are now well established policing
practice despite the largely negative evaluationszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1 within the
N.P. experimental context.
8.5.4. The evaluation of wide ranging organisational change
projects such as N.P. will almost certainly present those
undertaking the assessments with problems and dilemmas.
Both Irving et al (1989) and Turner (1987) as the leading
independent evaluators, both make reference to a number
of problems and difficulties they encountered. Irving
1The exception being Brixton Division, Turner 1987[d), Beckett 1989.
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regularly criticises the lack of precision and definition of the
N.P. treatments, whilst Turner's major complaint is that N.P.
was a systematic and integrated project that did not allow
him and his team to isolate the effect of one treatment from
another.
8.5.5. Both the above examples amount to genuine and legitimate
difficulties for the N.P. evaluators to overcome. It is
suggested however that these difficulties are neither
original or unique. It is proposed that similar problems
would be encountered in evaluating any major
organisational change programme based upon systemic
and systematic principles.
8.5.6. It has been established that staff participation in
organisational change programmes is highly desirable if
high levels of resistance to the changes are to be avoided.
(Kirkpatrick 1985, Carnall 1990 et al)
8.5.7. Further, many writers have described the benefits of the
systems approaches to organisational change. (Beckhard
and Harris 1987, Porras 1987, Senge 1990 et al) It is
probable therefore that attempts to evaluate change
programmes that incorporate the foregoing principles will
encounter similar problems to those of the N.P evaluators.
8.5.8. This does not imply however, that organisational change
programmes should be altered to suite existing evaluation
methods or evaluators. Rather, it seems more appropriate
that evaluation methods should be devised that enable
such complex change programmes to be assessed
holistically. This being acknowledged as more
straightforward where there is a single overall unit of
measurement and straightforward success criteria. Such
measurement criteria being more common in commercial,
as opposed to police organisations i.e. measurement by
units of money with well defined success criteria, such aszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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profit levels, and other leading indicators of commercial
success e.g. return on capital, share growth and dividend.
8.5.9. In policing however, measurement and success criteria are
varied, imprecise and difficult to quantify, making the task
complicated for both manager and evaluator. (O.P.R.
1990) This difficulty is developed and illustrated at Figures
8.2 (i-iii) where the major organisational characteristics of
commercial and police organisations are compared.
8.5.10. It was argued at Section 7.5 that many of the incentives and
motivators available to commercial organisations when
implementing change are not similarly available to, or
feasible for use within police organisations. In making
distinctions between the characteristics of commercial and
police organisations, the tables at Figures 8.2 (i-iii) reinforce
this proposition, as well as illustrating the features of
similarity and contrast that are significant to evaluation of
change processes.
8.5.11. The tables are not intended to be exhaustive, either in
relation to organisational characteristics, or the suggested
contrasting features in each cell. In making generalisations
of this type, exceptions are likely that do not correspond to
either type of organisational profile. Similarly, there will be
commercial organisations that are very close to the police in
terms of many of the suggested characteristics. Conversely
there are characteristics of every police organisation that
are very distinct from the majority of commercial
organisations Le. purpose, values, resources.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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ORGANISATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICE
CHARACTERISTIC ORGANISATION· ORGANISATION
Mission is usually Mission is often
fixed and clear - set partially obscure and
Purpose internally by the variable - set by
owners and/or the government, the law
organisation itself and the public
Ambitious and Altruistic and
competitive may be non-competitive,
Values possessive and corporate ethics
acquisitive based on fairness,
integrity and truth
May be large or Comparatively large
small, growth may and generally stable,
Size often be a major with only marginal
goal and contraction expansion or
unavoidable contraction
May be formal or Invariably formal in
Formalisation informal in structure structure, hierarchy
of and culture - and culture - tends
activities mechanistic or towards mechanistic
organic in style and bureaucratic in
style
Primarily throtJgh
Multiple means, hierarchical
Co-ordination either formal and/or structures, with well
informal defined and
standardised
administrative and
operating procedures
Figure 8.2 (i) Comparative table of Police and Commercial
Organisational CharacteristicszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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ORGANISATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICE
CHARACTERISTIC ORGANISATION. ORGANISATION
Source Self promotion of Primarily legal, based
of knowledge, skills on common law, with
authority and expertise publicly recognised
expertise/experience
Always many,
May be few and specific and
Procedures general, unwritten formal, arising from
and rules and unspecified. procedural
May also be highly legislation, statutory
regulated regulations and need
for operational
consistency
Always required to
Openness to Usually adaptive cope with uncertainty
environmental to customers and reflect public
influences needs and market priorities, whilst
forces preserving ethical
values and relying on
precedent
May be tall or flat, Always tall,
Structure adaptive and hierarchical and
flexible virtually static
Volatile and Secure and career
adaptive, often with based, frequently
Management movement between within a single
competitors organisation -
dismissals and dismissals and
redundancies not redundancies
uncommon exceptional
Figure 8.2 (ii) Comparative table of Police and Commercial
Organisational Characteristics
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ORGANISATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICE
CHARACTERISTIC ORGANISATION· ORGANISATION
Multiple and diverse
Clarity of objective(s) objectives, with
Measurement and success criteria, unclear success
usually measured by criteria, measured by
units of money both quantitative and
qualitative indicators
Assets publicly or Always publicly
privately owned, owned, cannot
Resources capital may be benefit from sale of
invested and assets, may not
borrowed, assets borrow or invest
sold or acquired capital
To owner(s), To the public,
Accountability shareholders or the law and
partners the government
All activities Many activities
Differentiation eventually contributing to
of contributing to single diverse
activities goal - may involve goals, but risk
some risk as to aversive at
outcome organisational level
May be confined to Always twenty-four
a single location hours, every day,
during a throughout multiple
Operation conventional working locations - operations
week and/or multiple frequently outside
timesllocations - management control
operations controlled and determined by
by management reactions to events
Figure 8.2zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(iii) C mparative Table of Police and Commercial
Organisational Characteristics
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8.5.12.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt may be argued that if N.P. had been specified in the
degree of detail that Irving would have preferred, then it is
probable there would have been ~ittle opportunity to reflect
local staff preferences and variations into the scheme. It
being a fundamental principal of N.P. that local policing
should reflect local needs. (Section 2.8). Therefore
adherence to one of the fundamental principles of the
project, created a problem for the evaluators, in that it is
difficult to assess the effectiveness of any change if the aim
is not specified in sufficient detail at the outset.
8.5.13. Variations that occur during the development of changes at
a local level may alter the target, and thus the outcome of
the change. If the evaluation process does not recognise
and take account of such dynamics, then it is possible that
the change will be reported as unsuccessful, in that it did not
meet the original aim. The temptation it seems, is for the
evaluators to concentrate upon the process towards the
specified change, rather than the outcome of the change
itself.
8.5.14. This may be illustrated in the N.P. project by reference to
the establishing of a system of geographic assignments for
officers. The precise method of achieving such a system
was not specified, although various models were supplied
by the project team. The N.P. evaluators and Turner (1987)
in particular consider this change to be an aim, or end, in
itself. Whereas the N.P. authors clearly state that police
geographic assignments are the means by which greater
community contact might be achieved. The method for
doing so, being less significant, and obviating the need and
the desirability for detailed specification.
8.5.15. Likewise, Turner's complains, that it was not possible to
isolate and assesses the effect of the N.P. treatments with
the degree of rigour he would have preferred, was due to
the integrated nature of the N.P. system. Again, this feature
was a fundamental principle of the N.P. project, in that each
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of the treatments were associated together in such a way
that benefits would accrue through the integration and the
harmonisation of the N.P. sub-systems. (Section 2.16)
8.5.16. If the N.P. system had been re-designed and altered in order
to relieve these two major difficulties for the evaluators, it is
argued that the systematic characteristics of the project
would have been lost. At minimum, the project would have
been changed so significantly, that the projected benefits of
N.P. would not have been achievable as originally
suggested
8.5.17. In such an event, N.P. would have consisted of a set of
detailed specifications of 'best practice', defined by
individuals who were not responsible or accountable for the
operations or outcomes of the treatments. Implementation of
the 'best practice' would then have implied a sequence of
changes, separated through time, or test location, in order
that each change could be independent of every other for
evaluation purposes.
8.5.18. By such means the evaluators problems might have been
addressed in part through the project design. However, as
shown at Chapter Three, there are considerable difficulties
associated with holding a control site independent and free
of the confounding effects of normal organisational
dynamics. Turner's (1978[a] pg. 31) suggestion thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...control sites should invariably be used for comparison"
indicates that he considers the process of evaluation"to be
more significant than the process of making effective
changes. This conclusion being determined after the earlier
N.P. experience of attempting such an evaluation model
(Section 3.2)
8.5.19. The view expressed by Turner (ibid.) on the nature of
evaluations and the associated constrained view of
organisational development (Section 4.15) coincides with
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Easterby -Smith's (1994) categorisation of assumptions
made by evaluators.
8.5.20. Easterby-Smith (1994) draws a distinction between two
types of approaches by evaluators:
i. thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"agency view", oncentrates on individual
members of the organisation achieving their aims and
aspirations for change; the considered view of these
evaluators is that in order to achieve change in social
systems, it is necessary to dismantle existing social
and organisational structures and create new systems,
ii. the "determinism view", in contrast, is the position
adopted by those whose assumed wish is to preserve
the status quo - i.e. what takes place in organisations
is largely determined beforehand and is constrained by
roles, hierarchies and structures
8.5.21. This distinction is significant to the N.P. evaluation process
as Easterby-Smith (ibid.) associates determinism with a
consensus view of an organisation's decision making. Thus,
it might be rational to assume that if an evaluation is seen
as being of high technical quality, then it is more likely to be
adopted and used. Whereas a conflict view of the
organisation, based on individuals endeavouring to organise
and progress change, (the agency view) would see
evaluations as a part of an ongoing political process within
the organisation or community in question. Easterby-Smith
(ibid.) suggests that this is because evaluations are largely
about generating or re-generating information and it is likely
that as a part of the ongoing political process of the
organisation, that evaluations will be "...dragged into the
political arena..." (pg. 114) despite it seems, their technical
quality!zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.5.22. Easterby-Smith qualifies these views in that the technical
quality of an evaluation is invariably important to all
evaluations. He asserts that being able to demonstrate that azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...reasonably technical job ..." has been achieved, is an
important political advantage, in order to ensure others take
notice of the evaluation. It is not unreasonable therefore to
suggest the opposite might also apply. If the evaluation is
perceived as not being a "...reasonably technical job ...",
then it becomes difficult for it to achieve recognition within
the organisation.
8.5.23. Easterby-Smith (1994 pg. 117) suggests that if evaluations
are to be taken seriously within organisations then it is
necessary to be aware of how decision makers customarily
receive their information. He suggests three categories:
i.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAscientific form - written reports with quantitative
performance indicators and statistical detail,
ii. bureaucratic form - written reports with less reliance
on substantiating claims with evidence, but rather
demonstrating that the information has come from a
perceived correct and legitimate source,
iii. anecdotal form - reports that are not normally written
and formal, but rather a part of the natural conversation
exchanges between members of the organisation and
which address, or reinforce, a particular point of ~iew
through enlightening (and "boratic"; accounts of
experiences.
8.5.24. Thus, solutions to evaluators' problems involving the
adoption of evaluator's suggestions, raise the further
dilemma for decision makers, of how far an evaluator should
become involved in the process that is being evaluated?
This particular issue was described as a difficulty by Irving
et al (1989) and may well have arisen through the close
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proximity between evaluators, the project team and
divisional officers at the test locations.
8.5.25. It is suggested that the evaluators had not understood the
way in which evaluation information would be accepted and
used within the organisation as suggested above. If they
had wished to have their work noticed and acted upon, then
presumably they would shape and target their reports by
one or more of the above means.
8.5.26. In the case of N.P., the evaluators did not construct their
work on this basis, or on the basis of skills that would
address the features of N.P. that were considered most
significant to the organisation. Rather the evaluations were
designed and progressed on the bases of the practical and
intellectual skills available to the evaluation teams.
8.5.27. Even in a large and comparatively well resourced
organisation such as the Metropolitan Police Service, the
economic reality of having to adapt existing resources to
problems is a common occurrence. No criticism is
therefore implied, but the proposition is made that an
evaluation of a project such as N.P. will almost invariably
reflect the skills of the evaluators and the implicit
assumptions they make about the nature of change in social
systems and organisations. (Easterby-Smith 1994)
8.5.28. This proposition is especially evident from the work of
Turner (1987 [a-d]) who's previous employment was with
the Government's Treasury and who reflects a strong cost
consciousness throughout his evaluations. A factor that was
not addressed by the authors of N.P. in other than in the
conceptual sense of organisational efficiency and
effectiveness. (Section 3.9)
8.5.29. During the N.P. project, the evaluators needed to work
closely alongside the project team and divisional officers to
gain the trust of their subjects in order to gather data. The
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socialisation of the evaluators into the policing cultures,
whilst allowing them to undertake their studies, also
inextricably involved them with the project.
8.5.30. The evaluators were therefore very aware of the features of
evaluations that would attract attention within police
organisations and be seen as legitimate. A dilemma was
thus presented for the evaluators as to whether and how
they should intervene when the programme being
evaluated, provided negative indications. (Irving et al 1989)
8.5.31. An additional dilemma was also presented in that if they
decide to intervene and seek an alteration to the project ,
how should negative assessments be introduced to the
organisation without running the risk of having further
assessments rejected?
8.5.32. It may be argued to be unethical for evaluators of socially
significant systems i.e. policing, education, health care, to
remain wholly independent and silent, when the evaluations
of such systems are giving negative indications. Bluntly, the
outcome of such an evaluation, would be analogous to
claiming a surgical operation to be successful when the
patient did not recover!
8.5.33. Easterby-Smith (1994) however, demonstrates how such
interventions in similar organisational situations could be
inappropriate. He argues from the basis that there is a
fundamental problem in trying to deduce actions for the
future, based only on knowledge of what has taken place.
Such as the information that would normally be available to
evaluators from a current study. Easterby-SmithzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.)
quotes Patton; (1978 and 1981) that creative thinking is the
only way to bridge the crucial gap between knowledge and
action.
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8.5.34. On this basis it is argued that it is inappropriate for
evaluators to seek to intervene in the direction of change
programmes unless there are maier public safety or ethical
issues at stake. It is also argued that it is equally
inappropriate on the basis of this rationale for evaluators to
assess the creative thinking that produces the momentum for
change by recourse to inappropriate methodologies and
arguably invalid measures.
8.5.35. For instance, the police attitude data gathered by Irving and
TurnerzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) that indicates some of the N.P. treatments
were not welcomed by operational officers. This might have
been an expected outcome, given knowledge of the police
culture in relation to change. (Chapter Four and Section 5.6)
It is suggested that this evaluation result does not indicate or
support the assertion that the changes were either
inappropriate or unnecessary as the evaluation methods
used are argued to be largely invalid. Again, bluntly, the
situation is analogous to using a thermometer to measure
distance!
8.5.36. In the case of the N.P. project it is argued that the lengthy
and expensive evaluations (Irving et al 1989, Turner 1987
[a-d]) together with the evaluators' recommendations were
largely ignored by both the Metropolitan and Surrey Police
for the following reasons, derived from the preceding meta-
evaluation:
i. The methodologies (scientific in style) did not conform
to the customary means by which the most senior
officers of the police service receive their information,
(bureaucratic and anecdotal in style)
ii. The major attraction of N.P. to the senior decision
makers was the integrative and holistic approach to
policing. (Irving et al 1989) The systematic features
and suggested potential benefits of this approach were
not addressed by the evaluators, other than by
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negative critique of systems
methodologies. (Easterby-Smith
and integrative
1994 pg. 124)
suggests that if evaluators are unable to convince
people that:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"...there is something wrong with the present state
and make positive suggestions as to how to get
started with change, there is unlikely to be much
consequence resulting from their efforts. ")
iii. The evaluations relied upon methodologies in which
the evaluators were skilled, rather than those that
would have been most appropriate for a project such
as N.P. Irving et al (1989) adopted a sociological,
attitudinal and behavioural approach, based
principally on limited observational and questionnaire
data. In contrast Turner (1987 [a-e]) adopted a
reductionist approach which sought to assess and
compare the benefits of each of individual N.P.
treatments at each test site by questionnaire, reported
crime and cosUbenefit data "...without the benefit of any
personal field experience..." and with "... a certain
amount of personal judgement ..."
(Turner 1987 [a] pg. 29)
8.5.37. In concluding his assessment of evaluation methods and
politics, Easterby-Smith (1994) supports the conclusions of
this review of the N.P. evaluations. He found that where the
more traditional, experimental research evaluation methods
were adopted, such as those used for N.P., the findings
were invariably equivocal or negative.
8.5.38. Easterby-Smith (1994) argues that such interventionist
styles of evaluation are generally not welcome at policy
making levels. He suggests they are likely to have little
value there, because the scale of policy decisions are
beyond the scope of most evaluators. Precisely so; the N.P.
evaluation experience has been shown to have focused on
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issues and features of N.P. that were almost wholly
subordinate to the organisation's need to implement an
accountable and pro-active policing style as envisaged by
Scarman (1981) and others.
8.6 The Systems Approach to N.P.
8.6.1. The genesis of N.P. has been described in Chapter Two
and it is not necessary to re-visit the decision to adopt
Checkland's (1972) methodology for 'real world problem
solving'. It was clear to the authors of N.P., and it seems to
others, that the more conventional, reductionist approaches
to organisational development were not successful in the
policing context. (Sections 2.20 and Paragraphs 8.5.6-7)
8.6.2. It has been shown that the integrative and holistic approach
of N.P. was seen as a strength by the authors and a
weakness by the evaluators.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.) A number of decision
makers and observers were clearly attracted to the overall,
co-ordinated design of the policing system, as well as to
some of the central treatments, i.e. geographic responsibility,
alignment of duties to demands. (Paragraphs 2.20.9, 8.3.22)
8.6.3. There are therefore two outstanding questions for this
research related to the adoption of systems methodologies
and techniques.
i. Whether the systems approach in total or part
accounted for what has been described as largely
unsuccessful by the external evaluators? (Turner
1987 [a], Irving et a11989)
ii. Whether in the light of the N.P. results, systems
thinking and the associated methodologies remain an
appropriate approach for the analysis and design of
policing systems?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.6.4. The open system concept (Section 2.16, Figure 3.1) applied
to police organisations is discussed by Irving et al (1989,
pg. 191) who argues that the concept iszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAH••• attractive from a
theoretical point of view, but hardly represents the political,
psychological or sociological reality. "
8.6.5. Despite his condemnation of the approach, Irving uses the
open system concept in order to challenge the
appropriateness of adopting a systems approach for the
design of policing systems. He describes the issue of the
balance of power between police and the community as
evidence of this. The thrust of this criticism being that the
N.P. thesis did not address the question of a balance of
power between the policing environment and the policing
system. He saw N.P. as increasing the influence of police
to run strongly out from the police system, to the human
environment, but that influence not being reciprocated by
the community.
8.6.6. Irving et al (1989) specifies a number of police
organisational characteristics in support of this argument in
order to show, that in systems terminology, policing
organisations tend towards a 'closed' organisation model,
viz.
i. a strong police culture that influences police behaviour
ii. high levels of practical autonomy for senior officers,
iii. the police disciplinary and complaints system' being
handled by police themselves,
iv. the limited power of community representatives and
agencies to obtain changes in police operational
behaviour.
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8.6.7. This was precisely the situation that N.P. sought to correct
by implementing treatments that altered the organisational
conceptual model from a 'closed', to a more 'open' style.
(Section 5.2)
8.6.8. Irving's argument however, seems to have little relevance to
a critique of a systems approach, the 'open/closed'
organisation model, or systems methodology. Rather the
argument has much to do with personal and political views,
regarding the influence and accountability of police in the
community.
8.6.9. Due to the inclusion of the personal views and values, that
when written were high on the national political agenda, it is
not possible to precisely determine whether Irving et al
(1989) accept or reject the fundamental systems
proposltions of N.P. (Chapters Two and Three)The fact that
Irving's evaluation is not a purely technical account would
not be regarded as surprising by Easterby-Smith (1994)
who comments "...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAho value laden is most evaluation
practice." (pg. 166)
8.6.10. Similarly, Turner (1987 [a-e] does not directly address the
N.P. systems propositions. Criticisms are however made that
imply a general dissatisfaction with the holistic approaches
for organisational change. In summary these are as follows:
"Implementation of so many separate elements of
change at the same time is impracticable." (ibid. pg.
30)
"Even if it had been practicable, proper evaluation of
them would have been impossible , because no
satisfactory comparison can be made when more than
one change is made atzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa time." (ibid. p . 30)
"Experiments should be severely limited in their
individual scope. In general no more than one aspect
should be changed at anyone place at anyone time,
and the extent of the change should be modest and
taken in steps if necessary." (ibid. pg. 31)
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HA joint trial of elements should only be attempted when
the effects of each individually are known." (ibid.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBApg.
31)
8.6.11. It may be inferred for the foregoing that Turner rejected
holistic concepts for experimental systems and
organisational change projects. Clearly and understandably
for him, the technical quality of the evaluations was more
significant than achieving improvements in policing.
However what is surprising, is that in arguing that each of
the N.P. treatments should have been tested individually,
Turner asserts that;
"Most of the elements can be expected to have onlyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa
very small (if any) impact themselves on the state of
crime, or the views of the general public." (ibid. pg. 30)
8.6.12. Exactly so, precisely the reason it was originally argued that
a systematic, co-ordinated and integrated design was
necessary in order to achieve worthwhile improvements. It
was suggested that the overall benefits of such a design
would accumulate and be greater than the sum of the
benefits of the individual parts. Additionally the integrated
design would negate many of the inter-group and inter-
personal conflicts likely in an uncoordinated system. (Hart
1981)
8.6.13. The arguments advanced by Irving (ibid.) in respect of REF
(ii) above are clear. He asserts that the representation of
complex individual and group processes by the use of
systems analysis techniques, flow charts and diagrams is
inappropriate where the theories and relationships being
presented, are in themselves, only probabilistic. He argues
that the use of such devices adds a deterministic value to
the relationships on the basis that systems analysis is
H••• primarily used for tackling mathematically determinate
relations between variables" (ibid. pg. 188)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.6.14. In seeking to manage the acknowledged complexity of such
situations and relationships, Irving adds that such
techniques lend an inappropriate, concrete and graphical
representation to such complexity. This he argues was a
particular weakness of the systematic N.P. approach that
synthesised a number of many disparate theories into a
single metatheory. The weaknesses in individual
probabilistic theories were thus compounded by graphical
systems analysis techniques in order to present the
concepts to non scientific audiences.
8.6.15. Although Irving does not suggest that there was any deceit
involved or intended by such representations, he does imply
that non scientific (police) decision makers, were
persuaded by such techniques. The underlying implication
being that senior police officers did not understand the
intricacies of the psycho-social factors and theories
involved, but that these were made understandable by the
use of charting and similar techniques. Irving's difficulty
seems to lie in what was seen as predictive qualities of such
devices, (Le. in a transitive relationship if a ~ b, b ~ c, then
a ~ c) where such logic was applied to complex
behavioural phenomena, such as modelling pro social
behaviour by police officers.
8.6.16. It is argued here that the techniques adopted for the N.P.
analysis and design conformed to the rules and principles
specified by Checkland. (1979 in Flood and Carson 1993) It
is accepted that such diagrams are a powerful and
persuasive means of visualising complexity. However, it
does seem probable that individuals, informed or otherwise,
will draw conclusions and make assumptions on the basis of
what is seen in the device. It seems this is likely to occur
despite explanations of the limitations of such models
(Flood and Carson 1993)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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8.6.17. In the case of N.P. it is acknowledged by Irving et al (1989
pg. 188) that a warning of the limitations of the models was
provided, "zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthe systems model. is not a description of
reality...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAit iszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa vehicle for structuring the many and various
elements and relationships in a complex system." (Hart
1981)
8.6.18. It is argued that the real difficulty was that the problem
situation being analysed and presented, involved complex
psychological and behavioural phenomena that had
traditionally only been studied by specialists working to
conventional social science methodologies. Such
methodologies had sought to reduce the variables in
human activity systems and human behaviour, to precisely
defined and thus scientifically testable definitions.
8.6.19. N.P. inter alia, attempted to synthesise behaviours and
incorporate predicted outcomes into a systematic design of
police operations. Such an approach whilst attractive in
some respects to social scientists, arguably presents
insurmountable difficulties for existing social science
methodologies and evaluations.
8.6.20. The synthesis and aggregation of systems processes, Irving
argues, leads to "fuzzy concepts" that arise from the
development of such metatheories. It might be seen as
inevitable however, that traditional social scientists would
find such an approach inappropriate. It is argued here
though, that 'fuzziness' in the sense used by Irving, is a
metaphor for complexity, which is a significant attribute of
many social, and human activity systems, (Flood and Carson
1993), policing being no exception.
8.6.21. Checkland and Scholes (1990) in suggesting a model for
social systems analysis conclude that the account of a
social system described by the model can never be complete
or static. It is evident that social and human systems in the
organisational context are continually altering as they are
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living, dynamic and continually interacting with each other
and their environment.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is argued th t this complexity is
inevitable and for the purposes. of police organisational
development should be tackled holistically. To reduce the
human factors in policing systems to a set of precisely
defined, individually testable behaviours would be to
misunderstand the nature of policing. (Sections 2.2-6)
8.6.22. It is suggested that there is nothing within the N.P. external
evaluator's assessments of the project that presents any
serious threat to the appropriateness of the systems
approach.
8.6.23. A number of relevant arguments have been advanced by the
evaluators as to why the approach may have been weak,
incomplete or potentially misleading. These criticisms
however, are more criticisms of the application and work of
the N.P. authors, rather than the identification of inherent
weaknesses or failures of the systems approaches. It is
argued therefore that there was nothing within the systems
approach to N.P. that would indicate the inappropriateness
of the methodologies for analysing and designing changes
to policing systems.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
8.7 Summary of Findings
8.7.1. The five categories of suggested explanations of the
outcomes of the N.P. project have been discussed above
and may be summarised as follows:
i. N.P. Systems Analysis - has been argued as being an
accurate and appropriate representation of the problem
situation and external change stimuli that N.P. sought
to address. (Section 8.2)
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ii. N.P. Systems Design - has been argued to be
appropriate as a 'designed system' (Checkland 1981)
and directed at relevant change targets, having the
potential for improving the police problem situation.
(Section 8.3)
iii. N.P. Systems Implementation - has been shown to
be inadequate in a number of significant respects in
the light of the knowledge of high levels of individual
and cultural resistance to change within police
organisations. (Section 8.4)
iv. N.P. Evaluations - have been shown as not having
addressed the significant holistic and integrative
features of N.P., or the change dynamics within police
organisations. Thus it is concluded that the evaluations
have not fully and reliably represented the outcomes of
the N.P. trials. (Section 8.5)
v. N.P. Systems Approach - there no evidence to
emerge from the N.P. project that weakens the original
assertions (Section 2.16) that systems thinking and
approaches offer the best opportunities for improving
the design and performance of policing organisations.
(Section 8.6)
8.8 Overall Conclusions
8.8.1. It is undoubtedly the case, that N.P. was evaluated by
individuals who were not police officers and who viewed
policing systems from a conventional social science
background. This approach contrasts with the design and
development of N.P., having been undertaken by practising
police officers, taking a systemic approach to the design of
an operational policing system.
376
8.8.2. It is suggested therefore that in such a complex human
activity system as policing, it is unlikely that there would be
high levels of agreement as ~o approach, design or
outcomes from these two perspectives. (Easterby-Smith
1994)
8.8.3. It is equally arguable that in complex human activity systems
of this type, a full understanding and explanation of the
dynamics of routine operations and the dynamics of change
(Sections 6.10 -11) will never be fully understood. Thus
making a reductionist approach to evaluations even more
inappropriate. Flood and Carson (1993 pg. 33) suggest thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"Complexity does not exist solely in things to be observed..."
"Human actors have reasons, or intentions that lie behind
each action....Observation is not enough to properly
appreciate human actions."
8.8.4. This argument is developed (ibid.) and it is suggested that
human actions can only be understood in the context of the
existing set of social rules and practices that aid
understanding of human action. In other words, even
accurate observation of behaviour is insufficient, some
understanding of the context of the actions is necessary.
8.8.5. This argument may be extended in the context of
organisations with strong internal cultures, such as police
organisations. It has been suggested how such strong
internal cultures might be perpetuated. (Figure 5.4) It is
concluded here that internalisation of such strong cultural
behaviours can amount in themselves to a set of
organisational rules which need to be understood before the
actions of individuals within the cultural system might be
understood, as suggested by Flood and Carson (1993)
8.8.6. The implication of this conclusion for change to policing
systems is that the behaviour of police staff needs to be
understood at the overall police system level and in the
context of the police culture. Thus, there are few change
377
targets within policing systems that will not effect the
cultural sub-system in someway.
8.8.7. It has been shown (Sections 5.6 and 6.6) that change to
cultural sub-systems is likely to be met with resistance and
may take a considerable time. Therefore the methods of the
change implementation in police systems need to reflect this
difficulty, to a much greater extent than a mere
acknowledgement of the problem.
8.8.8. The N.P. experience has established that a number of
principles of change management are particularly significant
to the implementation of change in policing systems, as
follows:
i. effective internal and external communications,
ii. senior and intermediate management support,
iii. effective change leadership,
iv. change implementation co-ordinated simultaneously
across all change targets,
v. using a combination of coercive and participative
approaches to change.
vi. establishing internal teams to manage change,
8.8.9. Each of the foregoing principles is summarised below in the
context of the findings of this research:
i.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommunication an effective means of
communicating both the vision, need and the nature of
the changes foreseen, is an essential feature of the
change process. (Beckhard and Harris 1987) External
communications become significant as the police
system increases in 'openness' and the need tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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exchange information about changes necessary to
improve outputs becomes relevant. These aspects of
the change process have be!3nshown to be especially
significant within policing systems and largely absent
from the N.P. trials.
ii.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAManagement Support - a willingness to change by
senior management cannot be assumed to consistent
with the views of individuals at operational or
intermediate levels. The active support of senior and
intermediate managers is essential to satisfactory
change (Tyson and Jackson 1992) .
iii. Leadership - has been shown as necessary in order to
overcome the high levels of uncertainty likely to
accompany major change. The principles of effective
change leadership (Bass 1990) should be applied to
individuals and groups experiencing difficulty with
practising new procedures and working within
unfamiliar circumstances. Effective leadership will
reduce confusion, improve individual's levels of
confidence and self esteem, thus improving work
performance. (Sections 6.9 -10)
iv. Change Targets - in recognising the difficulty of
changing organisational culture, it is suggested that to
be successful, change must effect each of the
associated change targets simultaneously (section
5.5), if long term evolutionary change is considered as
too slow for the needs of the organisation. For
instance, appropriate management support and
effective communication must be swiftly followed by
changes to structures that are seen as reinforcing the
naturezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof the change. Such changes must then be
aligned with the necessary alterations to systems and
procedures that actually produce the altered style of
output. It has been shown that reliance on a single
approach to ~ change implementation is likely to be
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unsuccessful in a strong anti-culture. (Paragraph
8.4.11)
v. CoercivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAand Participative Change - the above
conclusion leads to the proposition that a combination
of an initial coercive change, succeeded by more
participative approaches to further changes, is likely to
be appropriate where a strong culture existszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(ibid.). It
has been shown that unless the organisational culture
can be altered sufficiently quickly, the culture may
become a powerful force in resisting further attempts
at change. It is unlikely that a participative approach to
change would be successful in negotiating major,
fundamental changes, perceived as deeply affecting
cultural norms. As many of the inducements and
motivators available to commercial organisations are
not available to police (Section 7.5 and Figure 8.2), it
is concluded that coercive change is necessary to
quickly tackle resistant cultural issues. Such an
approach should be followed with a more
participative style to address associated detailed
changes.
vi. Change Teams - it has been argued that major change
to policing systems is an inherently complex process. It
is suggested as highly unlikely that the requisite skills
detailed here for the management of the change
processes will be available in a single individual or
focused to a single individual by a hierarchical
structure. Rather, the necessary complementary skills
.
and experience might be incorporated in the concept of
a 'change team' or 'task force' (Pedler et al 1991)
which is suggested as appropriate within police
systems. Multiple changes within different functions
and locations might be achieved by establishing a
'network of teams' as suggested by Katzenbach and
Smith (1993)
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8.8.10. This research has demonstrated that in order for major
change to be effective within police organisations, a systems
approach to both the changes themselves and the change
process is necessary. Minor incremental alterations to
procedures that are reliant upon single implementation
methods are unlikely to produce significant benefits in the
strong work culture of policing.
8.8.11. Neighbourhood Policing survived as a systems concept in
both the Metropolitan and Surrey Police despite the
experience of the experimental trials. Both organisations
refined and adapted the original ideas, changing the name
to 'sector' and 'area' policing respectively, but retaining all
the fundamental principals set out in the original thesis.
(Hart 1981, Beckett 1981, Chapter Two)
8.8.12. 'Sector policing' features as a priority for the Metropolitan
Police corporate strategy (M.P.S. 1994 [b]) and area policing
is now a well established feature of the approach to police
service delivery throughout the County. (Chief Constable of
Surrey 1993)
8.8.13. The final quotation comes from the Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police, but it is appropriate to record that both
the offices of the Chief Constable of Surrey and the
Commissioner have consistently sustained and supported
the N.P. concept:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"The completion of the change to sector policing during
1993 resulted in closer community contact and better
alignment of resources to demand across all divisions.
Divisions compared the patterns of calls for assistance
from members of the public and the number of officers
performing street duty, resulting in an improvement in
the availability of officers to meet demands. More
flexible shift patterns, minimum staffing levels and
proactive sector initiatives have all combined to
improve performance on visible street duty." (M.P.S.
1994 [a] pg. 8)
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APPENDIX 'A'
Appendix 'A' to Chapter Four (Paragraph 4.1.5) provides examples
of various charts used by the N.P. project team to illustrate and
explain the systematic features of the N.P. project and its
implementation. The charts were designed in varying levels of detail
depending upon the subject and purpose. The original documents
were produced on translucent drawing paper for reproduction in
display size. The copies reproduced here are significantly reduced in
size from the originals.
Appendix A1 to A5
Appendix A6
Appendix A7
Appendix AS
AppendixA9
Appendix A10 to A12
A sectionalised copy of the
PERT chart developed for the
sequential implementation of all
elements of the N.P. project
over a one year period
An implementation bar chart of
the overall NP project showing
the various project stages at
each test site.
An example of an
implementation sequence chart
for a specific test site showing
precise implementation and
activity dates.
An example of an outline
implementation sequence for a
specific project treatment.
Box and Arrow diagram used to
explain relationships between
project elements at test sites.
Examples of flow charts used
as visual representations of
project elements for training and
presentation purposes at test
sites.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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NETWORK OF ElEMENTS SHOWING NECESSARY LINKS
(Meaning of arrows: 'a' is necessary for ...·b· )
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INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATION MODEL
Sictor Planalag/MoaUerlng ProcesszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt
-;;hlghllgbts particullr problem. ....~---,
Wll~ tbl IIslstaacl 01 tbe D.I.I.U.
'lde.tlIy III -Ageaclls wblcb bavl
la Interest II tb. problill.
Is tbe scali 01 the problem anlt
its solution;-
DIVISIONAL SECTORJ.
.!. ...
Refer to Divisionll Management
TealD lor discussion.
Identify appropriate level 01
consultation within identified'
Agency •
••
Does relevant Agency agree to
a joint approach.
al HO bl YES
In association witb relevant
Agency develop strategy to deal
with identified problem •
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Plan agreed.
al NO bl YES
Implement Plan
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Evaluate results
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